

THE BULLETIN OF THE MENNINGER CLINIC

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BULLETIN of the MENNINGER CLINIC Topeka, Kansas

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TEN REVELATIONS OR ACHIEVEMENTS

HARLOW SHAPLEY, PH.D.

Incited by the currently hyperbolic expansion of human knowledge, I first examine briefly what of importance have we done in the past half century, and then venture some predictions for the next decade or two. I shall first call attention to ten revelations or achievements that seem to have most affected man's life and thinking. All are important. The first two and the last two are worthy of special comments. Here are the ten by title:

1. Sputnikery
2. Galaxies and the Expanding Universe
3. Relativity Theories
4. Cosmic Evolution—the new revelations that everything evolves—
biological, atomic, celestial.
5. Transistors, Lasers, and Other Minutiae of the subatomic world.
6. Cybernetics and Computers, and the new knowledge of how to
think.
7. DNA and Chromosomes (genetics)
8. The Origin of Life—from Inanimate to Animate
9. Medicinal Triumphs (polio, tuberculosis, diptheria, and many
others)
10. Freudian Exploration of the Human Mind

Those are my ten Revelations that have brought us two-thirds of the way through the twentieth century. Further advances will be made in all fields, but most sensationally for the first two (Sputniks and Galaxies), and the last two (Medicine and Brains). A few words on each of them:



The field of astronomy was represented for the first time by a Sloan Visiting Professor in the Menninger School of Psychiatry when the distinguished Dr. Harlow Shapley of Harvard University arrived on December 5, 1965 for a two-week appointment as the 34th Sloan Professor.

1. *Sputnik* was inevitable when the German war-makers lobbed their first missiles across the English Channel. That led directly to fission of uranium and fusion of hydrogen. Goddard soon became recognized as an Epoch Maker. The moon became a challenge and a goal. We are drifting into a desperate age—desperate, dangerous, exciting—where we hunt through local space for numerous dwarf stars, and for Jupiters and Saturns on the loose.
2. *Galaxies*. Our philosophies and religions are in the near future going to wake up to knowledge that we can no longer accept a one-planet Deity. In the solar system, I further predict, we shall find bodies as yet unsuspected. We shall find some baffling conditions that may make necessary a revision of our belief as to what matter is and what motion can do.
9. *Medicinal Researches*, carried forward with the blessing and cash of the national governments, will make it unpopular, perhaps illegal, to have any standard ailment. Words like tuberculosis, hard arteries, yellow fever, cholera, and the like, will be obsolete, at the bottom of the dictionary's page; and at least some forms of cancer will be outlawed. The normal life span will be 100 years. (All this if the Hydrogen Atom is under control.)
10. And finally I call attention to the future discovery of how to use the half-used *human brain*. I have long expected that some genius among us would discover and write the equations for producing thought. We are yet so primitive! We are excelled in so many ways by so many animals and plants. We have but one natural sense organ to keep us in touch with the Cosmos—hearing, feeling, smelling, tasting are all useless in dealing with a World in the Making. Sight alone helps us. Out in the Milky Way where there are billions of stars, there are probably richer planetary systems than ours, more powerful sense organs. There are probably sentient beings throughout the Milky Way, but probably not many with interest in this Ambitious Symposium on Worlds in the Making.

DR. HARLOW SHAPLEY



Doctor Shapley is more than an astronomer. He is a philosopher of tremendous vision, based on the knowledge and discoveries of his life's work. And, finally, he is a speaker and a writer whom the layman as well as the scientist can understand.

Dr. Shapley was born in Nashville, Missouri, and educated at Carthage Academy, the University of Missouri, and at Princeton University. Doctor

Shapley states that in his youth he was a police reporter on the *Chanute Daily Sun* and a few months ago visited Kansas, keeping in touch with the source of early inspirations. From 1914 to 1921 he was on the staff of the Mount Wilson Observatory, Pasadena, California, and from 1921 to 1952 was Director of the Harvard College Observatory, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Since 1952 he has been Lecturer on Cosmography at Harvard University.

Honorary degrees have been awarded Doctor Shapley by seventeen universities, including those of Delhi, Honolulu, Mexico, Ireland, Toronto, Copenhagen, Princeton and Harvard. He has been made Honorary Foreign Member of the national academies of ten foreign countries, and has been awarded medals and prizes by the Vatican, India, Mexico, England, France, etc. Among his publications are half a dozen books and more than 450 scientific articles.

While he was here, Doctor Shapley gave two lectures which were attended by overflow audiences. They were:

1. *Galaxies and Mankind* (December 8, 1965)

Doctor Shapley reported on the researches, mostly his own, which "led to new methods of measuring great stellar distances, and those measures led to the discovery that the Copernican Heliocentric theory must be abandoned; we are far from the center of the Milky Way. Our sampling of space has shown that there are at least ten billion galaxies like our own in the measurable universe, and on the average a galaxy has more than ten billion stars and numberless planets."

2. *Religion in an Age of Science* (December 15, 1965)

Doctor Shapley showed the bearing of the galaxies on philosophy and religion and presented the Ten Revelations or Achievements that have this century changed man's life and thought.

The Editors

DIFFICULTIES IN LEARNING—A TALK TO TEACHERS*

PAUL W. PRUYSER, PH.D.†

More than a century before Freud published his *Interpretation of Dreams*, which provided the key to an understanding of unconscious mental processes and introduced the important notion of intrapsychic conflict, the poet Schiller wrote a series of pedagogical essays,¹ in the form of letters, from which I quote the following paragraph:

"Man can be his own enemy in two ways: either as a primitive, when his feelings reign over his principles; or as a barbarian, when his principles disturb his feelings. The primitive despises art and acknowledges nature as his unlimited master; the barbarian mocks and disgraces nature, but more despicable than the primitive he often enough proceeds to enslave himself to his slave. The educated man befriends nature and honors her freedom by merely controlling her capriciousness."

I think this paragraph forms a suitable preamble to discussions about difficulties in learning. It contains the nucleus of a philosophy of education attuned to the modern emphasis on man as his own enemy, which has proven to be so much more realistic and fruitful than the timid or tender-minded notions of man as victimized by nature, culture, bad parents, neglect or fateful circumstances, all of which impinge upon him from the outside. It is an early and forceful correction of Rousseau's mistaken idea of the noble savage. It anticipates the existential idea that the individual is not one, but many: angel and beast, freeman and slave, primitive and sophisticate.

Schiller's statement also contains some interesting psychological premises by alluding to the importance of motives and feelings, the role of attitude, the idea of control and regulation, and the categories of freedom and power. Moreover, it introduces implicitly the deepest rationale for all pedagogical activity: that without education man is reduced to primitivity and barbarism. In the face of these two gruesome alternatives, education is a completely self-justifying enterprise, hardly in need of further buttressing by utilitarian, moral, religious, political or perfectionistic considerations.

* Presented at a Colloquium, Conference of Internationally-Minded Schools, Englewood, Colorado, August 2, 1965.

† Director, Department of Education, The Menninger Foundation.

Put in a nutshell, if the primary goal of education is to elevate man beyond his primitivity and barbarism, its failure can be described as allowing a person to remain stuck, wholly or in part, in his basic enmity to himself in either of the two characteristic forms. His feelings can thwart the civilization process or his attitudes can thwart his feelings.

Perhaps it is better to use the phrase "failure in the learning-teaching compact" than "difficulties in learning." This is a tactical choice, for when we speak of *learning difficulties* the danger is that we omit, naively or by subterfuge, all references to the teaching process and throw the whole burden of the duty to progress on the pupil. If there are any problems, they are only the pupil's, we imply. The term "failure in the learning-teaching compact" implies both the pupil and the pedagogue, and the parents as well, with strengths and weaknesses on all sides, and a shared responsibility. The most basic lesson to be drawn from clinical practice is that all human problems are embedded in multilateral relations and that even intrapsychic conflict, or man's enmity to himself, receives impetus from and encroaches upon the relations between individuals. After all, no human being was ever born *ex nihilo*, and even loneliness and boredom require some relation to others. Indeed, from La Rochefoucauld comes the shrewd observation that one is nearly always bored with people by whom one is not allowed to be bored, such as teachers and parents. There are always powers on the horizon, or too close at hand!

Mutual Views of Failures in the Learning-Teaching Compact

Since I have now introduced a clinical perspective, it may be appropriate to start with the teachers and hear their views of learning failures, always remembering that we deal with a two-way street of relations. A list of teachers' criticisms of students' performance, assembled in 1944 by Lois B. Murphy and Henry Ladd,² contains the following observations:

pigeonhole viewpoint	gives stereotyped answers
limited imagination	antagonistic to new ideas
lack of critical attitude	contented with facts
emotional attitudes prevent analysis	no ability to generalize
failure to see relationships	difficulties in writing
rigid prejudices	glib superficial acceptance
mechanical study process	unable to apply understanding

inability to observe	disorganized approach to work
inability to put experience to work	pseudo-intellectualism
inability to relate observations to readings	sentimentality
difficulties in concentration	dependence on rules
	material does not make deep emotional impression

While these complaints are based on findings in a college population, most of the items can be taken as pertaining to elementary and high school populations as well. It is noteworthy that all these teachers' statements deal with performance vis-a-vis subject matter and the learning tasks, rather than with classroom behavior, campus conduct or social relations. I feel quite partial to this list because the recent psychiatric and psychological literature on learning problems appears to be preoccupied with descriptions of classical psychiatric syndromes, discipline problems, character deviations and other disturbances in the general rubric of "mental health" as these occur among students, whether or not they affect learning performance.^{3,4} Relatively little is said about the relations between psychiatric problems and the process involved in learning subject matter. The virtue of the Murphy-Ladd list is that it is focused on performance, work processes and scholastic judgments.

How do learning problems look from the other side, the side of the students? To the best of my knowledge we do not have anything analogous to the Murphy-Ladd list; instead, the literature is replete with observations by third parties such as psychiatrists, school psychologists, school counselors and other professional caretakers. To get some direct student observations about learning difficulties I asked two of my own children, both in high school, what learning difficulties they had experienced, incidentally or for longer periods, in the school situation. Here are their answers:

- writing cursive: needing much time and enticement to practice it.
- fractions: the idea of fractions made no sense at first, and required more explanation than was given.
- boring subjects such as history: "why should we know so much about dead people?"
- drawing and coloring ornamental pictures: why couldn't we make free-hand drawings?
- "I want to know more about our present world—but not from a biased teacher who voted for Goldwater."
- "I like things that remain the same: biology, literature."
- "When studying science, my vocabulary is too limited."

The theorems in mathematics are too abstract.

"I sometimes feel lost and left out in science because I think differently."

"Most children want to imitate their parents instead of their teachers."

"Sometimes I do not want to please the teacher, especially when he is unfair, or discriminates against people."

"Some teachers are just not inspiring."

"There is not enough incentive."

Though this is admittedly a very small sample, and probably biased, these students' observations are not negligible. It is of note that they range from the acquisition of motor skills to the ideological implications of teachers' attitudes. They contain references to the existence of different modes of thinking (abstract, functional, concrete). They bring out different existential values placed on time (the past is dead, some things in life should remain the same), and different kinds of insight (the idea of fractions is difficult to grasp, but social-political acumen can at the same time be present to a high degree). They introduce diverse criteria for evaluating teachers (competence, inspirational gifts, conservative or liberal attitudes, sensitivity to discrimination on all levels). There is an intuitive recognition of different talents and personality styles (free-hand drawing as against cramped compulsivity; vocabularies are not one but many, depending on one's purposes and gifts). There are some references to motivation for learning. One of these is clearly placed in the context of the teacher-student relation ("I do not want to please him"), the other alludes to identification choices ("Most children want to imitate their parents") with one party having to lose to the other.

Now that we have heard some thoughtful reflections about learning difficulties from both parties in the learning process we may return to Schiller's images of the primitive and the barbarian. Both fail to grow up; both fail to learn. They fail to see the opportunities of nature or the opportunities of culture, and the far greater opportunities of both combined. They appreciate neither the energies and impulses of nature, nor the benevolence and creativeness and the long-range satisfactions of culture, let alone the rich and marvelous novelty which a controlled and guided nature affords. For they confuse impulse with danger, structure with confinement, freedom with whim.

A Basic Theory of Coping Behavior

Schiller's primitive and barbarian are human images set up by an aesthete, to whom beauty was the apex in the Platonic triangle of truth,

beauty and goodness. How would a contemporary mental health worker, more pedestrian, more pragmatic and more professional than Schiller, organize the poet's thoughts into useful concepts? Since I wish to present a viewpoint rather than a catalog, I will take time to elaborate on some basic theoretical material. More systematic and enumerative overviews of learning problems can be found in the literature.^{2, 3, 5-8} I will focus on motivational difficulties.

I think it behooves us first, with Freud, to infer from the savagery which has persisted in all cultures the existence of an aggressive drive in man which is inherent in his own nature, and not merely a product of, or an acquired reaction to cultural circumstances. To this may be added Freud's observation in *Civilization and Its Discontents*,⁹ that the opportunities for any of us to settle things by direct aggression have been progressively diminished by the course and forms of civilization. In any place and time, instinctual forces are to be channeled and harnessed, as it were, through cultural institutions, through codes that govern social relations, and various controls which the individual normally learns to impose upon himself, aided by examples, values, power structures, the immutable features of reality and his desire for enduring satisfactions.

To these assumptions I wish to add another group of ideas. In *The Vital Balance*,¹⁰ by Menninger, Mayman and me, a theory of the ego is advanced in which some aspects of this psychic structure are likened to a regulatory mechanism, such as a thermostat, a homeostatic process, or a governor of a ship. While none of these similes is entirely adequate or elegant, they will do to convey our general idea that the human being is equipped with all kinds of coping devices enabling him to adapt to his natural and social environments and to his inner environment of natural promptings, longings, ideas and ideals. It is one major function of the ego to achieve thereby each moment the best possible dynamic equilibrium in a fluid situation where things come and go, people change their minds and attitudes, and change is the order of the day. Using another metaphor, borrowed from economics, one might say that the ego is constantly bargaining and arbitrating between several parties, inside and outside the individual, each claiming his rights, each wanting his opportunity, each wanting some advantage. The ego's goal is then describable as giving each one his due, and securing the best advantage physically, mentally, emotionally and spiritually for the individual whose well-being it attempts to serve.

Combining a dynamic and economic view of the ego's actual operations, and their effect on the individual and society, makes it possible to estimate a person's degree of mental health by asking what psychic "price" he pays for the satisfactions he is after. The clinical facts are that some people cope with minor stresses by very elaborate, risky and costly maneuvers through which they hope to establish a vital balance between their desires and the possible, between threats and enticements, between frustrations and satisfactions. Others are able to use relatively inexpensive devices adroitly for coping with major upheavals, quickly restoring their optimal baseline, so to speak, after being threatened with imbalance.

Life has many possibilities for coping with stress and each person has his bag of tricks, but some bags are better or more richly supplied than others. Some schoolchildren become boisterous, some start teasing, some engage in inappropriate giggling when they are in difficulty. Others react with shyness or with sleepiness to a demanding classroom situation or a stern teacher. Most of us take care of the tensions of everyday life by occasionally laughing, crying, boasting, eating, smoking, drinking, dreaming and daydreaming, fantasy formation, engaging in sports or crafts, sounding off in the school newspaper, enjoying music, or by deftly changing the actual realities of our situation. And when tensions augment, or last longer than bearable, many of us will fall back on a new line of defense (to use a military metaphor), or pay higher prices (to speak economically), for restoring our equilibrium. Hard thinking becomes worrying, ordinary caution and attention become a strained watchfulness, humor becomes facetiousness or unseemly burlesque, forgetting becomes inhibition, blocking or strong repression, a drink becomes drinking, with new and unanticipated dangers. In some pupils, rereading assignments in textbooks becomes a vacuous repeating or an obsessional reiteration without grasp. But even these first order maneuvers may not be sufficient to restore one to a comfortable optimum. Stress may still increase, or fail to be eliminated, urging the individual on to more strenuous efforts, more costly devices, more desperate controls to stem the tide.

What tide? What flood is being feared? Our conception of stress is linked with our conception of the dynamic potentials of the person. There are urges to live and urges to die. The urge to preserve, enhance and foster life is constantly threatened by the urge to die, kill, destroy or be destroyed. To curb the latter in favor of the former is part of the

mysterious arrangements whereby life maintains itself as long as it lasts. In this context, stress is not merely a push or pull from the outside, as many people defensively wish to see it, but can be more accurately defined as anything, whether starting from the inside or the outside, that arouses aggression within the interior threatening to destroy the integrity or growth of the organism. The subjective stressfulness of stress, to speak experientially, is not the outer event or trauma or dangerous seduction, but the welling-up of aggressive potential in magnitudes or intensities beyond comfortable control. The stressfulness of stress is its felt threat to life, to the maintained integration, the obtained satisfactions, the proven equilibrium or any hoped for melioration of the human condition. It is the threat of dyscontrol, or loss of order. And since control is itself a human value which gives unique satisfaction as it is exercised, any threat to the maintenance of such control entails also an internal deprivation which arouses further aggressive reactions, giving the person a still harder time to do what he can to restore equilibrium, now handicapped by restrictions in the choice of means.

This view also contains an extended definition of what a symptom is. Freud proposed that a symptom contained at least the following dynamic or unconscious meanings: (1) a hidden libidinal wish for some satisfaction, (2) an outer-directed aggressive discharge, (3) an internal, self-directed aggression. He emphasized that it is always a compromise, established by the ego vis-a-vis the various realities it has to deal with. Interpersonal theory added to these features the symptoms' meaning as a distress signal—a cry for help. I wish to add to all these its economic intention as a salvaging effort and a staying device whereby the organism preserves its integrity and wards off further disintegration or death. For behind every extremity lurks the threat of a more ultimate extremity: the outbreak of total aggression which would annihilate the individual. In the face of such threats symptoms can come to entail more and more sacrifices of satisfaction, cruder and more desperate maneuvers, riskier actions, more flouting of social conventions, more departures from reality, more stunting of growth.

Learning Difficulties as Emergency Reactions

And so one may have to proceed, or recede rather, to ever more costly and inadequate ways of dealing with mounting or prolonged tension. We recognize as a *second order of dyscontrol* those conditions in which

the aggressive discharge is blocked from consciousness by dissociative withdrawal: fainting, brief lapses of consciousness, etc. Also, a fear becomes a phobia; dislike of some subject matter, say algebra, becomes a selective stupidity in it. I have known intelligent women with excellent motor coordination who insisted that they "just could not sew—not a stitch!" Or the aggressive discharge may be displaced to one's own body, as one symbol for the self, causing various somatic complaints, pains, discomforts or irregular body functioning which interfere with productivity, study skills, concentration, and well-being. A more subtle form of this is the well-known asceticism so often found among adolescents: this can be intensified into a dogmatic abstinence from proper food intake or body pleasures, staying up late hours to do homework without heeding the needs for rest and play, passing up parties or exciting cultural gatherings. In others, the aggressions displaced to the body take the form of excessive indulgence in alcohol, tobacco and narcotizing substances. Not to be forgotten are the symbolic, ritualistic or magical discharges of aggression frequently found in school life: pranks and vandalism during Halloween parties, panty raids and hazing practices.

To this second order also belong the great variety of sexual perversions, which consist of combinations of aggressive and sexual components. As long as the sexual relations are predominantly affectionate there can hardly be any question about their healthiness, although one may still raise ethical and pedagogical questions about the proper age and occasion for engaging in them. Certainly their all too arduous pursuit may be a wasteful drain of energy, a flight from intense boredom or an expression of lagging cultural interests. In the perversions, however, we are dealing with an essentially aggressive pattern entailing unscrupulous intrusions upon the feelings of others, more or less blatant violations of moral codes or flouting of public mores. But like lying and cheating, they can still be seen as attempts to establish a compromise solution to conflictual tendencies; whether these attempts are bungled or not, the individual or his victims pay a costly price.

The outstanding social and biological feature in all these symptoms is that there still remains a more or less successful control over the aggressive impulses by disguise, symbolization or slow discharge in small quantities. Much of the effect of the aggression, moreover, turns upon the individual himself to the detriment of his productivity and creativity. In Schiller's sense, the primitive aspects outweigh the barbarian features.

Feelings are indulged, but with some repudiation or warping of the principles of economy, culture, art, communication, and of the ability to have long-range satisfactions prevail over short pleasures. By a hidden, usually unconscious indulging in the natural propensities, nature is acknowledged as master to the detriment of "art" which in Schiller's context stands for elegance, harmony, beauty, and sense of proportion, paired with goodness and truth.

And so one could go on describing the whole gamut of psychiatric disorders as ways of coping with stress. In some cases the ego may abolish control precipitously, allowing a more or less abrupt and paroxysmal show of naked aggression. Some violent act, or a series of acts, occurs against all the constraints of society and interrupts the person's own customary control. In other cases, one may find gross repudiation of the obvious features of reality—outright "craziness" by popular judgment. My point is that all psychiatric conditions, many forms of so-called antisocial behavior, and many of the strange behaviors or "misbehaviors" of schoolchildren can be looked at from this combined psycho-economic and dynamic vantage point. They all make sense as efforts at preserving the integrity of the person under adversity. In this view, the differences between health and illness are less radical than one is prone to assume and the word "symptom" is no longer strictly a medical term: we all move daily on a continuum of coping maneuvers, ranging somewhere between an ideal of health and the extreme of severe illness.

I am confident that not all psychiatric symptoms regularly occur in the school setting. And I also realize that teachers may have, at first, some difficulty in seeing the symptomatic side of human conduct. But the facts are that strange behavior occurs in school, and that sometimes drastic things happen, to everyone's surprise. Model students may suddenly commit a criminal act; intelligent students may utterly fail in social adjustment. The cantankerous student who is a misfit in social study discussion periods may be brilliant and to the point in mathematics or physics. Even the ideal teacher may have his stupid days or suddenly act as a sourpuss. The all-A student may begin to lose his good class standing and put you to the task of *cherchez la femme!*

But psychopathology can often make the minor difficulties of life more lucid and understandable and so it is that at least some learning difficulties may be clarified as students' problems in coping with the stresses of their lives. *Learning difficulties are not merely a lack of something,*

like a loss of good performance, or a failure in expectations. They may be a product, or byproduct of a student's positive attempts to make the best possible psychodynamic "bargain" out of a difficult and complex situation in which wishes, urges, desires, values, fantasies, seductions, disappointments, aspirations, threats and fears are being brought together in some sort of compromise.

When teachers complain of limited imagination or a pigeonhole viewpoint or any other learning disturbance in a student, it is opportune to ask systematically whether this is the student's current general attitude in all classes, or whether it appears to be specific to a given class or task. The next thing to investigate is whether it is specific to subject matter, to a given teacher, or to the teaching method, and whether anything in these is threatening to the pupil or has a special subjective connotation or symbolic meaning. The word "threatening" must be used with some psychological sophistication: success and achievement may be experienced as threatening, too, when it implies outdoing one's father in one way or another, or when a high grade acquires the meaning of getting back at one's older sister.

Some children, particularly in adolescence, are so fearful of the consequences of intellectual and social growth, with its increased responsibility for mature sexual behavior and control of aggression, that they may come to renounce scholastic achievement in one or more areas, secretly hoping to be taken in by a more structured and autocratic organization which fosters their dependency needs, such as the military. Others may renounce their birthright to mature pleasures of, which they are afraid, in favor of some younger sibling, in whose successes and escapades they take vicarious satisfaction.

I remember a patient who, as a youngster, was angrily aroused by his lessons in European history. His parents were intelligent immigrants who, though not extolling their country of origin, were very articulate about the pros and cons of cultural differences, which the boy felt as a punitive correction of his own efforts to shed the marks of his alien background in order to become an all-American youth. The effect was that he blocked on history lessons, but while the surface impression was one of selective dumbness, the dynamics of his learning block were a clear case of counteraggression. Such selectivities often occur in foreign language learning, with very complex motivations.

Why is it that so many schoolchildren are so decisive in asserting that

they are, say, "no good" in mathematics but apt in social studies, or that they "hate" biology but "love" to learn French, while objective aptitude tests show few significant differences in talent for any of these subjects? Why do some women, otherwise deft in finger movements, feel that they cannot sew a stitch? Why do some boys insist they will break too many things at dishwashing? Why do some people have a "green thumb" in gardening? The answer is, of course, that aptitude is, psychologically, closely related to attitude, and that in the unconscious things and ideas are symbolic representations of people. And since people are loved or hated, admired or despised, imitated or rejected, followed or opposed, things and ideas including scholastic subjects are liable to the same affective reactions.

Time was when some hardboiled materialists proclaimed that "*der Mensch ist was er isst*"—man is what he eats. Yet even this flatfooted statement may contain a deeper psychological truth when one considers orality in the broader sense of "taking in," "incorporating," "ingesting and digesting," "subsisting on" and "identifying with." It is an ever-present mode of establishing "who and what one is," or in a modern word, one's identity. While human operations should not be confined to this archaic heritage, one cannot do without it either and all of us make ample use of it in arranging the affairs of our lives. One's identity is probably the most important organizing concept and guiding idea in life; it functions as a psychological beacon in fair and stormy weather. It is constructed from positive and negative identities, from loves and hates, from choices "for this" and "against that," endlessly repeated and gradually more automatized.¹¹ I think this means that in an age of specialization, with the available identification figures of parents, teachers and culture heroes themselves specialized, one cannot expect students to be stimulated to being equally good in all subjects and skills, as Renaissance men were supposed to be. Note that I am not advocating one or another ideal education product, nor am I slyly encroaching upon the educationists' privilege of setting the goals for education; I am merely pointing to a functional difficulty which is to be taken into account, and which may explain some baffling selectivities in intelligent students.

Selectivities of this order, as integral parts of the students' identities, may affect the learners' attitudes toward novelty. Some students have shock reactions to the introduction of new subject matter, new viewpoints, new ideas, or even new teachers. While new tasks must always

be timed to meet the pupils' growth rates (and individuals may depart markedly from their age norms in some respects), one also has to reckon with a more general attitude to anything new which *qua novelty* may threaten the individual with unsettling of a tenuously achieved equilibrium. After all, even teachers may feel threatened by having to reorient themselves to the "new math," and it is more comfortable to teach and reteach the vices of Stalinism than to present intelligently the current complexities of Russian conditions and ideology. Novelty always forces us to reconsider our values, biases and habits, and while this appeals to a few, it is rather threatening to many.

Occasionally teachers complain that the learning material does not make the expected emotional impression, while emotion would be desirable for assimilating it. One can think in this connection of certain canons of poetry, ideological propositions, rules of art, or history lessons. One should be prepared to see this as a possible defense against any and all feelings. Particularly in adolescence, romantic, sexual or aggressive feelings may be aroused to such intensity that all emotion becomes equated with instinctual danger, leading to attempts at suppression of all feelings, including those elicited by objective learning material.

We do not know enough about curiosity to explain its marked presence in some, or to control the conditions that foster or thwart it in others. But there are definite observations of schoolchildren, once bright and curious, who sacrifice their talents, with a gross loss in IQ scores upon testing, in favor of a more desirable or less threatening goal, such as being "one of the boys" or responding to a popularized, cheap version of "femininity."

A word needs to be said about study habits, since these are of such underlying importance to all scholastic achievement. Although I do not feel that orderliness is always the highest virtue, neither do I think that sloppiness and disorganization are ever justifiable. Some organization of time, space, and attention is absolutely indispensable, and is, moreover, fostered and rewarded by our culture. Why then do some bright children show such a blatant lack of good study and work habits? One answer has been given by Mahler,¹² using energy-economic considerations similar to ours. She notes that some children, faced with a preparatory task, engage in much wasted motion by raiding the icebox, going to the bathroom, having to do errands hastily, and becoming very restless or bored, using these maneuvers to postpone the task or avoid do-

ing it altogether. She relates these observations to the fact that schoolwork so often requires preparatory work in solitude and suggests that the solitary situation is feared, because it may stimulate sexual cravings or aggressive fantasies or other temptations which are difficult to cope with. Studying may thus become a phobic situation, dealt with by stalling or by asking a parent or friend to sit by and watch, or check the work, or by escaping to the library. When the reluctant students finally settle down they turn on the radio, nibble, chain smoke, pace the floor.

That much study time can be wasted by excessive social activity is clear enough. It is less well understood, however, that absence of social life or popularity can have the same dreadful consequences by stimulating the student to engage in wistful daydreaming, laborious planning for engagements, and excessive attention to clothes and other social paraphernalia.

In all the examples I gave, I have confined myself to functional disturbances which can be understood in the framework of a dynamic-economic theory which specializes in intrapsychic conflict and assumes that man can be against himself. While Schiller's terms *primitivity* and *barbarism* should not be overplayed, and are not intended as a typology, they elucidate quite strikingly some basic modern psychodynamic concepts which teachers may find it profitable to be familiar with.

A more complete presentation of learning difficulties would have to speak also to structural conditions of cognitive loss, or defect states which present handicaps in school learning. Various forms of mental retardation, especially mild retardation, are not uncommon in public and private school settings, and are often not discovered until expected progress in the school years does not materialize. Of particular interest are the aphasias, agnosias and apraxias, and such conditions as word blindness, asymbolias, crossed cerebral dominance, disturbances in left-right discrimination and spatial orientation which affect spelling, reading, number and writing skills. But this is an area requiring specialized diagnostic work, leading into the field of special education or rehabilitation work. I have tried to stay within the ordinary classroom situation, with ordinary students and ordinary teachers, and ordinary learning difficulties.

The last word is, of course, that teaching and learning are never ordinary. Becoming an educated man who befriends nature by honoring her freedom and by merely controlling her capriciousness, as Schiller phrased

it, is no less marvelous than a computer-guided weightless stroll in space. But though it is less spectacular, it may yet require a more daring existential decision.

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MARTIN SCHEERER, PH.D.
(1900-1961)

Martin Scheerer was born on June 10, 1900, in New York City. As he was fond of saying, he "lost his English accent early in life," being taken back to Germany at the age of six weeks. His parents, German citizens, continued to live in Berlin. Here Dr. Scheerer grew up, studying at the Wilhelmshaus as an undergraduate, and later taking courses at the University of Berlin. After semesters spent here and there at various universities, a tradition of the time for European students, he settled down to work for the Ph.D. at the University of Hamburg. Here he studied under Stern and Cassirer and formed lasting associations with Fritz Heider and Heinz Werner. The degree was granted in 1931. His Ph.D. thesis, a critique of Gestalt psychology, was published about this time under the title of "Die Lehre von der Gestalt."

The advent of Hitler broke apart the psychology department at Hamburg. Dr. Scheerer, now a teaching fellow, lost his position, and, with his parents, went as a refugee first to France, then, in 1936, to the United States. Soon after arriving he met Kurt Goldstein and the two men began their long collaborative association leading to the publication of the monograph, *Abstract and Concrete Behavior*, and the Goldstein-Scheerer tests for brain damage.

His American years saw him teaching at several places, chiefly at Brooklyn

College, the City College of New York, and the New School for Social Research. With the passage of time, his thinking came to represent a synthesis of Gestalt psychology, developmental psychology, and the organismic approach.

The fall of 1948 saw Martin Scheerer permanently established as Professor of Psychology at the University of Kansas, a place and an area of the country which came to claim his affections to a high degree. Here he taught for 13 years and carried out research in the field of cognitive psychology.

He died on October 19, 1961.

For some years before his death, Dr. Scheerer had been fascinated by the psychology of humor. He had just begun a series of concrete experiments, designed to test his hypotheses in this field, at the time of his death.

The following paper was presented before the Graduate Faculty of the New School in 1947. The theoretical portion stands just as he wrote it. A second part (not published here), outlining and suggesting possible ways of implementing the theory via experimentation, was prepared by Dr. Gerald Goldstein, Topeka VA Hospital, who worked closely with Martin Scheerer on this subject for several years.

Constance Scheerer

AN ASPECT OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMOR*

MARTIN SCHEERER, PH.D.

Two years after the philosopher Henri Bergson had published his now-classical essay on laughter, the French psychologist L. Dugas made this statement: "There is no more trite phenomenon than laughter and none more frequently studied . . . none of which one has collected more observations and built more theories. But with all that, laughter resists explanation. One finally is tempted to say with the skeptics, let us be content to laugh and let us not seek to know *why* we laugh, since reflection kills laughter and it would therefore be contradictory to discover its cause."

This skepticism contains an important kernel of truth, namely, the truism that the best way to kill a joke is to explain it. The universal recognition that any attempt to break down humor into acts of cognition destroys it, may well have been the reason for the frequent attempts to explain humor in terms of emotion. This is not the place for a historical survey. Such a study of the theories of humor would start with

* Paper read before the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, May 19, 1948.

Aristotle and fill volumes. One may, however, divide the basic approach to humor into two different types.

Type 1 explains humor subjectively, in terms of emotional content or motive. We owe to Thomas Hobbes the still widely-accepted explanation of laughter as "a sudden glory arising from the experience of eminence in ourselves by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly." Later, Alexander Bain attributed laughter to the annihilation of an overlarge pretension. These emotional processes in terms of experienced superiority of ourselves or the degradation of others have been supplemented by processes of energy release of tension, or relief from rigid constraint. These theories lead from Bain, Spencer and John Dewey to Freud. It is a tribute to Freud's genius that his motivational theory is perhaps the only one which deals with both sides of humor, the reaction *to* and the creation *of* humor. If for brevity's sake we disregard Freud's finer distinctions between wit, the comic and humor, we find the common denominator in pleasure-seeking. In our striving for euphoria we are seeking that state in which we defray our psychic work with a minimum expenditure of energy. According to Freud, reason requires more psychic work, and therefore obviates pleasure. The pleasure of wit arises from relaxing the inhibitions exercised by reason.

However, this release of inhibitions is made possible because wit still obeys the censorship of reason. Through wit we release pleasurable play, as, for example, a play on words, with the permission of reason. Wit therefore originates from an economy of energy expenditure usually invested in inhibition. In modern Freudian terminology the inhibiting ego or superego controls our impulses toward sex, aggression, or libidinal impulse release. A reduction in the work effort of this ego takes place when the outlet of impulses can be sanctioned by the sensibility of humor. The rationale of humor renders the inhibition unnecessary. Time does not permit the elaboration of this rationale as described by Freud through the dynamics of displacement, condensation, indirection, allusion, etc.

In contrast to these concepts of disinhibited self-centered pleasure-striving, William McDougall presents us with the opposite but nevertheless subjective interpretation. Where Freud has us laugh because humor provides an outlet for socially not-sanctioned impulses, where Hobbes has us laugh because we have no sympathy—McDougall has us laugh because of too much sympathy. Laughter, for McDougall, is the anti-

dote of sympathetic pain, the defense of the organism against the minor pains to which man is exposed.

Type 2 localized the conditions of humor in more objective contents of the situation. In Aristotle's definition, for example, the ridiculous is "a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others." Bergson's position fits into this category. Laughter arises only with regard to human activities. It occurs whenever a person appears as a mere *thing*, that is, when the mechanical triumphs momentarily over the living spirit. Laughter thereby becomes for Bergson also a social corrective; laughter guards against human rigidities. The emphasis of objective contents in arousing humor is further represented in those theories which make the humor reaction dependent on similarity or dissimilarity of ideas, or on incongruity between abstract categories and concrete objects, as Schopenhauer emphasized. Just as the Type 1 explanations of humor which work from the emotional reactions contain irreconcilable contradictions, so do the Type 2 approaches, working from the objective contents of humor. We hear from John Locke that wit puts together similar ideas, whereas others stress the contrast of ideas. Schopenhauer's most profound treatise is too narrowly confined to the class logic of subsumption which neglects the actual psychological course of thinking and reasoning even in humor.

In summarizing both types of explanation of humor the following criticism seems to be indicated: Whether humor reaction is described in terms of motivation, emotion, or by the interplay of ideas, no one has made a thoroughgoing qualitative inquiry into the cognitive side of the process. Undoubtedly, cognitive functions are involved in the emotional reaction to humor. We cannot divorce the cognitive from the emotional aspect because the cognition has to precede the emotion, or, to say the least, there cannot be an emotion without concomitant cognition. Investigation should also be carried out to determine how the one depends upon the other. Though it is commonly agreed upon that some content has to be experienced and grasped in order to evoke humor, a precise psychological study is lacking as to how this content has to be organized and how it is grasped. Even where such analysis has been attempted, as for example by Schopenhauer, the syllogistic generalizations do not fit all the cases. His contention that the ridiculous arises through the subsumption of a concrete item under a wrong abstract category fails to include the cases where one or more abstract ideas are subsumed

under such wrong categories, or where two concrete actions exchange their meaning: An example of the *first* would be the statement about the impoverished Scotch University which was prolific in its awarding of degrees: "Let it persevere in its present plan and it may become rich by degrees." Or we might take the statement about a certain actor that "He has a great future behind him." An example of the *second* would be the story of the Emperor Augustus who met his virtual double on the street one day and asked him, "Fellow, was your mother ever employed in our palace?" to which the man replied, "No, sire, but my *father* was."

Regarding Bergson's thesis that humor always works via degradation of the spiritual to the mechanistic, automaton level, one can cite the case of the preacher who by mistake took a cookbook instead of his bible into the pulpit and started his sermon by reading, "Taking vinegar. . . ." but caught himself and continued ingeniously by saying, "Christ blessed the soldiers." Or there is the famous repartee of Dumas *fils* to Dumas *père* when the father introduced the son to guests as "his worse creation." The son replied, "And believe it or not, it is not his own." One can scarcely assume that Dumas *fils* was alluding to a pure automatism of his real father!

It is, however, futile to engage in polemics of individual instances against too-wide generalizations, especially since my own hypothesis may meet with the same fate. I am already guilty of the indiscriminate, global use of the word "humor" without distinguishing humor from wit, the comic, irony, parody, satire, and the ludicrous. The reason for this indiscriminate use of the word "humor" lies, however, in the basic question I wish to pose—namely, is there a common underlying principle in the organization of contents which are grasped as humorous? If this can be demonstrated as a *genotypic* principle of structure, then the various phenomena of humor could be understood as *phenotypic* modifications of this principle. The object of such inquiry is therefore twofold: First, what is the formal aspect of the thought process in grasping humor? Second, what is the formal structure in the combination of meanings that has to exist to arouse humor?

Evidently this formulation of the problem does not include as yet the process of the creation of humor nor the motive to be humorous. It may, however, be expected that a better clarification of the cognitive side in humor may eventually also elucidate the motivational side. The truism should be borne in mind that a joke first has to be understood to be ex-

perienced as funny, and that we usually lose most of the fun, that is, our emotional reaction to a joke, if we have to explain it. This phenomenon points to the fact that something in the nature of the humorous feeling depends on implicit understanding of humor and is impaired by explicit, discursive understanding.

It may be at once argued against the search for formal aspects of humor that no common structural principle will be found because the content of humor is always determined by social and cultural conditions which differ so widely. According to this argument the experience of humor must therefore derive from the specific past experiences which we accumulate in our given milieu and historical period. The undeniable truth that people laugh at different things in different eras and different environments and that not all people laugh about the same things does not detract from the other undeniable truth that it is the human organism that does the laughing under definite conditions. What are these? One can raise the question of past experience in two ways as it is done in contemporary psychology.

(1) Does past experience in terms of specific stimulus-response connections constitute meaning as the resultant sum of the presently aroused associations?
 (2) Or is the acquisition of experience already codetermined by the functional properties of contents and their structural relations? If the latter is so, then what we call meaning must be an organized whole in which the experienced contents fit structurally. Fittingness and nonfittingness of meaning would then rest upon certain relations between the contents of experience, that is, on relations between the meanings of the contents. Though the experiences may differ widely in different environments, the laws of fittingness need not be arbitrary laws of conditioning. In other words, regardless of the different social contexts in which we acquire our life contents as meanings, the criterion of fitting and nonfitting could be rooted in definite relation of parts within their whole. It is therefore possible that organizational laws of meaning as to fitness and not-fitness exist, notwithstanding the fact that what will fit in one milieu may differ from what fits in another. We must therefore expect that only people with a communality of experience-background will appreciate the jokes that have the same humor contents. But we need not expect that the formal aspect of the organization of humor contents must differ with different experience backgrounds. We have an analogous problem in the theory of perception and productive thinking where the work of Wertheimer and his followers has demonstrated that organization and reorganization of past knowledge in terms of structural fitness occurs. Some applications to the question of structure in humor have been made by Gestalt psychologists and like-minded investigators. M. Harrower, for instance, demonstrated in a series of experiments that a given joke can be matched to an abstract diagram if there

are several to choose from, both fitting and not-fitting. These studies, however, did not focus on the question of *why* the joke is humorous. In 1931, Scheerer pointed out that in many jokes a similar recentering of the meaning of parts occurs as in problem solving. In 1932, N. R. F. Maier related the humorous experience to problem solving in general. He distinguished humor from reasoning, however, by stating that the solution of a problem is usually in harmony with the direction of the problem requirements, whereas in humor the final configuration is contrary to the expected direction. This leads to a recentering of the initial direction which involves a shift in the meaning of certain parts. Such a change in direction would be illustrated by the above-mentioned examples of the Emperor Augustus and Dumas *père* and *fils*.

Closest to the proposition I wish to advance here are the theories of Hughlings Jackson and Paul Schiller. Almost 75 years ago, Jackson analyzed a number of jokes and puns in which he found a duality of meaning to which he referred as "mental diplopia" or double vision. What this implies will become clear immediately if we take this example of Schiller's: A little boy becomes restive at a concert given by the famed cellist, Casals, and asks his mother: "Say, Mother, when the old man gets through sawing his box in two, then can we go home?" Here we have the "double aspect" of the cello, once as a musical instrument for the grown-up who enjoys the music, and once as a box plus saw-like tool with which, in the eyes of a child, an old man sits sawing monotonously. According to Schiller, the joke is an ambiguous logical structure with great instability similar to ambiguous figures in perception. The essence of the humor reaction consists in two phases. In the first, we experience a strange feature. In the second, we discover a duality of aspects. We now view the initially strange feature from another aspect that makes it fitting so that a unified configuration with a double role emerges. To Schiller the joy of humor is this discovery of the double function in the critical motive: All laughter is the result of the sudden relief from a somewhat disagreeable situation.

Critically the following may be annotated: First, Schiller deals with the structure of jokes as if they were ambiguous perceptions and therefore he does not really enter the problem of meaning and symbolic thought; thus he is able to speak of ambiguous figures changing involuntarily. Second, his relief theory precludes the enjoyment of a joke *after* it has been heard for the first time. Yet it is well known that a good joke can re-arouse laughter time after time, and may also be cherished in memory. Lastly, Schiller does not sufficiently distinguish between jokes and puzzle solving, since he identified the thought pattern

as the same in both processes. In a joke, however, the starting situation is experienced as inappropriate and thereby provides the clues for the observer in discovering the double aspect. In the puzzle the observer experiences not inappropriateness but unsolvability and from there he is not led to a solution. He has to make a hypothesis. What is further overlooked by Schiller is the fundamental difference between the perception of an unstable or ambiguous figure which has two aspects and the understanding of a double meaning. Here, the ideational process supplies a perceptually absent aspect of meaning as in listening to a joke or seeing a cartoon. The thought process occurs, therefore, on an abstract level of interpretation. Upon closer analysis it is almost surprising to discover that the understanding of humor proceeds almost entirely on the psychological level of abstract thinking in the domain of symbolic meaningful contents.

It is further important to note that in perceiving an ambiguous figure the observer does not see both figures *simultaneously* at one glance. He sees either one or the other. Therefore Schiller's identification of a joke reaction and perceptual reaction is oversimplified. The quintessence of the humor response is to experience a simultaneity of two different aspects, of fittingness and nonfittingness at the same time. This, however, is the prerogative of abstract thought. Simultaneity of dual meaning as a characteristic of abstract thinking has been stressed by Kurt Goldstein, A. Gelb and others. The impairment of this function in brain-injured patients who fail to understand analogies, metaphors and puns has also been pointed out by authors such as Sieckmann, Binari, and Henry Head. This fact becomes even more impressive when we find in the same patients sometimes so-called "*witzelsucht*," that is, a compulsive punning, side by side with a defect in grasping genuine humor. There is an involuntary intrusion of other aspects, a looseness of figure and ground boundaries.

A cartoon may tell us a long story which is of the same basic symbolic character as a narrative in language. If we therefore speak of double aspect of meaning, we should find similar organizational principles in verbal humor as in cartoon or pictorial humor. Both the pictorial and the verbal have in common that they are statements *about* and conform to Hughlings Jackson's concept of the propositional character of meaningful language. One can therefore raise the question whether genuine humor is possible without propositional language. Now, if we speak of

double meaning in verbal humor, we usually take it for granted that a word is used in two different meanings, just as is an ambiguous perceptual figure. This poses a question—do we customarily use words which have possible double meanings with conscious awareness of these multiple meanings? As trivial as it may seem to answer with a "no," it is here that the psychology of humor meets the psychology of language. If we do not use words with conscious awareness of their multiple meanings, what prevents the main associated meanings from occurring when we utter the word? When one speaks of "stiff joints," we immediately think of rheumatism, until we hear the joke about the patient who asks the doctor, "What can I do to keep from getting stiff in the joints?" to which the doctor replies, "Stay out of the joints!"

It was L. Vigotsky who pointed out that the conceptual meaning of a word is not the same as the understanding of it in a context. We may apply this by saying more precisely that the word "joint" has a conceptual range of different meanings. Which meaning the word will call up will depend upon the sense of the sentence or on the context of the situation. Therefore the word is not conscious to us in its entire conceptual meaning range. It is not ambiguous but always fixedly defined by the sense structure as a whole in which it functions as a part. When we first hear the response of the doctor we are temporarily estranged. We have then to discover another sense structure, another "sphere" into which the word "joint" can fit to make sense out of the doctor's reply. This sample joke, though trite, could be multiplied *ad infinitum* and should substantiate the following conclusion: the double meaning of words in humor is not a double meaning of the word as such but is a discovery of another sense structure from which the word acquires another meaning—a fitting function as a part in a whole. There may be a few who by now will have thought of the word "joint" as a plumber's fixture or a roast of meat.

One may now raise a further question about the relationships of humor and meaning. When we survey the most typical instances of humor we are struck with a phenomenon to which Bergson has called attention. He spoke of "a situation being invariably comic when it belongs simultaneously to two altogether independent series of events and is capable of being interpreted in two entirely different meanings at the same time." The humor of such events may, however, not be rooted in the forcible reactions to the mechanization of life as Bergson postulates. I should

prefer to call Bergson's simultaneity of independent series of events the coincidence of two world lines of causation which we experience as overlapping in a common situation. Since each of these world lines has its own sense structure we experience their meeting on the one hand as a chance overlap, and on the other hand as completely intelligible.

Consider these examples: In the winter one seat in a subway train is overheated and therefore not occupied. During the rush hour, at each station an innocent victim rushes to grab what seems a much-sought-after and desirable empty seat, but gets up almost at once. This repeats itself at every station with an increasingly humorous effect on the observers. Or two women friends meet each other repetitively but unintentionally in a series of shops on a certain day, each chance meeting seeming funnier and funnier to the pair.

What is apparently left out in Bergson's description is an important psychological process, the act of "wondering about" the coincidence, a philosophical attitude toward the mere possible, reminiscent of Aristotle's term "wondering about." The estranging experience of an apparently meaningless coincidence resolves itself into the understanding of the sense structure of each world line in its own right. An unintelligible chance event is thereby made a harmless coincidence.

At this juncture we may witness the difference between humor and catastrophe. The crossing world lines of a disoriented drunk and timetable for trains bound in the wrong direction is pregnant with humor owing to the harmless nature of the crossing. Conversely, a speeding car, a dark, wet night, and a washed-out bridge can converge in catastrophe.

If we place the theory of double aspect of meaning in the wider context of the discovery of coincidences of the harmless meeting of world lines we may have a principle of wide applicability. We can deal with witty word-plays—"the Christmas season consists of alcoholidays"—from the same basic point of view which can be applied to situational humor. The proverbial figure of the man unknowingly betrayed by his wife is seen in two contexts—the factual context of being betrayed as others see him, and the unreal context of the beloved husband as he sees himself. This can become a source of humor. It implies an attitude toward the mere possible in the observer because he has to hold in mind the relationship between the real context and an unreal "as if" context. This attitude of the "as if" places humor responses as well as humor creation

again close to the characteristic of abstract attitude as described by Goldstein and Scheerer. We may find a developmental continuity from the act of pretending in the child, to deliberate teasing, to the enjoyment of masquerade and imitating others. In each case the person is playing a double role, acting simultaneously in two different situational contexts. For example, our imitation of somebody else creates laughter because we are portraying at the same time the characteristics of another person while still being ourselves in the eye of the observer. The observer marvels at the possible coincidence, at how the imitator annihilates his individuality. Even the keen observations of Bergson on the so-called mechanical which triumphs over life, such as when a dignified gentleman slips on the pavement, might have to be revised in this light.

Perhaps we laugh because it appears to us *as if* life has become mechanical whereas it actually never can become so wholly. The collapse in the dignity because a coincidence of world lines brings a piece of ice underfoot does not actually reduce the person to the status of robot, but reminds us of the ever-present possibility that our existence can become simultaneously part of *opposing* or *dual* aspects.

It is at this point that I feel the need to depart also from Schiller's estrangement-relief formula. It appears an incorrect description of humor reaction to say that a joke is understood "if we grasp a matter shown as unitary in its double role." Actually, the process of understanding the joke only assigns to the critical motif a double role in two different contexts which never become completely united. There remains an antagonism between the two spheres of meaning which share the critical motif that gives us the experience of tension. And this tension is enjoyed because it is at the same time intelligible.

The hypothesis of double aspect in the new sense here advocated may find additional support in the fact that the greater the meaning contrast between the two overlapping aspects, the greater the humorous effect and the enjoyment of tension. Therefore, a verbal pun will increase in humor the more disparate the two meanings are while at the same time sharing an identity of sound or even an important third relationship. Freud himself makes a similar comment when discussing the word-play—"amantes" are "amentes" (lovers are lunatics). I want now, however, to depart also from Freud regarding his claim of a tension release and economy of energy as the basic process of humor. Undoubtedly laughter is tension relief, but the relief element in humor relates only to the over-

coming of the estrangement by discovering the context in which the critical motif fits. The enjoyment of the joke transcends the laughter because it is rooted in the enjoyment of the tension created by the antagonism of meaning between the two contexts simultaneously cognized. From this point of view it is possible to arrive at a modification of the tension relief theory of humor.

The relief process is only part of a more complex activity which is rooted in the total attitude of the person toward the world. The relief from estrangement results from the discovery that what appeared at first unfamiliar resolves itself in a dual familiarity, fitting in two different, opposed contexts of meaning at the same time. In this regard may I happily quote from Freud who quotes the French author Melinaud as follows: "What makes us laugh is that which is at one and the same time both absurd and familiar."

It seems highly plausible that this explains laughter as a relief phenomenon but just as plausible that it does not fully explain humor. The relief hypothesis fits excellently well into all kinds of laughter—the laughter of defense against sympathy, the laughter of derision as defense against deformity as a deviation from familiar normalcy. On the other hand, we know from experimental observations on children by C. Bühler and others that laughter fails to appear when a familiar object takes on unfamiliar features, for example when Daddy appears wearing clown's clothes. Then anxiety arises. D. O. Hebb has also shown this with chimpanzees. It may not be amiss to generalize that laughter occurs when estrangement resolves itself into familiarity and that anxiety sets in when estrangement persists, threatening the loss of anchorage in orientation within familiar frames of reference. Yet the dimension laughter-anxiety is of a different psychological order than the dimension of humor. The formula "laughter is relief from estrangement" does not exhaust the total pattern of humor behavior. There is also quite uneconomically at work the pleasure in the coincidence between two antagonistic meaning spheres, the enjoyment of the sheer possibility of such coincidence. Perhaps it is for this reason that we also enjoy the phenomenon of twins (the coincidence of physical identity with different psychological individualities). The difference between laughter and humor may be borne out by Freud's own observations that the creator of a witticism does not laugh as much as his audience. In addition, we often laugh forcibly in a comic situation without actually having enjoyed ourselves. If the hy-

pothesis of the tension relief aspect of laughter and the tension enjoyment aspect of humor is correct, an interesting consequence may be drawn. We may now understand the creation of humor as the enjoyment of discovering or of producing coincidences which in turn create non-threatening tensions. With that we would be in the realm of play on the abstract level as a distinctly human characteristic. Humor-play would have to be distinguished from other play. The attitudes toward the mere possible are here directed toward the discovery and creation of coincidences of a certain antagonism of meaning. We have here an attitude which takes an event as a link in a necessary chain of two world lines and at the same time as a mere possibility. In this attitude we are even capable of taking the impossible as real in a playful way. Therefore humor is rooted in a basic attitude of detachment which reconciles iron necessity with freedom from enslavement to it. If we then inquire about the function which humor serves for the ego, we may say that humor is the playful realization of a multiplicity of coincidences in meaning. It thereby frees the ego from responsibility and the chains of reality. This notion of humor as a specific direction of human play may be elucidated by two questions. The poet Friedrich Schiller has said that "Man plays only while he is man in the full sense of the word and only while playing is he fully man." And Jean Paul has said, "Wit gives freedom and freedom gives wit."

FORCED TERMINATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

Transference, Countertransference and Reality Responses in Five Patients*

PAUL A. DEWALD, M.D.†

The indications for termination and the various phenomena accompanying this phase of psychoanalysis are well known in clinical practice. Even in instances where the analyst insists on termination in spite of the patient's objections, the decision is based primarily on what is deemed best for the patient, in spite of the various transference distortions and interpretations that the patient may place on such an eventuality.

However, termination of analysis may occur independently of the patient's interests and needs, thereby significantly altering the termination phase and its impact on the final level of adaptation made by the patient. Such things as the patient's inability to continue financial arrangements, significant and prolonged organic illness, or the necessity for a geographic move may preclude further analytic work. In other instances, termination may result from the analyst's inability to continue. These include such things as death of the analyst, serious or prolonged illness, or the analyst moving geographically making further analysis impossible.

A search of the psychoanalytic literature does not reveal any reports in which termination of analysis was forced by personal factors or decisions in the analyst. Freud⁷ describes the setting of a forced termination date in the case of "the Wolf Man," and Ferenczi and Rank⁵ experimented with the arbitrary setting of termination dates. Orens¹⁰ describes the effect of setting a termination date as a stimulus for the production of material previously excluded from the treatment by the patient. However, in all these instances the termination was thought by the analyst to be therapeutically indicated.

Rosenthal²² describes the general reactions of 27 group therapy patients to the sudden death of their therapist (Paul Schilder), mentioning four patients in some detail.

But even the psychiatric literature is meager in records of this type of termination. This is the more surprising since, in psychiatric training programs, this type of forced termination based on the therapist leaving

his immediate situation is a regular and frequent occurrence. Lenzner¹² described the problems of four psychiatric residents in terminating their cases at the end of their training period. Pumpian-Mindlin¹⁸ also described such experiences in a psychiatric training program. Wiener²⁵ studied 48 patients arbitrarily terminated at the end of two therapists' training, but focused his interest on subsequent return for treatment. Reider²⁰ describes a type of transference to institutions in patients whose therapists have left them.

In view of the paucity of reports on this type of termination, I feel that the following "experiment of nature" is worth reporting.

In January of 1961, I elected to leave my former location and settle in St. Louis. This meant that I would have to terminate my entire therapeutic caseload at the time of my departure in June, 1961. There were five patients in formal psychoanalysis, and 12 patients in various types of psychotherapy. Experiences with termination of the psychotherapy cases have been reported elsewhere.⁴ This report will deal with the five psychoanalytic patients, all of whom were told in January that I would be leaving the city in June.

Patient #1: A 35-year-old technician had been in analysis for more than three years for a mixed neurosis of acute onset, involving phobic, obsessional, and free-floating anxiety symptoms. This was superimposed on a rigidly obsessional character structure. The analysis had been tedious and slow, with intense defensive avoidance of any manifestations of regression. The entire transference relationship was muted and denatured, and his predominant attitude was one of guarded, suspicious mistrust and a continuous anticipation of rejection, punishment or attack. The major pathogenic trauma had been a tonsillectomy at age three, followed by chronic middle ear infections for two years and ultimately a prolonged hospitalization for mastoidectomy at age five.

When told of the termination, he expressed concern that his symptoms might recur, and an awareness of his dependency on me, but at the same time he indicated an attempt at mastery by suggesting that he quit analysis right away, and saying that it was "just as well" that he begin now to depend on himself and on his wife. He spoke of his mild anger at me for deserting him, but from then on attempted to minimize any reaction to it.

The patient associated his reactions to termination with the surgical procedures of early childhood. These had been brought up before in

* Versions of this paper were presented to The Chicago Psychoanalytic Society, May 28, 1963; The American Psychoanalytic Association, May 3, 1964.

† St. Louis, Missouri.

association with castration fears. During the termination, the same material was approached from the standpoint of his fantasies of having been abandoned. He recalled waiting for his mother to come and anticipating that she might never return. His subsequent response to his parents had been one of guarded mistrust and uncertainty.

During the last three months, the patient missed an increasing number of sessions on flimsy excuses. During one two-week interval, he missed six out of ten scheduled sessions. He repetitively sought to reverse the passive role of "being left," into the active role of being the one who leaves. Although he developed some intellectual awareness of the meaning of his behavior, he never achieved full emotional insight and he terminated analysis without ever displaying any major affective reactions. In the forced termination this patient reacted by reproducing his original response to his parents at the time of hospitalization.

Patient #2: A 24-year-old single white girl began analysis for a mixed phobic, hysterical, and obsessional neurosis, and a major symptom of an acute hysterical torticollis. She quickly developed a regressive transference neurosis which in the first year was primarily focused at the oedipal level of development. During the second and third years, however, oral and anal fixations became increasingly prominent. She made a slow but steady modification of behavior and attitudes, and began to engage in social relationships, and to work regularly. Her sexual behavior, however, had a strongly masochistic orientation, which was also prominent in the transference neurosis. By the end of the third year, the patient was manifesting an intense transference resistance with slowly continuing structural change.

When told of the termination, she had an immediate reaction of grief and depression, along with fantasies of acquiring my penis before I left, as well as wishes to follow me wherever I went. There were feelings of guilt that she was responsible for my departure, and an elaboration of anger, rage, and sadness. An event previously mentioned in a rather casual way was now recalled and reexperienced in an increasingly affective and meaningful form. When the patient was three and one-half, her father had been inducted into the armed forces during World War II. The patient responded to the separation from him with a sense of guilt and the fantasy that her positive oedipal attachment had been the cause of his leaving, which she perceived both as a rejection by her father of herself in her feminine role, and also as a punishment inflicted

by the mother for her oedipal strivings. She had then regressed to oral and anal attachments which were the major focus of symptom formation during the development of her neurosis. After the father's return, the patient revenged herself on him by refusing to accept him back as a father, even though she was his favorite, and in spite of his well-meant although immature efforts to be a good parent. From then on she had never referred to him again as "Dad," had never kissed him and, whenever forced to address him, would call him "you," or would refer to him through her mother as "your husband."

In the transference neurosis there was a similar regression, from oedipal and phallic attachment to me as the father, to oral and anal attachments to me as the mother. This sequence was also reflected during the termination phase in her behavior outside of analysis. There were intermittent upsurges of intense aggression and the impulse to hurt and humiliate me for the felt rejection of her, but at the same time intense guilt and the masochistic need to suffer. In her sexual behavior with men during this time, she repeatedly acted out a teasing and provocative pattern, thereby reversing the original experience of having felt teased and stimulated in the oedipal situation only to be left abruptly at the time of the father's departure.

In the last month, the termination and her responses to it provided the central theme of almost every session. She elaborated her masochistic use of illness as a means of revenge to spoil my reputation and frustrate my therapeutic ambitions, to invoke guilt in me for leaving, and to try to provoke an angry attack by me which could be followed by a reconciliation. These transference wishes were dealt with by my indicating that she now had conscious control as to whether or not she would get well. During many sessions, she attempted to ward off the expression of affect, but gradually her defenses lessened and she made steady movement toward more mature heterosexuality and away from the pregenital fixations.

Patient #3: A 25-year-old housewife began analysis in March, 1959. The major traumatic event in her life was her father's sudden death when the patient was seven years old—a loss to which she had never experienced an adequate grief and mourning response.

For this patient, the termination represented a replication of the father's sudden death. This reproduction of the original trauma through

the form and timing of termination resulted in the mobilization of a variety of affects, conflicts and defenses which were experienced in the transference neurosis as a repetition of those connected with the father's death.

Patient #4: A 36-year-old married man was first seen in face-to-face, three-times-a-week psychotherapy for abdominal pain, irritability and temper tantrums with his family, and a generalized sense of ineffectual living, lack of satisfaction, and inadequacy. The patient was an only child, whose aggressive and demanding father had depreciated him as weak and sickly, whereas the mother had been overprotective and had fostered the patient's passivity and dependence on her.

Beginning when the patient was five, both his father and mother had a series of extramarital sexual affairs. Both parents would impulsively go off on their romantic escapades, and by the time the patient reached the third grade, he could never be sure, when he left for school in the morning, whether or not his parents would be gone for several days when he returned. When he was 12, the parents obtained a divorce.

The patient was seen in psychotherapy for 515 hours with moderate symptomatic improvement and insight development, and some structural change. Termination was initiated by the patient with my agreement. A number of areas were still unresolved, but I felt that further face-to-face therapy at this time would serve little useful purpose. The patient returned nine months later and was seen in 18 sessions. When he returned again, he was advised to begin psychoanalysis and was seen four times a week.

During the next few months he worked through material previously expressed in psychotherapy, but now experienced a greater expression of affect in the transference neurosis. He had been attempting to write a novel. His creativity in writing was equated with his feminine identification and fantasies of being impregnated, with the writing of the book as an act of delivery. The writing was also seen as an anal evacuation, with the book as a fecal product. The book also had a narcissistic core in that the characters in the book were all a part of himself and were friends whom he created, and, therefore, whom he could control and manipulate. This also meant that he was not dependent on anyone else, and that if in the book he killed off any character, such a person could always be replaced by creating another. He repeatedly set himself a deadline for the completion of the book, but each time would experience

anxiety over separating from the book and its characters, and would refuse to share them with potential readers who represented rivals for the interest and affection of the fictional characters.

The forced termination was very different for him than his earlier ones. Previously he had played an active part in making the decision to terminate, whereas on this occasion he experienced it passively. On both previous occasions he had anticipated a return and a continuing relationship. For him it meant the repetition of the previous separations from both parents and as in the original situation he attempted to maintain a denial of affect in the presence of the object. However, he was consciously aware of an intense sadness, and outside the analytic hours, when reading or watching television, any story in which there was a loss or a reunion would evoke a painful emotional response.

In the treatment sessions, however, he attempted by joking, withholding and evasion to deny all feeling toward my departure. He felt that to cry or express genuine sadness over my leaving him was to be weak, helpless and vulnerable, and he many times consciously feigned indifference, as he had on the occasions of his mother or father leaving him. In childhood he had retreated into fantasy play with toy soldiers and stuffed animals, and in the transference neurosis he made use of the characters in his book for the same purpose. When he finally sent it to the publisher, his fantasy was that the publisher himself, as well as the general acclaim from the book, would replace me as his chief object. It was only with the hope of a substitute relationship that he felt capable of giving me up, and he deliberately waited until he would be finished with analysis before finding out about the book, lest the book also prove a frustration and he would then be robbed of his hope.

He had many fantasies of maintaining or somehow reestablishing a relationship with me, and was particularly frustrated at being unable to find out where I was going. Another fantasy was that if his treatment had occurred early in my professional career, I would always remember him as my first cure. But since this was no longer possible, he wanted to maintain his neurosis and therefore be my only therapeutic failure. "You will never forget me, because for the rest of your life there will be a thousand cures and me, the only failure." At one point, in speaking of his ability to avoid experiencing deep affect, he said, "How would we ever get a cure if you were *not* going. I could play this game for the rest of my life."

In the last few days of the analysis he said: "I love you, and I want to be with you, and I don't want you to leave me. But if you do, I love you anyway. It's there and nothing can change it." After elaborating his awareness of a genuine feeling and his pleasure in having it, even if one of sadness, he went on to say "your decision to go was based purely on you, and was not an attempt to abandon or destroy me. I no longer see myself left bare in the snow. If my wife were to leave me, it would be because she preferred not to be with me. But you will do better somewhere else, and somehow that's different."

At the time of the last session he was in realistic financial trouble and did not pay the final bill. Three months later, I sent him a follow-up bill which is still unpaid. My interpretation is that he is using the unpaid bill as the basis of the fantasy that I think of him frequently and, therefore, that our relationship will continue indefinitely.

Patient #5: A 35-year-old scientist entered analysis in September, 1960, with a chief complaint of a work inhibition. He was fully capable of working in collaboration with, or for, other people, and helped his students to do successful work, but was unable to produce the type of scientific creative work of which he was capable. In addition, his symptoms included recurrent moderately severe depressive episodes.

During the first four and one-half months of analysis, the patient proved to be extremely articulate, introspective, and psychologically perceptive, and developed a positive transference relationship, as the result of which he noted an alleviation of symptoms and a return of his capacity for creative work. He was able to write three significant scientific papers and there were manifest derivatives of steadily intensifying transference up to the time I told him of the impending termination.

Initially the patient fantasied that, with the pressure on him to finish prior to my departure, he would be able to resolve his problems more rapidly than most patients in analysis and might actually complete his treatment by June. Accompanying this was a fantasy that, analogous to his own work with students when time was short, I could change my approach, and make an active and semimagical attempt to cure him. The patient manifested a number of depressive responses to the anticipated termination and loss of me, expressed repetitively in dreams and other tangential associations. He could express the thought content related to my departure, but the accompanying affect was subdued and bland.

Increasingly as he withdrew from the transference relationship, his

burst of productivity and capacity for work lessened, and he became discouraged, angry, and ambivalent about resuming analysis with someone else. Having glimpsed the productivity of which he was capable while in the earlier phases of analysis, he believed he should continue it, but he feared trusting another analyst lest the same desertion occur.

In the next-to-last session the patient described his feelings "as if the analysis was buried and packed away. It is very much like peas that are tilled under to improve the soil—the temptation is to collect them and not plow them under, but I know that I have to plow the analysis under and start over."

Discussion

This form of termination, a geographical move by the analyst, introduces a number of specific factors which do not occur in the more customary situation of terminating an analysis. It represents an arbitrary decision by the analyst based on his own interests and needs, and does not take account of the potential impact on the patient, or of whether the patient is ready for termination. The patient has no active participation in the decision; it is fixed and irrevocable, and cannot be tentative, or delayed as in other analytic situations. In addition, it may come suddenly and unexpectedly so that there can be no advance preparation; and it introduces the patient to a set of facts in the reality of the analyst's life, outside of the analytic situation.

Thus the net effect is to introduce into the transference situation a currently stressful and traumatic *reality* event. It involves a repetition for the patient of infantile and childhood helplessness in the face of arbitrary parental behavior, and the feelings of rejection and desertion experienced by the patient have a basis in current reality. In the more usual termination phase, the patient may experience feelings of rejection and desertion by the analyst, but the reality of the situation is otherwise, and the conflict remains intrapsychic.

In spite of this difference, however, significant therapeutic work can be done in this termination phase. In the setting of a transference relationship, or of a regressive transference neurosis, the patient must now integrate and to some extent work through the conflicts evoked by the partly realistic traumatic situation. When the forced termination can be anticipated far enough in advance (in contrast to sudden illness or death)

the analytic situation can be maintained, and the working through process continued to the last session.

As would be anticipated, the patients' responses were a function of the nature and intensity of the transference neurosis. Patient #1, who had avoided a regressive transference neurosis, manifested a reaction of hurt and anger, but only in derivative and remote fashion. He never experienced a grief response; instead he withdrew even further from the analytic relationship. In patient #5, where the transference neurosis was only beginning, there was a cessation of further transference development, with continuing efforts at intellectual understanding but intensified defenses against affective experience.

Patients #2, #3, and #4 each had a significantly regressive and intense transference neurosis established at the time of the announcement, and the affective components of grief, depression, anger, rage and attempts to maintain a loving relationship were all consciously manifest and, at least to some extent, worked through. All three of these patients repeatedly stated their feeling that in one way or another their behavior had been a factor in the termination, whereas such guilt feelings were absent in cases #1 and #5.

All of the patients attempted to mobilize guilt in me for the termination, but again this was most prominent in cases #2, #3 and #4 and least so in case #1. In this connection, the maintaining of symptoms was a prominent feature, since to make further strides forward and to resolve conflict effectively meant minimizing my guilt, whereas to remain sick would intensify it. Patients #2, #3 and #4 expressed a variety of suicidal fantasies as part of their reaction. In #2 and #4, these were primarily related to aggressive wishes for revenge against me. In #3 this also represented the fantasy of reunion with the dead father.

For four of the patients, the forced termination represented a repetition of significant earlier pathogenic experiences of separation from key objects. For patient #1, it represented the sudden and anxiety-provoking separation from parents at the time of his surgical experiences in early childhood. It was the reality event he had anticipated ever since, and it had been partly against this eventuality that many of his character defenses were originally established. For patient #2, it represented a repetition of the loss of her father at age three and one-half, when he was inducted into the army. For patient #3, it represented a repetition of the father's death. For patient #4, it meant a repetition of the arbi-

trary experience of "abandonment and desertion" in early childhood by both parents, and subsequently the disruption of the family by divorce when he was 12. In patient #5, no major early separation experiences were uncovered.

In cases #2, #3, and #4, the termination served as a catalyst for the mobilization of rage, and the negative transference. And, in cases #2 and #4, it had a rather specific impact on the working through of the transference resistance. For a considerable period of time, patient #2 had resisted progress in an attempt to achieve transference gratification and, with the announced termination and the frustration of the transference wishes, there was a sharply increased rate of maturation and achievement of more realistically oriented gratifications in her other relationships. Patient #4 revealed that the previous two terminations of treatment had been undertaken with the consciously avowed intention of returning at a later date, and the forced termination meant that this time "it was for real."

In each case, I had to make a decision whether or not to recommend that the patient continue in analysis with someone else after I left. Patient #1 had already had 775 hours of analysis at the time I announced the termination. The pressure of symptoms had subsided, there had been an unchanging resistance to the development of a transference neurosis, and an avowed lack of interest in further self-exploration. I therefore felt that further analysis at that time was not warranted, and made no mention of transfer to another analyst, nor did the patient propose this.

Patient #2 had had 575 hours of analysis and was involved in an intense transference resistance. Prior to making my decision to move, I had already begun to consider the setting of a termination date as a possible means of dealing with this. Hence, I did not consider suggesting a transfer and, when the patient herself brought this up, I interpreted it to her as a manifestation of continuing resistance.

Patient #3 had already manifested a moderate structural change, was involved in a regressive transference neurosis, and had the potential for significant further analytic exploration and development. In announcing the termination, I therefore told her that we would work until June, and that it was possible she would be able to complete her analysis by then, but that, if further analysis was indicated then, arrangements could be made to transfer her to another analyst. This meant to her a repetition of the experience of being expected to accept a stepfather when she was

13, and brought into conscious focus many of her previously repressed reactions to that event. Her determination to complete analysis before my departure was in part a refusal to accept such a substitute for the real father. During the remaining time she made significant progress in conflictual areas in addition to her separation reaction, and transfer to another analyst was not felt to be necessary.

Patient #4 had in the past repeatedly acted out his denial of affect over separations by seeking substitute objects, and I felt that transfer to another analyst would represent the same defensive acting-out, and would permit him to avoid experiencing the full impact of the separation from me. There were also realistic financial objections to his continuing analysis. Therefore no suggestion of transfer was made by me, and the patient himself, recognizing his wish to find another analyst as a neurotic defense, did not pursue it.

Patient #5 had a considerable creative potential if his inhibitions could be analyzed. He was told that it was unlikely his analysis could be completed in the time remaining, and transfer to another analyst in June was recommended. Although he accepted this intellectually, he did not follow through on the recommendation. One and one-half years later I heard indirectly that he was again seeking an analysis.

The countertransference implications in the termination included, most prominently, a feeling of guilt at "deserting" the patients. In interpreting resistances against development of the transference neurosis, I had tacitly urged the patients to trust me and to invest emotionally in the relationship, and there was an implied promise that the analysis would be continued to the point of an appropriate conclusion. The sudden termination therefore meant a breaking of this trust and of the implied promises. Also because of some separation experiences in my own life, as well as the nature of the termination of my own analysis, I was aware of a tendency to over-identify with my patients in their reactions to the termination.

I was also aware of a number of feelings of disappointment at leaving the job unfinished, particularly in cases #3, #4 and #5, with the sense of regret that all of these patients were probably capable of a more completely self-fulfilling and self-developing analytic experience than could occur in the face of this termination. Furthermore, my various reality problems involved in making the move at times interfered with the ideal of analytic composure and freedom from personal tension and uncertainty.

Upon arrival in St. Louis, I had the experience of dealing with this same problem from a different perspective. About a month before my arrival, one of my analytic colleagues in St. Louis suffered a sudden heart attack and had to curtail his practice and transfer a number of his patients to other therapists. I began analysis with two of his patients. Although I was alert to the implications that such a termination and transfer to another analyst would entail, these reactions never emerged significantly when the patients resumed analysis with me. One patient had only recently begun analysis and was not yet sufficiently involved in a transference relationship to be aware of any response other than that of concern regarding the reality of his analyst's illness. The other patient, who had been in analysis considerably longer, had successfully maintained intense resistances against the development of a regressive transference neurosis. The fact of a three and one-half month summer break before he resumed analysis, the necessity to establish a relationship with me, and the nature of his defenses against object relatedness, all precluded much response to the former analyst's illness.

In conclusion, forced termination of analysis, once a transference neurosis had been established, involves a number of reactions similar to those in termination of any analytic treatment. In addition, however, it introduces a number of specific elements which make it a dynamically different experience for the patient and for the analyst. The more the reactions and responses can be elaborated in the work with the original analyst prior to the occurrence of the termination, the more likely it is that the patient will be capable of at least some working through and resolution of associated conflicts. Where the elaboration of such reactions must occur in a subsequent therapeutic setting, and the patient is preoccupied with the establishment of the new transference relationship, there is a much greater possibility of successful repression of these separation responses, so that when they eventually do emerge they are likely to be reacted to as a past memory rather than as a current transference experience.

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READING NOTES

Dr. Gunter Ammon came to the Foundation from Germany in 1958. One of his hobbies was an intense interest in primitive cultures; several times he visited Mexico, and in particular the Lacandon Indians, descendants of the old Mayas. He learned their language; introduced them to hypnosis, aspirin and other blessings of white civilization, and studied their customs. They in turn presented him with many of their artifacts, some of which he contributed to the Museum of The Menninger Foundation.

Dr. Ammon also studied the peyote cult and participated in some of the rituals of the Native American Church, whose annual convention was held near Topeka in July. This experience he reported at one of our colloquia. He made numerous gifts to the Library and Museum of the Foundation and his parting presentation was an ancient leather bound volume, published in 1750, which contains Celsus' book *De medicina* and several commentaries on the work compiled and edited by one T. J. ab Almelo-veen. Garrison says that Celsus' book "contains, among other things, the first use of the term 'insanity' (*Insania*)."¹ All we can find, however, in our amateurish researches is a reference in the index to "*insania quando expectanda*," pages 62-63. Calling upon our Latin scholars in the Department of Religion and Psychiatry we have scanned these two pages without discovering how insanity is there defined or described. Nevertheless we are grateful to Dr. Ammon for this and other things, and we retain faith in Dr. Garrison, whose Latin was probably more fluent than ours.

P.S. As this copy goes to press, we learn that Dr. Ammon is happily married and has set up in private practice of psychiatry and psychoanalysis in Berlin.

* * * *

In the annual report from our publishers, I learn that *Love Against Hate* and *Man Against Himself* continue to be sold in about equal numbers—together nearly 10,000 copies in the last six months. But most interesting to Jean and me is the fact that during the same six months the Spanish edition sold about 3,000 copies, the Finnish edition even more (exact number not known to me), the Japanese edition a great many more (number of copies not known to me), and the English edition the fewest.

* * * *

In the May 1965 issue of *The Historical Society Mirror*, published by the Kansas State Historical Society, editor Nyle Miller says:

"The New *Webster's International Dictionary*, dubbed Webster III, has some of us talking to ourselves.

"When in high school, I worked before and after classes on the old *Anthony Bulletin*. Besides melting and pouring lead, and taking care of the usual chores of a printer's devil, I was given the opportunity to learn to operate the linotype.

"I shall never forget one afternoon. I appeared for work feeling quite chipper about the string of type I had set the evening before, when the regular linotype operator angrily confronted me with my proofs.

"He pounded them with his fist as he lectured about my abysmal ignorance of word divisions. And furthermore, he lashed on, 'don't ever, ever divide the word bishop on the hop!' It's 'bish-op,' but preferably no division at all, he raged.

"That scene was burned in my memory. Ever since I have made every effort to remember word divisions. Now, Webster's third edition comes along to contradict much that I learned. When some of us first heard of the idiosyncrasies of the new dictionary we hoped if we ignored the work that it would go away.

"It didn't, and we're being stuck with many innovations. For examples, the word arctic, Webster now tells us, can be pronounced without the first 'c,' and it's all right for sherbet to be spelled sherbert. 'Bas-ic' is divided 'ba-sic,' 'nursery' becomes 'nur-sery,' and 'scen-ery' is 'sce-nery.'

"Heaven be praised, though. His worship, the 'bish-op' still stands as of old, even through the authority of this Webster. Hopefully the old printer can continue to rest unturned in his grave. However, the way things seem to be going it may be OK, in another score years, to dissect bishop 'on the hop.' May I be spared the day!"

* * * *

The Chicago Natural History Museum Bulletin for July 1965 contains bad news. Great ice sheets have repeatedly pushed down from the poles, as you know, piling up on the land, crushing everything before them, diminishing the oceans, only to melt after a few thousand years and recede again toward the poles leaving everything in a mess.

Because a way has been found to record the temperatures of the ocean at various times in the world's history back 300,000 or more years (by making chemical examinations of the plankton dug up from the ocean bottom), we know now that there have been seven great warm spells and seven great cold spells since 300,000 B.C. And at the present time we are heading for a cold spell; in fact, we are *in* it. The glaciers will be upon us

here by the year 15,000; then it will start to warm up again. Do you wish now they hadn't made this ingenious discovery of how to know how cold the ocean was nearly a half million years ago?

* * * *

Calvin Wells, the author of *Bones, Bodies and Disease* (Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), is described as having studied both anthropology and medicine in London and Paris, and as having worked for the British Inspectorate of Ancient Monuments and for several museums. The text of his book is illustrated by figures, followed by full pages of half-tones with subsequent notes on both the figures and the plates. It describes and illustrates medical conditions of many kinds discoverable or deducible in the bones, mummies, drawings and artifacts of prehistoric peoples.

Inasmuch as our Museum has recently acquired a pre-Columbian pair of figurines which seem to illustrate the very act of skull trephining, I read with particular care the author's chapter on that subject. According to him it was done by many primitive peoples in many different parts of the world. In one site in France, sixty skulls were found together of which five had been trephined. The Peruvians were, of course, masters at it, recovered skulls there showing definite evidence that three quarters or more of the patients survived the ordeal and frequently underwent it a second or third time.

Incidentally all psychiatrists will be interested in the sincipital-T burnings—a treatment given melancholy women, consisting of an inflammatory reaction from the frontal back to the occipital bone induced by incising the scalp and pouring boiling oil or resin directly onto the periosteum.

* * * *

Dr. Edward Pinckney is a competent internist with an alert and inventive mind. I know him to be an excellent teacher. Why he became so angry at the claims and theories and propositions of psychoanalysis I do not know. But his book, *The Fallacy of Freud and Psychoanalysis* (Prentice-Hall, 1965), is full of angry skepticism, to put it mildly.

His zeal leads him into some extravagances. "I do not know of a single case where a psychoanalyst, even one with a medical degree, performed a comprehensive physical examination on his patient before commencing analytic treatment." Now Ed knows me and he knows that I always insisted on physical examinations on all of our patients at the Menninger

Clinic, not only before analysis begins but regularly every year during the analytic treatment. And we aren't the only ones who do this.

* * * *

Rescue in Denmark (Simon & Schuster, 1963) is a detailed account of how the people in Denmark did what the people of all other countries, including our own, failed to do. They refused to countenance the destruction of the Jews by the Germans. They refused to cooperate with the Germans in finding Danish Jews and took vigorous measures to smuggle Jews out of Denmark as rapidly as possible.

The details which the author, Harold Flender, has collected are fascinating and the total impression of Danish character is inspiring—although nothing new to us. It is a psychological problem of more than academic interest to try to answer the question the author poses in the last chapter—*Why the Danes?*

Every Dane ought to have a copy of this book to put proudly on his mantle and every Jew or friend of the Jews ought to have a copy on hand, to remind him that in one of the darkest hours of history there was one group of people whose convictions resisted all threats. In so doing (and in other ways), the Danes proved themselves the most civilized nation in the world.

* * * *

The third volume of *Nederlands Handboek der Psychiatrie* by Professor Doctor J. J. G. Prick and our Dr. H. G. van der Waals has just appeared. Unfortunately few of us can read Dutch and we hope that this will someday be translated. However, in *Psychiatria, Neurologia, Neurochirurgia* (Vol. 68, pp. 229–240, 1965) a reviewer, E. A. D. E. Carp, says:

“Any attempt at objective evaluation of the Psychiatric Textbook by Prick *et al.* leads one, after a repeated study of the contents and guiding principle of the book, to the conclusion that here a serious effort has been made to overcome the slump which has characterized the evolution of psychiatry in the past ten years. In the early years of this century an attempt was made to found a clinical psychiatry on psychiatric disease pictures as entities; this was followed by attempts at a multidimensional psychiatric nosology; designs for a psychiatry based on personalistic foundations; the beginning of a design for an anthropological psychiatry on the basis of existential analytical principles. The present attempt offers a clinical psychiatry based on mainly biological principles. Undoubtedly the results of, and insights into modern chemotherapy, and modern advances in the field of cerebral physiology, must have something to do with the optimism displayed in presenting this approach. It can also be

pointed out that our compatriot Prick is among the few who can claim authority in these widely divergent fields.

“The first two chapters, written by our compatriot in the USA, Dr. H. G. van der Waals, provide an introduction to nosological systematics and the general theory of neuroses. The main features of the psychoanalytic personality theory are clearly presented. In the reviewer's opinion, even those who believe they are sufficiently familiar with the theory of psychoanalysis will find it useful to study this part, which combines succinctness with thoroughness and readability. The theory is elucidated by many examples, and the author again and again demonstrates his familiarity with newer concepts which have rejuvenated the theory of psychoanalysis.”

* * * *

The Sixth Mental Measurements Yearbook (Gryphon Press, 1965) edited by Oscar Krisen Buros is a book I am not competent to review, but those who are competent to do so, clinical psychologists, would probably pale before the task. It is a huge book—over 1700 pages; there are approximately 10,000 names in the index and some of these names are followed by many references. There are 50 pages, double column, of the contributing test reviewers—400 of them. Over 1200 tests are listed and most of them critically reviewed.

This book sells for \$32.50 but I presume no library or clinical psychology board could afford to be without it.

* * * *

Two psychoanalysts, Herbert Hendin and Willard Gaylin, and a psychologist, Arthur Carr, undertook to study twelve nurses who had no complaints but who were paid to come for five interviews each. Psychological tests were administered independently by the psychologist. *Psychoanalysis and Social Research* (Doubleday, 1965) is a report of those interviews—a few pages of each, with the exception of samples in which all five interviews were summarized. The conclusion relates to the process of estimating the tension level of individuals who are not sick and who do not consider themselves so but who, of course, have “problems.”

“The discrepancy between how these individuals function and any textbook description of health or ideal adjustment is striking . . . [They] turned out to have as much evidence of impairment in function as . . . patients in psychiatric practice. . . . What makes one individual with a problem seek help while another does not?”

* * * *

Dr. Reuben Fine, the clinical psychologist, is the same Reuben Fine whom all chess players know from his fine, classic analyses of the game of chess. He is a relative, as some may remember, of our colleagues and former associates here, Henry and Milton Wexler, and may have been inspired by them to enter his present career. In *Acta Psychologica* (Volume 24, 1965, pp. 352-370) he presents a subjective (he calls it introspective) account of blindfold chess playing. He himself played only private games during his visits here—not blindfolded. Kaltanowski, who is even more famous for his blindfold playing, stayed with us several days and permitted Dr. David Rapaport to make many psychological tests on him to see if we could learn how it is done. We didn't. Dr. Fine carries the investigation forward in a most interesting way, but he concedes that it needs more study.

(Just for the annals of history, I want to record that through some accident of fate or skillfully masked courtesy on the part of Kaltanowski, I managed to tie one game with him here while he was playing a score of others, blindfolded!)

* * * *

Dr. Douglass Orr was with us for four years as a resident and staff member. He went to England in 1936 and studied health insurance and medical care, and wrote a book about it. After the war he went to Seattle, and more recently to Los Angeles. In all of these places he had much contact with social workers, clergymen, physicians, teachers and others who counseled people who were in distress. His recent *Professional Counseling on Human Behavior: Its Principles and Practices* (Franklin Watts, 1965) is a simple, didactic book about counseling, clearly written and soundly based. Like many other books which substitute clear, simple English for recondite and abstruse ponderosities, this book may be passed over by some as an elementary text for the unsophisticated. But such readers had better look again, especially psychiatric residents. It's good. I am personally pleased to discover that the message of our *The Vital Balance* proved to be so acceptable and useful to the author.

* * * *

The Two Assassins (Crowell, 1965) is a conscientious summary of clinical data on two recently famous murderers written by a well-known and most proficient science writer, Lucy Freeman, aided by Dr. Renatus Hartogs, the psychiatrist who said in 1954 after examining Lee Harvey

Oswald, "This child is explosively dangerous and we can expect him to commit an act of violence during his lifetime if he does not get help in understanding his fury."

* * * *

I had no idea that the notion of a mechanical man, the robot, concept is of such fascinating interest to the public. But it really is, I conclude from having glanced through a book, *The Pseudo-People* (Sherbourne, 1965), by William Nolan. I learn that there are four anthologies of science fiction dealing with this subject, this being the fifth. Besides that, there is much robot fiction.

At first I thought I would not read any of these stories but I did, and they are far from dull. In some of them, the robots are conceived of as benign and helpful, having been programmed so as to be incapable of violence. In other stories, they are completely ruthless, incapable of emotions.

* * * *

I like books that describe the realization of a dream. *A Thousand Ages* by Nancy D. Sachse (Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 1965) is about an arboretum at the University of Wisconsin, which I made a special trip to see because I had heard what a wonderful thing it had become.

In 1853, one man of vision urged the University to obtain specimens of the trees and shrubs characteristic of the State and said he would "venture to predict that the University or College that shall first surround itself with such an 'Arboretum' will first secure the patronage and good opinion of the people, and will outstrip those institutions that show a lack of taste and refinement by omitting to plant trees."

Well, the University was a long time getting around to accepting this suggestion. The Arboretum was again urged by a landscape artist in 1907; this stirred up "enormous enthusiasm. Enough of the older generation remained to recall the wilderness paradise and demand action." During the years I was attending the University, the President tried to get funds for the proper land acquisitions but failed. Then in the late 1920s, a man named Michael B. Olbrich began to speak out for an Arboretum and the preservation of wildness. One member of the famous Dr. Jackson family, the son of the pioneer doctor, Joseph W. Jackson, listened. (One of his descendants is now a Fellow in the Menninger School of Psychiatry.)

In 1929, came the financial crash and the sudden death of Mr. Olbrich. The Arboretum idea seemed lost. The Indian mounds were being destroyed by vandals. But 28 acres of unmolested wilderness, containing some mounds and an Indian trail to a spring where an Indian still lived, aroused the special interest of the Dr. Jackson, aforementioned, who had never forgotten Olbrich. He gave a dinner in 1931 to revive the project.

Then ensued "an extraordinary period . . . during which the regents and the administration of the university maintained an attitude of greatest caution." (!!!) But, under the leadership of Dr. Jackson, the Arboretum finally got going and a committee was formed on which many agencies were represented. I will skip the ups and downs thereafter—the tremendous difficulties they had getting started, the many men who were disappointed, the hopes and failures of their efforts. With the greatest difficulties, little piece of land after little piece were acquired until finally a wonderful collection of trees and plantings, springs and mounds, wild life habitats, ponds and hills, were put together in one of the best arboretums in the nation.

I am proud that a member of our profession helped push it over the peak of the resistance. And what is the lesson of this for us in regard to *our* arboretum (feebly begun in 1933) and other projects?

K.A.M.

TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY REUNION OF THE MENNINGER SCHOOL OF PSYCHIATRY

The 20th anniversary reunion of the Menninger School of Psychiatry will be held in Topeka, April 1, 2 and 3, 1966. Alumni and faculty members of the School and graduates of other professional training programs of the Foundation have responded enthusiastically, by the hundreds, to the announcement of the occasion, so that original plans and locations have had to be revised to accommodate the numbers expected.

Distinguished guest speakers will be Miss Anna Freud, director of the Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic and training center, London, England; Dr. Lewis Robbins, medical director of the Hillside Hospital, Glen Oaks, New York; Dr. Rudolf Ekstein, Reiss-Davis Clinic for Child Guidance, Los Angeles, California; and Dr. John Sutherland, medical director of the Tavistock Clinic, London, England.

Nine scientific workshops will be held. Subjects and leaders will include:

Community Psychiatry, Drs. Roy Menninger, Ivor Jones, Lenny Duhl, and others.

Hospital Psychiatry, Dr. Peter Fleming, Lewis Robbins, Ruth Barnard and Irving Kartus.

Adolescent Psychiatry, Drs. Cotter Hirschberg, Edward Greenwood, Stuart Averill and Donald Rinsley.

Correctional Psychiatry, Drs. Herbert Modlin, Cecil Chamberlin and others.

Psychiatric Education, Drs. Paul Pruyser, Charles Hofling, Samuel Schiff, Milton Miller and others.

Research, Dr. Robert Wallerstein and others.

Psychotherapy, Drs. Bernard Hall, William Tarnower and Murray Bowen.

Private Practice, Drs. Jack Dunagin, John Adams and George Guthrey.

Psychoanalysis, Drs. Robert Forman, Ernst Ticho and others.

The workshops will be followed by a colloquium (a Saturday morning tradition in the School) by Dr. Karl Menninger.

The Freudian Follies will be recreated one evening by Dr. Victor Bikales, Dr. George Guthrey, Dr. Jerry Katz, Dr. Ann Appelbaum, and other original members of the casts.

Dr. Herbert Klemmer is chairman of the Steering Committee, assisted by Dr. Donald Neher, Irving Sheffel and P. K. Worley. Other committees: Publicity, Dr. Robert Menninger; Program, Drs. Dennis Farrell, Philip Woollcott, Walter Menninger; Publications, Drs. Dennis Farrell, Ali Mebed; Arrangements, Drs. William Tarnower, Ronald Chen, R. E. Reinert, Jerome Katz, Ann Appelbaum, Herbert Klemme and Mr. P. K. Worley; Women's Program, Mrs. Anthony Kowalski, Mrs. Ali Mebed, Mrs. Lawrence Kennedy, Mrs. Carroll Elmore.

difficult to command, as when a small boy or girl speaks as if full-fledged masculinity could, in this way, be achieved. Lispering may represent continued infantilism. The use of an *f* sound in place of an unvoiced *th*, as when *thing* becomes *fung*, indicates a history of struggle towards an adjustment with one's father. The first question, before we get to *validation*, is the matter of the originality and the reasonableness of this approach; and on both scores the book makes good.

The procedure of the book is straightforward. Seventeen "working assumptions" are made, based partly on direct observations of the speech of children, and partly on psychoanalytic and other clinical concepts. They are not stated in the crisp form which would make sharp verification or refutation possible. This is a pilot study; it will advance our confidence in the general utility of a way of working. This manner of working consists of two steps: (1) Interview and speech tests given by a speech-and-hearing expert (C.R.) to a group of twenty-four pre-adolescent children who are subjects for a longitudinal study at The Menninger Foundation; (2) independent observation of copious developmental data on the same children by a clinical psychologist (A.M.). The speech-and-hearing expert marshals his evidence in a rather global fashion, itemizing each observation, but allowing himself free scope in drawing interpretations; he then "postdicts" or states, without seeking further information, what the prior and present personality problems of the child must be. Thus, from the "tongue thrust" he concludes the presence of vigorous phallic strivings which may combine with, or be offset by, other psychosexual manifestations. Some of the postdictions actually go back to early infancy; some to the pre-school period; some to a period not long before the time of his own observations; while some relate to the child as he now is at the time the examiner observes him. Thus, a better word than *postdiction* needs to be found. In most cases it is clear from the record what period is referred to.

The examiner turns over to the clinical psychologist the set of such postdictions. It is then her task, marshaling a great deal of evidence, particularly the data gathered in pre-puberty clinical interview by Doctor Povl Toussieng, to state the degree of conformity with the facts as clinically observed, rating these on a five-point scale. Doctor Moriarty, though her conscientious work is well known, does not pretend to be an "uncontaminated" judge; nor is it claimed that Doctor Rousey himself had no information but the observed speech responses; he interviewed

BOOKS BY MEMBERS OF THE STAFF

Diagnostic Implications of Speech Sounds: The Reflections of Developmental Conflict and Trauma. By CLYDE L. ROUSEY and ALICE E. MORIARTY. Introduction by Peter Ostwald. \$7.75. Pp. 156. Springfield, Ill., Charles C Thomas, 1965.

Evaluations of personality have been greatly enriched in the last few years by studies of "expressive behavior" of many forms. The evolutionary perspective of Darwin, with emphasis upon "expression of the emotions," and the psychoanalytic approach of Freud, with emphasis on unconscious control of motor outlets, as in slips of speech, have taught both clinicians and experimentalists to look everywhere for types of postural, gestural, facial, vocal, and many other types of expression which can reveal the conscious, preconscious, unconscious meanings of inviting and threatening situations. Much of this is called today "non-verbal communication."

Of intense interest is communication which is both verbal and non-verbal, in the sense that the speech mechanisms may be involved in a rather simple anatomical-physiological fashion, and also in true speech, in which meanings or complex social implications may be conveyed through the use of these speech organs, and through the apprehension of meanings implicit in the speech of others. The present volume deals primarily with the former system of functions, described in the present volume as *speech*, but incidentally here and there includes also some reference to *language*, that is, to the meaningful organization of speech sounds.

Conceptually and clinically, the book marks an important advance in documentation of the thesis that the emotional history, the impulse-defense configurations (past and present) betray themselves to the trained observer. The open channels of expression may yield vowels, conceived primarily to express aggressive and sexual impulses, while consonants give sharp definition and indicate the adjustment predicaments in which the person is placed. The basic hypothesis of the book is that the way in which the mechanisms of speech are used, even when meaning is not included, represent adaptive or adjustment ways of confronting life. Hoarseness, for example, may represent an unconscious effort to place the voice at a pitch range which is physiologically dif-

the child about his speech history. These admissions appropriate in a pilot study will, at the same time, suggest to the reader that there is much more to be done, at a later stage, in preventing possible contamination in such studies. As noted, postdictions sometimes relate to events actually current in the life of the child rather than to an earlier period, and since the observer, who was physically present in administering the examination, must have formed some clinical impressions of his own through cues other than speech cues, this leaves one with a hope that some of these sources of possible "contamination" may, in later studies, be reduced or eliminated.

If one wishes a "box score" of general success, this lies at the level of about eighty percent judgments essentially correct as seen in Doctor Moriarty's evaluation. Such box scores, however, are of rather limited significance under the circumstances. It would still be worth while to try a control method, namely to see how far the postdictions made about a certain child would apply to other children used as "control" children from the same study. Even though this would not remove all of the contamination, it would have some value in terms of perspective, and should be done.

More important to this reviewer than the high box scores is the rational and orderly way in which the speech expert has prepared material which a clinical psychologist can then evaluate in terms of other behavior criteria. This is well done. Lucidity and charm are achieved in this report. Secondly, much to be commended, is the development of working assumptions which are nearly ready, and should soon be entirely ready to take the form of hypotheses which can be objectively and quantitatively tested. Third, emphasis must be placed upon the challenging evidence that not only speech itself, but the *perception* of speech fits into the same general normative scheme, so that the child who has difficulty in proper *control* of the speech apparatus (e.g., so as to produce, when needed, two speech patterns which have different significance in our culture) likewise fails even to *hear* these two patterns as distinct; the difficulty is perceptual-motor, not just motor. Pursuit of this latter point would tie this more closely with a number of projective tests which are primarily perceptual rather than motor, and would articulate this with personality theory as a whole, on a broader basis than behavior analysis alone would permit.

In at least these three respects then, this is a valuable book. More

broadly, it is a vigorous presentation of a way of looking at speech production as a vehicle of communication which can in time be ordered within the larger sphere of communication studies as a whole.

Gardner Murphy, Ph.D.

The Church in a Changing World. By RICHARD A. BOLLINGER. \$1. Pp. 106. Elgin, Ill., The Brethren Press, 1965.

What might have been a fairly routine report of one more church conference has instead been presented as a highly interesting and significant document. If there are more creatively written summaries of a theological conference, they have never fallen into the hands of the reviewer.

The author points up in a vivid and inescapable way the dilemma of the Church of the Brethren today. The Brethren style was distinct and dynamic a century ago. In the 1860's, comments Bollinger, the Brethren were plain-spoken, noted for their industriousness, integrity, and frugality. They had a strong brotherly quality in their congregations, used "brother" and "sister" as forms of address, emphasized conformity to the group, wore distinctive dress, and refused military service. Today, most of this style has disappeared or been greatly modified. The uniqueness of the Brethren has eroded, until they are left with the question of who they are. He summarizes in one diary entry: "I have the feeling the struggle in this conference is coming out into the open. We are quite articulate about our past history but we don't quite know what to do with it. Can't go back, can't stand still, can't go forward. Will this conference provide an attractive alternative?"

With those words, Bollinger summed up not only the dilemma of the Brethren, but the massive crisis facing most Protestant groups today. It is for this reason the book deserves a wider reading than its original target audience. The institutional introversion of many churches has left them with a massive ambivalence about moving ahead in race relations, social problems, and community action, with church attendance declining across the country. The times will call for new church structures, and the battle for change is well joined.

This book will not comfort those seeking encouragement to hold onto the past, nor those seeking easy answers. It will stimulate those looking for an intelligent discussion of some of the pertinent issues facing Protestants.

Clyde H. Reid, Th.D.
New York, New York

BRIEF BOOK REVIEWS

The Psychiatric Unit in a General Hospital. RALPH KAUFMAN, ed. \$10. Pp. 482. New York, International Universities, 1965.

This book contains the proceedings of the Dedication Conference of The Institute of Psychiatry of the Mount Sinai Hospital of New York. The authors are thirty well-known authorities who discuss the psychiatric unit in a general hospital from the point of view of the setting and its personnel, the patient, the therapeutic programs, training and education programs, research and impact. The book is a must for those opening psychiatric units in a general hospital and provocative and stimulating in its application to predominantly psychiatric hospitals. The authors are aware that the addition of a psychiatric unit will upset the ecological balance of the general hospital. They are hopeful that the resulting problems can be resolved with mutual benefit. (Herbert Klemmer, M.D.)

The Therapeutic Dialogue. By JEROME L. SCHULMAN, JOSEPH C. KASPAR and PATRICIA M. BARGER. \$6.50. Pp. 163. Springfield, Ill., Charles C Thomas, 1964.

The authors have devised a system of examining the therapeutic interaction between patient and psychotherapist. It not only helps the reader organize a basic approach to developing the themes in the therapeutic process, but outlines the method which allows the therapist to better evaluate his work and use supervision. It is easily read and although primarily aimed at neophyte therapists, I would recommend it even for those with more experience. (Anthony Kowalski, M.D.)

Theories in Social Psychology. By MORTON DEUTSCH and ROBERT M. KRAUSS. \$3.95. Pp. 244. New York, Basic Books, 1965.

This is a brief and clearly written introduction to the guiding viewpoints in social psychology. Admirable as a textbook, it should also appeal to any psychologist who desires a wide-ranging overview of this highly fragmented field. As is inevitable in a work of this sort, much is lost when major theories are condensed and schematized to fit within a few pages: Erik Erikson, for instance, has received short shrift. But in general, the presentation appears balanced and judicious and the authors' evaluations fair. (James Taylor, Ph.D.)

The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. 20. RUTH S. EISSLER and others, eds. \$10. Pp. 566. New York, International Universities, 1965.

This current volume marks the twentieth year of publication for this annual, and the volume continues the stimulating level of eminence heretofore achieved. Because of the contribution it makes, and the clarity of its writing, we at The Menninger Foundation should take special pride in the paper included in this volume by Shevrin and Toussieng on tactile stimulation and instinctual development. As is always the case with these volumes, there are excellent contributions to theory, to various aspects of normal and pathological

development, and to the clinical matters of diagnosis and treatment. Whether one's work is with children or adults, there are articles which advance both one's knowledge and technique. (J. Cotter Hirschberg, M.D.)

The Executive Role Constellation. By RICHARD C. HODGSON, DANIEL J. LEVINSON and ABRAHAM ZALEZNIK. \$8. Pp. 509. Boston, Harvard University, 1965.

This study of the three top administrators of a mental hospital is an exciting and important step forward in the development of a dynamic social psychology of organizations. It combines vivid description of the day-by-day behavior of the executives with sophisticated understanding of psychoanalysis and role theory. It will be required reading for anyone interested in the study of people at work in organizations and will be equally important for serious students of management as well as those who are concerned with prevention of mental illness. (Harry Levinson, Ph.D.)

Psychological Processes in the Schizophrenic Adaptation. By SAMUEL J. BECK. \$10.75. Pp. 421. New York, Grune & Stratton, 1965.

This book is essentially an extension of Beck's earlier study of the structure of psychopathology in "The Six Schizophrenias." The latter is a unified effort to report the results of a factor analytic attempt to discern in Rorschach and psychiatric data stable patterns of psychopathology in a sample of schizophrenics. The present, more loosely organized work presents Beck's attempt to translate these statistically derived patterns into more concrete personality structures, as well as a longitudinal study of nine middle-class schizophrenic children. In the largest segment of the book Beck applies a conception of basic psychological processes to "The Six Schizophrenias" in an attempt to demonstrate schizophrenia as a mode of ego adaptation. While the general applicability of this effort is limited by methodological considerations and its validity by its dependence on unexamined, theoretical presuppositions, readers will nonetheless find this core segment of the book a clinically rich, suggestive, and erudite discussion of the nature of schizophrenia by a distinguished Rorschach expert and clinical psychologist. (Herbert E. Spohn, Ph.D.)

Versagt der Mensch oder die Gesellschaft? By FRIEDRICH HACKER. Pp. 424. Vienna, Europa Verlag, 1964.

This is a highly informative book by our well-known Los Angeles colleague and former staff member of the Menninger Clinic. The author makes a significant contribution to the psychological and sociological aspects of crime with the use of his rich clinical and courtroom experience, comparative discussions of American and European Laws and reflections on law as an important part of cultural development. He relates law to symbolism and mythology, and to psychoanalysis as well. Hacker is particularly refreshing and original when he deals with aspects such as "punishment and therapy," or when he examines the rational and irrational determinants of social punishment. This work is revolutionary, supernational and critical toward classical and conventional definitions,

such as crime, illness, society, the individual, guilt, and punishment. It is to be hoped that this work will appear in an English translation soon. (Günter Ammon, M.D.)

A Psychiatric Study of Fairy Tales. By JULIUS E. HEUSCHER. \$7.75. Pp. 224. Springfield, Ill., Charles C Thomas, 1963.

Psychoanalysts have some notions about the unconscious meanings of fairy tales. This was a thesis which interested the early psychoanalysts, particularly. It is a good mental discipline and a horizon-lifting experience to read this study of the language and meaning of fairy tales written from a quite different point of view, rather Jungian but not at all antipsychoanalytic, and certainly offering other than the conventional explanations. (K.A.M.)

Neuroses and Character Types. By HELENE DEUTSCH. \$7.50. Pp. 388. New York, International Universities, 1965.

Part one of this book contains the clinical essays that made up the volume *Psychoanalysis of the Neuroses*, published in 1930; part two is—with one exception—later clinical papers, some of which deal with follow-ups of cases first described in the author's original volume. Her paper on the "as if" personality is here, along with several clinical essays on literary figures, such as Don Quixote and Lord Jim. (Peter Hartocollis, M.D., Ph.D.)

Aspects of Depressive Illness. DAVID MADDISON and GLEN M. DUNCAN, eds. \$5. Pp. 184. Edinburgh, Livingstone, 1965.

Contained in this small volume are seven papers and the account of a panel discussion on depression—the result of a symposium arranged by the Postgraduate Committee in Medicine, University of Sydney (Australia). The principal guest speaker was Dr. Lawrence Kolb with the other participants coming from either Australia or New Zealand. All but the first two papers are clinically oriented with two outstanding contributions here being made by Doctor Kolb. His paper on psychotherapy in depression is directly applicable to the treatment approach found in our own hospital. Each paper is followed by a recorded question period which often emphasizes the principle points made by the speaker as well as dealing with any criticisms. Chapter Four contains an excellent concise summary of the literature in depression and deprivation in childhood. Anyone interested in this area, be he advanced professional or beginning resident, will be rewarded by the material. (Roman Borsch, M.D.)

Depressive States: A Pharmacotherapeutic Study. By ANTHONY HORDERN. \$7.50. Pp. 166. Springfield, Ill., Charles C Thomas, 1965.

This monograph describes a comparative study of two antidepressant drugs, amitriptyline and imipramine, on 137 hospitalized depressed patients. Extensive statistical data and factor analysis, presented in detail, lead the authors to conclude the superiority of amitriptyline in this double-blind clinical trial. The initial chapters present a brief review of the epidemiology of affective disorders and discuss other forms of somatic treatment for depression. (Arnold Wolfe, M.D.)