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SPECIAL ISSUE HONORING LEO RANGELL, M.D.

Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society / Institute

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EDITORIAL POLICY

The purpose of the Editorial Board is to publish a quarterly bulletin that will reflect a high level of scientific discourse in the field of psychoanalysis. While particular emphasis will be directed toward the psychoanalytic situation in Los Angeles, contributions from other national and international sources will be welcomed and encouraged. The editors will consider papers dealing with theoretical and applied psychoanalysis, reviews of psychoanalytically relevant books, reports of scientific meetings, essay reviews, brief communications and letters. Materials can be accepted for publication only on condition that they are contributed solely to the Bulletin.

All opinions expressed in the Bulletin are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society and Institute or its officers. All manuscripts, letters and business communications relating to the Bulletin should be sent to the Editor, Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Bulletin, 2014 Sawtelle Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90025. Manuscripts should be typewritten, double-spaced on 8½ x 11 paper.

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

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PRESIDENTIAL GREETING

This issue of our *Bulletin* is devoted to and in recognition of the many and varied contributions which Dr. Leo Rangell has made to the world of psychoanalysis. He has had recognition the world over for the highly respected quality of his thinking and skillful handling of many complex areas of clinical and theoretical problems. We have been more than pleased that Dr. Rangell has been an honorary member of our Society for a number of years and has continued to be very actively interested in our community.

It is with great pride and pleasure that I, on behalf of the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society and Institute as well as myself, do extend the warmest greetings to Dr. Rangell and his lovely and most gracious lady, Anita, without whose support some of the above productions of Leo's might not have been possible.

Mark F. Orfirer, M.D.
President, LAPSI

INTRODUCTION

It is with a great deal of pleasure that the Editorial Board presents this edition of the *Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Bulletin* to the readership.

It is a rare opportunity to be able to honor one of our own members during the time of his active, professional life.

Dr. Leo Rangell has been a major contributor to psychoanalysis locally, nationally, and internationally. His bibliography of over 250 publications represents an outpouring of the greatest magnitude. The range of his interests covers the gamut from neurology to penetrating psychoanalytic clinical and theoretical studies. While his psychoanalytic contributions have dealt with such themes as anxiety, compromise of integrity, and unconscious decision making, its main thrust has been to preserve, protect and expand on the development of psychoanalysis as a comprehensive theory of the mind with its roots in the study of the ego.

Dr. Rangell has held many high-ranking administrative positions during his active career. Among these have been three times President of the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society, President of the Southern California Psychiatric Society, as well as two terms as President of the American Psychoanalytic Association and two terms as President of the International Psychoanalytic Association.

The idea to devote an issue of the *Bulletin* to Dr. Rangell's work arose while planning the publication of the last issue of the *Bulletin*. That issue was devoted to papers presented at the 10-40 celebration. It was felt by some that Dr. Rangell's impact on the Los Angeles psychoanalytic scene needed greater emphasis than had been provided in these papers. It was proposed that we attempt a review of Dr. Rangell's place in Los Angeles psychoanalytic history by devoting a special edition of the *Bulletin* to his contributions.

We decided to ask some of our members to summarize various aspects of his work. Dr. Heiman van Dam, was chosen to cover the first half of Rangell's scientific production. His paper, "Leo Rangell, Crypto-Child Analyst," deals with Dr. Rangell's great interest and contribution to issues that interdigitate with child analytic themes. In an earlier part of the interview which became too lengthy to publish, Dr. Rangell spoke to Drs. Rodman and Wilson about his early years in Los Angeles during which he met regularly with a group of child analysts. This group evinced a freshness, zeal and devotion to their work which was encouraging and sustaining to the fledgling society.

Dr. Norman Atkins reports on the latter years of Rangell's writings from the seventies up until the present. He illustrates and integrates some of Rangell's most often quoted and far reaching clinical and theoretical discoveries and brings special notice to the broad sweep of Rangell's expansion of modern ego psychological thought.

Sadly, the warm, personal tribute by Helen Tausend, M.D., Dr. Rangell's long-time friend, colleague and fellow seminarian, must be published posthumously. We all share in the deep sorrow that she did not live to see the completion of this issue. Her sensitively written paper reflects the depths of her friendship and devotion to her friend and colleague.

Gerald Aronson, M.D., provides a penetrating study of Rangell's work from a classical, philosophical perspective. Dr. Aronson describes the nature of Rangell's creative mental processes and the manner in which they unfold.

Lee Shershow, M.D., our present Chairman of Professional Education, reports on Rangell's most recent Thursday night scientific presentation. He brings us up to date on some of Rangell's current thinking on the intra-psychic core of psychoanalysis.

Dr. Robert Rodman synthesizes and highlights elements of Rangell's thought as presented at a special Saturday convocation held at Cedars Sinai in April of 1986. Rather than reporting on the various papers and discussions, Dr. Rodman provides an overview of the day's proceedings. He draws special attention to the "total composite" nature of Rangell's theorizing and sees this as a unique dimension of his work. Particular note is taken of Rangell's contribution to total analytic theory — a prodigious attempt to include all of the meta-psychological points of view together with current expansions, under the umbrella of a balanced view of mankind in sickness and in health.

Dr. Wilson and Dr. Rodman spent approximately six hours interviewing Dr. Rangell with the sometimes presence of his gracious wife, Anita, at the Rangell home/office. The interview material was distilled to focus primarily on scientific issues. We are particularly pleased to be able to show glimpses of the human struggle which even an accomplished and experienced analyst goes through in dealing with very difficult clinical situations.

Finally, the issue is anchored by a paper which Dr. Rangell wrote. In it he explains, in sobering fashion, some of his reasons for feeling both pessimistic and optimistic about the psychoanalytic climate in Los Angeles. We admire and applaud his candor.

The editorial staff wishes, again, to thank all the participants in the special edition for their effort, dedication, and patience. We would especially like to express our gratitude to Dr. Rangell who worked steadfastly with us throughout the project.

We also appeal to the forbearance of the readership in waiting for the year that it took to complete this special issue. Many hours were devoted by all involved in its preparation. We hope you will feel that it was worth the wait.

THE EDITOR

INTERVIEW WITH:
LEO RANGELL, M.D.

INTRODUCTION

Leo and Anita Rangell welcomed the interviewers, Samuel Wilson and Robert Rodman to their Brentwood home on two evenings in the fall of 1987 for what turned out to be extremely spirited and interesting discussions on a wide variety of psychoanalytic subjects. The interviews took place in Dr. Rangell's study, a large, comfortable room filled with books, memorabilia, and examples of primitive art. It has been his professional office and consulting room for over 25 years, during which time he has conducted a full-time psychoanalytic practice, written a long succession of papers on the most pressing issues in the field, and served as President of the American and International Associations. The exchanges were warm and enthusiastic. Dr. Rangell was eager to respond at length to every topic posed. The first interview veered off in many directions and laid the groundwork for a more focused discussion in the second, which is the one published here. Dr. Rangell has an extraordinary range of ideas and information within his grasp, and can present clusters of related thoughts, together with the pertinent literature, quickly and easily. This capability and willingness to express himself is partly the result of a professional lifetime of writing papers and giving ex temporaneous discussions distinguished for clarity, conciseness and relevance. Anita Rangell sometimes interjected recollections of her own about places and people that arose in the discussion and it was clear that she has been her husband's constant and loving companion in his innumerable travels throughout the psychoanalytic world of places and ideas.

DR. WILSON:

I have a two part question to ask you. The first relates to your comment (during an earlier exchange not published here) about how the Society is fragmented into various groups or cliques. You talked about the fact that individuals in these groups only attend meetings where one of their own is holding forth, but eschew meetings where ideas different from theirs are being presented. You explained something about why you think this happens and wrote about it more extensively in your paper "Transference to Theory: The Relationship of Psychoanalytic Education to The Analyst's Relationship to Psychoanalysis." In addition to the factors you have mentioned, I have always wondered if a reason, and perhaps a major reason, psychoanalysts

continually seek out new theory or variations of theory is that they become discouraged with their clinical work and hope to find something new and fresh that will actually be helpful in their work with their patients. I suppose this might be a more positive way of looking at it. Secondly, and this derives from what I've just said, I have always been interested in the evidence for whether we are proceeding in the most efficacious manner or perhaps in an efficacious manner at all with an analysis. You apparently don't see much value in attempts being made to test the clinical psychoanalytic theory outside the consulting room by subjecting the raw data to various types of statistical and experimental analyses. If we don't do that, how can we escape the continual process of quoting one another and finally falling back on Freud or some other revered authority as the final arbiter of truth? Would you perhaps favor turning over this process to a community of scholars who would then arrive at correct formulations on a kind of high level philosophical discourse?

DR. RANGELL:

That is a very ambitious question or series of questions, all of which could lead either to a fragmented or coherent answer or essay. Where to start? Maybe I'll start backwards because that is what is freshest in my mind. No, I don't think the validation of psychoanalysis will come from a community of scholars who are not psychoanalysts. I think that we should listen very respectfully to philosophers, academicians, academic psychologists, historians and philosophers of science about the pitfalls and the shortcomings of our methodology and conclusions. But anyone not familiar with the emotional content or unconscious thinking which comes out of analysis nor with the method and spirit in which it emerges, is likely to approach all these subjects as if he were dealing mainly with rational, logical thinking. He is likely to attend primarily to surface manifestations, using the methods of his own science. He will have greater difficulty in establishing the scientific validity or falseness in our endeavors than we do. We certainly have a hard time ourselves. So I don't think that is an answer to the very important questions which you bring up. The danger of quoting one another is a distinct one. Karl Menninger pointed out the frequency with which Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein, and Anna Freud were re-quoted in paper after paper, leading to a stalemate in which other, more modern writers and contributors were left out. I certainly agree, and have stood for a complete opening of our minds to young thinkers, original thinkers, people who are willing to challenge old methods and try new ones. I think that we should listen to them all. They are welcome and should be listened to the way an analyst listens to material in general, how it fits the data, how it sits with respect to his sense of conviction. I don't think that you can judge a new or old contribution by dry statistical pre-analytic criteria or non-analytic criteria. New contributions, as well as extensions of old ones, have to be judged by the emotional resonance of truth.

Now, I come to the beginning. Is the fragmentation of societies due to another factor which you feel I have left out? Perhaps I have because I have stressed other ones than the disillusionment with therapeutic results.

I have had the experience over and over again of hearing the most dedicated analysts confess to me that their own personal analysis was a bad one, a failure. In fact I have yet to meet anyone who said he had a good one. It impressed me that some of the greats to whom I looked as models, told me that their analysts were bad clinically. Yet those people are not necessarily the ones who went from bad clinical experience to new theories.

I think that correct theory can explain failures as well as success. And new theory that claims success but cannot explain it does not impress me. I am much more impressed with a convincing explanation of a failure than an obscure and unconvincing explanation of a success. Therapeutic success can come from copper rather than gold, using the Freud metaphor. It can certainly come by suggestion. It can come by love. It can come by exhortation. It can come by authoritarianism. Certainly I don't aim to treat a patient with authoritarianism or exhortation. On the other hand, I have done what I consider to be good, proper, sincere, and what to me should be effective psychoanalytic hours of interpretation, or understanding, of being empathic, where the material that I put in did not go past the barrier of resistance and didn't have much effect. Nevertheless, if I could understand why the patient was resistant to what I was saying, I had hopes for the next day. I thought it was better analysis than if I had lost my patience, my temper, or reverted to some other type of therapy. So, I don't think that the fragmentation that lasts, that endures, can be explained simply by failure to get good therapeutic results. Many people have a tendency to jump quickly from one thing to another. Others stay a long time with one, and then a long time with another, and then a long time with another as well. In each era they give the illusion of having found an enduring system, so that people forget that some of these went from Klein to Bion to Kohut even to psychopharmacology as one of our analysts is doing. In the four or five year interval people forget the inconsistency and think that a new vein of gold has been tapped, and that each time the person is doing it with motives that one can follow and adhere to. I think that therapeutic disappointment leads more often to giving up the field of analysis completely. We have had some sad examples of that.

I remember a small cluster of people who were quick and eager followers of a new theory. It was in the first few weeks or months of the theory's popularity that I was meeting with them. They were trying to explain to me why they moved from their old teachers and mentors and leaders and were now speaking very negatively about them to the new ones. Two or three of them they looked toward each other and spoke almost in a single voice. I don't think any one of them alone would have had the courage or conviction to say this, but together they reinforced one another. They said "It (the new theory) works for us," meaning therapeutically. I didn't say then but I thought to

myself "It works for you? In two weeks you know that it works for you?" A few years later they dropped this new theory, because they could not tell until then whether it worked or not. So much for therapeutic success or failure as a motivation for fragmentation. I think it is an opportunistic one, but not an enduring one. Therapeutic disappointment is rarely approached in a rational and systematic way as a guide for what to do next. People just join the next charismatic leader or the new active and inviting social group, and start the process all over again. You asked what evidence we can have of the validity of our work and you had the feeling that I was against testing our work by experimental or scientific methods. Both of them need amendments. I am not against testing. I am for testing. But as I said in the answer to the first question I don't think that conventional types of testing are necessarily going to prove the validity of our conclusions and our formulations and our way of thinking. For example, controlled experiments by submitting detailed analytic hours taken from a tape or from a videotape, given to a series of evaluators. An analyst has a grant. The grant pays money. That enables him to hire evaluators. Of ten evaluators, maybe two are analysts. The others are psychiatrists, and some residents. But he teaches them how to evaluate on his scale. The scale is almost like marking a true/false question in college and just checking off yes, no, yes, no. And from the results of these quantitatively controllable statistics he will conclude by a majority vote of those ten people whether or not what the analyst said to the patient in that hour that is being evaluated hit the mark correctly. Did he get a grade from one to ten? Ten is right and zero is completely wrong. The reader then is supposed to have been presented with a good test of the methodology of psychoanalysis. I have never had much faith in anything that has come along so far with those methods. But some do strike me as better than others.

DR. WILSON:

That is a very complete answer. Are there any new ways to look at evidence or do you feel the old ways are adequate?

DR. RANGELL:

You're not asking whether there are any new ways of understanding material, but are there new ways of understanding or assessing psychoanalysis. I don't think there's any breakthrough. I don't know. Maybe a group of residents looking through a one way mirror at an analyst, not analyzing but conducting an analytically oriented hour, gives some kind of flavor to the viewer. It's terribly invaded by artificial factors and ethical factors, but still I think it gives a quarter or half of the flavor that can be gleaned. But it still doesn't give any satisfying proof of the rightness or wrongness. For instance, when people attribute motives to an analyst for what he says or what he thinks - the best example is Masson telling us why Freud used the concept of fantasy instead of sexual abuse - almost always that is a projection of the person who is doing the work. He certainly can't prove it and we can't disprove his allegations, except that we have confidence in one

person and not in another because of an accumulated lifetime of performance. I don't think we develop confidence in a person like Leo Stone because of one paper. It is a lifetime of consistent, sincere, coherent work. Why do we have respect for Freud, and not as much for Stekel or Ferenczi? It is not for whimsical, capricious reasons. A body of output impresses us for one thing, and comes from a character whom we would send our wives to for help. And we do not worship, at least we should not worship, nor denigrate Freud the person. Freud's personal life is really out of bounds. Freud did not have a charisma of person. He had a charisma of ideas. He appealed to whatever intellect was forthcoming from those he wrote for. A dull intellectual paper in our Society doesn't bring out the crowds. But the charismatic, controversial ones do. Always the people who have less compelling, less enduring ideas but who appeal to the crowd, or have shocking ways of presenting things, draw the bigger crowds. So, in answer to your question, I don't think there has been a breakthrough of anything that could make people believe or that can justify their belief. I think that has to come from a cognitive-affective, emotional, intellectual appreciation of correctness, and a sense of the likelihood of something being interestingly explanatory. I mean "interestingly" in a way that only analysis brings about. Nothing else does.

DR. RODMAN:

In matters of scientific conviction, I always think about the phlogiston theory, which had to do with an hypothesized substance around which many theories were built, before the discovery of oxygen. Thomas Kuhn talks about it in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Everyone was convinced that phlogiston really existed. Eventually it was scientific experiment which changed their beliefs. We analysts don't seem to have the equivalent of a scientific experiment, although Marshall Edelson speaks of the experimental nature of a single hour, and Winnicott wrote about the variety of behavior which different babies manifested when confronted at a certain age by a tongue depressor on his desk. In its repeatability, it had the quality of experiment. I suppose that we try for relative uniformity in our arrangement of an analytic setting. But there are only two people in the room, during the fugitive moments of contact between analyst and patient. Even when a report is made about what went on, there is the element of filtration through the mind of the reporter, the analyst. There is no repeatable way for numerous observers to look at the actual data, in all its complexity. In fact, even if someone else were present, that person would not have access to what was in the minds of analyst and patient. Who is to say, then, that your point of view is more correct than Kohut's or Klein's or anyone else's? You have great conviction about your point of view, which may very well be the most comprehensive one in all of psychoanalysis, but without recourse to crucial experiments, how would anyone know that what is going on in a clinical situation is best explained your way?

DR. RANGELL:

Thirty or forty years ago a large percentage of residents were impressed with their supervision from analysts. We felt we had a tool and that we would meet with resistance and it wouldn't faze us because we understood resistance too. Some people who were very antagonistic would always ask the same question: How do you know that you are right and the other is wrong? At first I used to answer quite defensively or aggressively. But after a while I realized that the question was unanswerable. Yet I didn't want to be cynical and say you wouldn't believe me anyway. That I know I'm right and you wouldn't know it unless you were analyzed. That's a cop-out. I think that the most focal answer has to do with description rather than explanation. Consider the people in the audience listening to the first psychoanalyst, who at that time didn't have much authority. In fact he was a lowly Jewish doctor whom everyone was against. That analyst was saying to the audience that they had anxiety. He didn't have to bombard them like a dictatorial leader or a comedian. We talk about anxiety and everyone listens. And that is the central focus of psychoanalysis and of psychoanalytic explanation. Anxiety is the fulcrum of neurosis. From that beginning Freud proceeded all the way to the structural point of view. When Freud went to the ego and the id and the superego in the mid-twenties, everything came to a crescendo. He didn't throw out the genetic, or, to my mind, the topographic or the economic points of view either. Others may disagree with me on that, but my own piecemeal struggling with theory has satisfied me on this point and I find that it satisfies a small group of people who are syntonic with me as well. This is not a bandwagon situation, but a slow, careful evaluation of pieces of theory. After 100,000 hours of clinical experience - I am not being facetious; I will tell you sometime how I came to this number - I know that an interpersonal explanation that leaves out the intrapsychic cannot be compared to an intrapsychic explanation that admits the interpersonal. I cannot say to you, listen to me. My theory includes self, object, and most other elements included in partial alternative theories. Does the other theory include what is contained in what I call "total" theory? You have to choose between the two by subjecting one point of view versus another to your clinical or life experience.

DR. RODMAN:

Someone else could reply - any one of them, Klein, Kohut, anyone of them could say to you: I feel the same way about mine. I've got 100,000 hours too. And I've listened just as hard as you have and this is what I think is right. And an outside listener has to have recourse to other criteria. Yet, in my opinion, you do *go far beyond relying merely on conviction. I want to take note of the fact that you are now using the phrase "total composite psychoanalysis." Here, I think, you become explicit in making room for every contribution that seems to have a solid basis, not because at this time we can articulate the logical relations of every subdivision of psychological thought, but to provide a place for all, against the day when it will be possible to demonstrate reasonable connections.*

DR. RANGELL:

Even biological.

DR. RODMAN:

Your viewpoint is anything but eclectic, but it is comprehensive. Klein's view was an intense and narrowly focused one. She discovered phenomena and explanations that nobody else might ever have seen. But what she discovered is still a piece of a bigger picture. Your viewpoint encompasses whatever she contributed that will stand the test of time. Yet, despite this framework which you have been constructing during your career, we still lack the equivalent of scientific experiment and we have to constantly be struggling to be a science, not to take a back seat to the physicist or the chemist or the biologist. There is one phrase which you used earlier: emotional resonance of truth, *which really suggests something more than the intellect at work. As a criterion of truth, it suggests that it is a whole person who is responding and deciding what is true. It suggests that it is not an isolated intellect doing philosophical analysis, but a person made up of mind and body, not mind alone, that arrives at a sense of what is right.*

DR. RANGELL:

I want to say two things about truth. First of all, is the word truth valuable? Should we strive for truth? You know that Kohut criticizes Freud's truth morality. He feels that Freud's elevating the morality of truth to the highest priority is a limitation of his way of thinking and he thinks that therapeutic achievement should claim a higher superego ideal than the morality of truth. This would be consonant with his saying you should allow a person to idealize the analyst even if it veers from reality, objectivity, and truth. Whereas Freud would say, as I would say, not because of Freud but again because of agreement, that every kind of distortion should be analyzed at the appropriate time. This includes idealization of the analyst. The goal is not to leave analysis with an idealization. I have seen some very distorted lives because of an unanalyzed positive transference. Freud talked about adhesiveness of the libido as a complication of analysis. That's often due to the worshipful, unanalyzed, sticky positive transference which leads to idolatry, of analysis, of intellect. So first of all, I agree with the analytic but not the Kohutian point of view that the morality of truth over therapeutic zeal has the greater, longer lasting appeal and possibility for the future of mankind. Kohut liked to talk about wisdom and mankind, and yet he talks about therapy more than he does about truth.

But now comes a very important distinction between historical and narrative truth. A lot of people believe that psychoanalysis cannot properly be called a science because it cannot claim to bring out historical truth. Narrative, or fantasy truth, however, is just as much deserving to be called reality - it is a new kind of reality, psychic reality - which can be just as pathogenic as historical truth. When a person suffers from a traumatic effect as an adult, he

is suffering from an original trauma and the traumatic memories of that trauma. The traumatic memories, even distorted ones, are now as much reality and truth as the actual trauma. If the actual trauma was concocted rather than having happened, it can be just as traumatic. If a person was approached by a shadowy figure in an alley, whether he was threatened with castration or had the fantasy or fear of being threatened with castration, they are both psychic reality and both true in that respect. As long as you have the fantasy and the fear and anxiety, he is not lying when he has a traumatic dream or a phobia of castrating objects or if he faints away at the sight of blood because he has castration anxiety. The importance of the difference between the two kinds of truth vanishes because they overlap. We are just as scientific as the physical sciences, although our methods are different. Our criteria are different. Hartmann brought this out in a paper on psychoanalysis and science. We combine the humanistic and the traditionally scientific. Many physical scientists have no interest or understanding of humanistic concerns. Their minds, which understand physical science, are very unscientific in the mental sphere. And many analysts are scientific in both the physical and the humanistic world. People can be one or both. Analysts should be both.

When I talk to residents I tell them that they are at a most acute point of decision-making. I say you had to make a decision to become a psychiatrist. That was pretty hard because you turned down surgery, medicine, dermatology. But if you think that was a decision, you are now going to have to decide whether to take an office, or work in a laboratory and what and how to practice and work. You will want to know whether to get prescription blanks and try to figure out which drugs are for psychosis, which for neurosis, which for borderlines, or whether you should listen for the animus and anima of Jung, or the castration anxiety that I tell you about, or separation anxiety, or whether you should have the patient's whole family come in for treatment. If you listen to me or take the analyst as your model, you will give each person who comes to you the dignity and opportunity to be a total human being alone, with the opportunity for utter frankness. If you invite a spouse or the family to come in with him or her, if you want to interview and treat all of them instead of the patient alone, that's a whole different ballgame and method of treatment. That is fine and you can do it. The whole person who walks into the analyst's office alone is given an invitation to speak freely. The corrective emotional experience he receives is to meet someone who doesn't judge him, but who lets him say the most outlandish things, which both then try to understand. I have always had a wide spectrum of types of patients. I recently had a patient who became quite violent. He had previously survived a serious suicidal attempt by a hair's breadth. He was a very interesting man. About ten minutes into an hour, he suddenly said "you fucking bastard, you shrinks are all the same, you can't do anything for me," picked up some objects and threw them, yelled "goodbye" and left. Some pretty scary things took place there for a moment; I can't go into details for a number of reasons. What happened is that he quit treatment but is back into it now. I treated the

incident with an analytic attitude. I was not judgmental in the ordinary sense, although I told him in no uncertain terms that he had over-stepped the limits. Many patients have said with gratitude that this is the only place in the world where they meet someone who is seeking out, as one patient put it, *"der emus"* (the truth). As much as they resist it, people admire the truth and cherish it and look upon it as a savior. You cannot show a false empathy, but you can try to understand someone non-critically. I think we basically have to respect the fact that patients come to be introspective, which is admirable in itself, no matter what else they do, compared to people who don't look into what they do to their lives. But these people, even though they blame others, are also willing to see their own role in it.

DR. RODMAN:

Aren't you concerned at all about that violence?

DR. RANGELL:

When he came back - I had agreed for him to return - I said he shouldn't have done what he did, that he had gone over the line. I told him I was willing to consider what he did as data and try to understand why he did it and we will go on from there. I thought he was going to burst into tears. But he didn't. He is very controlled. He did say if you'll have me, then I'll come back, thank you very much. I lost my fear of him. I only had a fear for the moment. I don't have it anymore. I feel safe.

DR. WILSON:

To move into a different area now, how do you deal with a compromise of integrity without appearing judgmental?

DR. RANGELL:

Well, that is an apt and difficult question and I have written a number of papers on it. I think that the seasoned analyst - and again it is something I came to because I worked on the theory - I think we face such patients long before we write a paper about it. And I think we are always non-judgmental about it. I don't have one patient who has not bent rules and has not done things he is ashamed of and that you would be ashamed of if you were he. But it is not hard to look upon all that analytically. You can have an analytic attitude towards internal conflict, whether it is conflict with instincts or conflict with the superego. Every conflict has both elements. Now, I don't say I analyze criminal Al Capone characters. I once did though. I had a Jewish Nazi with a phobia for cats. While analyzing the phobia for cats, in which I was very analytic, I heard in the associations of this Jewish patient, that he had a secret admiration for Hitler, that he used to listen to and reverberate to the German marches in his home at night. He had escaped from Berlin with enough money to set himself up well here. And he marched to German music. If he were only not a Jew he would have been a good Nazi. Would you believe that this man, with it all, had a very analytic relationship with me around his

complex feelings about the "pussy." It was a very satisfying analysis about his pussy phobia. Everything else of course came into it as well.

DR. WILSON:

I would like to bring this back to the idea of controversy for a moment. No analyst that I have ever heard of, from Freud on, is universally agreed with. I wonder what ideas of yours over the years have been the most controversial or have stimulated the most debate.

DR. RANGELL:

I find myself in a peculiar position. I have found that the subjects which are to me the most uncriticizable are the ones that are most avoided or ignored. This involves a series of contributions which I'm trying to put together now in a composite work, a book that has to do with decision, integrity, morality, ego will, and the executive functions of the ego. Really what it amounts to is action theory within the structural point of view. Because all these things - decision and integrity and will exerted by the ego, and ego directedness - lead to action. Psychoanalysis for almost a hundred years has been dominated by psychic determinism, and the part that is now most resisted - it's never been openly discussed, but it's been ignored - has been the fact that psychic determinism crowds out individual human responsibility. What is pushed out of view is the ego's action in the face of deterministic forces. In other words, every human being is subject to determinism by developmental experiences up to and including the moment he performs an act. But the final performance of an action is executed by his will, not his free will, but whatever will is left to act in the face of constitutional givens, and determined forces that impinge upon him from without and within. I find that concept ignored, resisted and sarcastically treated. It's a paradox. We turn away from what is felt as a moral tone, instead of seeing it as an extension into new areas of conflict. Why, when we need a theory of action, did we turn to Schafer who wrote his "action-language" theory outside of the metapsychological point of view, while I wrote about this within total psychoanalytic theory, which Schafer never referred to. There can be many explanations for this. In a recent article I pointed out a quote from Kohut in 1977 in which he says, as one of the justifications for his theory, that he was unable to find any place in conventional Freudian theory for choice, decision, action "free will," — he called it that - even though these phenomena are all observable clinically. In my theory I had included all of these. Now I wasn't interested in whether his theory included it or not successfully, but only in the fact that he "knew" very well that it existed in my previous theoretical papers because we were close friends, and he was aware of these writings. I just cite his quotation, point out the date of my paper and his statement that the subject does not appear in conventional Freudian metapsychology. My papers on this preceded his. My papers preceded Schafer's. I have studied the microscopic sequence in great detail and the intrapsychic mechanisms involved, and I point out that there is a moment of

ego decision which leads to actions in their various forms. This is walled off in theoretical discourse. Now is that controversial? I don't know what it is, but that is an answer to your question. Contrary to what you ask, it has not stirred the most but the least debate. I have noted that audiences seem numbed, not aroused. There is a huge ignoring of this main body of work. I don't know the reason for it. They say it's worse to be ignored than to be disagreed with.

DR. WILSON:

You said something earlier about the idea of total theory.

DR. RANGELL:

For example, that phrase appears in an article that's in the latest *Newsletter of the American.* There won't be a letter to the Editor on that subject, either pro or con. If there were a Kohutian summary in the mid-section of the Newsletter, I think it would stir up heated but interested debate. Why? I saw one anonymous critique of a paper of mine. You know, when you send in a paper the readers of journals send in anonymous criticisms. So in one case an editor sent me one of the negative criticisms. "He builds his whole theory on the ego psychology of the sixties," said the evaluator, critically. Is that a criticism? What does that mean? Are the sixties to be eliminated? Why is that listened to with authority instead of the reader being asked: "What is wrong, should the sixties be out, or should the twenties be in or out, or the seventies? Are you throwing out ego psychology?" I think there's a big revulsion now against Hartmann, as there was a rebellion against Rapaport, on the same score.

DR. RODMAN:

Why?

DR. RANGELL:

Two reasons for it. The one of lesser import is anti-scientism and anti-intellectuality. A more specific reason is that there is a negative reaction to the idea of ego will. It's a resistance against increased responsibility for one's actions. I think analysis has been used to excuse actions and I am saying that the individual, or ego, which initiates actions is not necessarily less responsible, but perhaps in a certain sense is even more responsible than pre-analytically. In other words, just as man does not know why he acts, it is equally true that he does not know *that* he acts. He does not know that he made an unconscious decision to kill or rob or desert or hurt somebody, which he attributes to accidental and other forces. I think there is a deep defense against an extension of responsibility for one's actions.

DR. RODMAN:

Do you think that the cultural conditions of the present time, which are away from responsibility and morality in a big way are affecting the responses of analysts to their own theories?

DR. RANGELL:

I don't think that it's just that the culture is influencing analysis. I think that analysts share the same behavior as the rest of the culture. I think that the desire to avoid responsibility resides in the hearts of analysts as much as it does in their patients. I think there's an unconscious collusion in that respect. I think that analysts have merged into the successful stratum of society and are striving to live in the same way as our patients live. Patients who can afford to come to us - at least when we are older and more "successful" - are generally better off than we are. I think that we get to share some of their shortcuts. I think that a hundred years ago an innovative psychoanalyst was willing to stand up against the mores of his time. Analysts are not outside of the range of average behavior than any other group. So that they don't have to be influenced to wish to absolve responsibility. They join it. I think they even join it in their Society life, their analytic life. My paper on "Transference to Theory," to which you referred has not been openly criticized but I don't think anyone likes it because I think everyone feels that he is being pointed at. No one opposes that paper, but neither is it praised. I think it is one of the most powerful papers I ever wrote. It was never given in Los Angeles.

DR. RODMAN:

You are saying that analysts in general have lost some of the independence that was there in the beginning, and that as a result of that the kinds of issues they are willing and able to join are limited.

DR. RANGELL:

The ego/superego problems have never met the ah-ha reaction among the analytic cultures as the ego/id conflicts have. In fact, there is always the feeling that a paper like that gets away from the real domain of psychoanalysis which is the struggle against instincts. Freud always said that the big concern of the analyst is the defenses against instinctual drives. I - and Joe Weiss joins me here, and Anna Freud, and Sandler, and Tony Kris - say that there are many things that are resisted other than instinctual drives. There are other primary and even secondary process elements that the unconscious ego resists and defends against. I think that is clinically demonstrable all the time. I think there is a whole world of that. You can repress a symptom, not just hate or love, other complex affects, unconscious fantasies. You can repress the existence of a phobia. People can find out only in treatment that they're phobic. They never knew it before.

DR. WILSON:

You mentioned Kohut. How do you feel about his claim that his ideas and his theory are more experience-near than the classical?

DR. RANGELL:

A completely unfounded remark. The best paper on that question of experience-near versus abstract is Waelder's paper on the levels of

abstraction. He said that there are phenomena that are close to being observational and others that are closer to being explanatory. But I showed in a number of papers that some things that are placed in the experiential realm are just as abstract. Transference, for example. Transference is a completely abstract explanation. You don't see the transference. You only see that the patient loves or hates you. Transference is a formulation. It's not an observation. Kohut is both as close and as far from clinical material as I am. No closer, no further. The only thing that is different is what I or we give as explanations and what he picks out among many factors as the explanation, and his particular type of explanation has always, for a hundred years, attracted larger numbers of adherents than a multidetermined interpretation. The idea of empathy. The idea of lack of love. The idea of not being loved. That always shifts the center of gravity from a person having a conflict within himself to his resenting, presumably on a realistic basis, the fact that he was deprived of maternal or paternal love. Now that has been a competitive idea to intrapsychic conflict from 1900 to now. What surprises me is that periodically, after having been superseded always by the idea of a more complex intrapsychic conflict, it rears its head and gets adherents again. What amazes me even more is that people who solved that problem give it up and reverse themselves on it. Like Heinz Kohut, whom I knew before he became a Kohutian, very, very well. I saw this developing. But again, as you said, this doesn't prove he's right or wrong.

DR. RODMAN:

Why do you think that there is such a ready audience for this appeal to lack of love? Why does it run so deep?

DR. RANGELL:

Because I think nobody feels sufficiently loved. Even if a person was very much loved, he could have felt unworthily loved. Everyone has a residual, and an insufficiency in this department. And it's a very convenient screen defense, screen explanation.

DR. WILSON:

I thought Kohut was referring more to the lack of understanding. It's not the same as lack of love.

DR. RANGELL:

No, but it's a more sophisticated variation. I think the same old-fashioned idea can be repeated and gain adherents. But the variation of it that's more acceptable now can re-attract the same mass approval, just as a new President cannot repeat the mistakes of someone who has been exposed and punished and seen through four or six or eight years before. But some new version of the same behavior can be re-enacted.

DR. WILSON:

In about 1969, I heard Jose Barchilon speak at the LA Society. He talked about the difficulty in analyzing narcissistic patients. I remember at the time he said he was looking forward to the results of Kohut's work, to find out what he was discovering. Saying that they were studying the analysis of narcissistic personalities which had heretofore been unanalyzable. Where a group of analysts were working on something that they had found difficult, using the theory that they had up until that time.

DR. RANGELL:

That is in line with people thinking that where you run into difficulties you automatically change the theory.

DR. RODMAN:

Don't you think there is a dialectic between explanations that emphasize helplessness and explanations that emphasize responsibility and that neither is adequate to characterize - I don't know whether to use the word truth or human experience or both. But neither alone is enough. People are both helpless and responsible. That is, you don't choose your parents, you don't choose your early defining experiences, you don't pick out your genes, although later on you develop a point of view about experience and you become an active participant in your own life, and a determinant in that life. Don't you think that there is a pool of people that increases to the extent that human helplessness is not adequately acknowledged? And that is the pool that is ready for Kohut. And that while this is going on, there is another pool growing that will be ready to embrace a renewed emphasis on human responsibility when the dialectic turns back?

DR. RANGELL:

Yes, exactly. There is an internal conflict and oscillation baetween automaticity and control. Psychoanalysis analyzes the unstable and changing intrapsychic relationships between them. There is a reflection outward of this dichotomy into the external phenomena you describe. Kohut promises to reduce or erase the helplessness aspect more easily and with a shortcut.

DR. RODMAN:

But maybe there was no adequate way of approaching or acknowledging or stating what I described and as a result the population of interested people, in a state of frustration, became ready to embrace the Kohut ideas in possibly an excessive fashion, with an intensity of rejoicing which seems messianic at times. Maybe he picked up something that he promised to remedy, so to speak, and developed a huge following for a theory which is basically a distorted cure for a prior neglect.

DR. RANGELL:

That is a question that provokes this thought and answer. Why don't you also mention Kernberg? He had as much of a new following at the beginning. He is more correct theoretically than Kohut but he merges with the mainstream too much for the liking of the crowd. That is why he is less exciting, and why there is much less of a Kernbergian group around him. But there is a Kohutian group. Kernberg is more correct, but Kohut is more exciting, and, I might say, more inciting, and gives a lot of people promise and a home who feel alienated in the old home. My own theories are less exciting or even less interesting to the extent they are seen as increasing responsibility. Responsibility in itself is not appealing, unless it can be appreciated that there is a reward that goes with it. That reward is increased mastery and autonomy.

LEO RANGELL: AN APPRECIATION

by Helen Tausend, M.D.

It is appropriate that the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society/Institute publish a special edition of its *Bulletin* to honor the work of Dr. Leo Rangell, one of its most esteemed members. Past President of the Southern California Psychiatric Society, of which he is a founding member, Dr. Rangell helped to establish and was first President of the Westwood Hospital, conceived as a psychoanalytically oriented institution for the mentally ill in the community modeled after Simmel's Tegel Sanitarium in Berlin. He has been three times President of the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society, and twice each of the International and the American Psychoanalytic Associations. He has taught theory and practice to clinical associates in both adult and child analytic training in the Los Angeles and the Southern California Psychoanalytic Institutes. Many residents who have been exposed to his teaching of psychoanalytic principles were attracted to undertake complete training and have become certified psychoanalysts. His teaching appointments include among others, those of Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the University of California in Los Angeles and in San Francisco, the only such double appointment in two branches of the University of California. He spent an extraordinarily fruitful year for his writings, 1962-63, as a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. His fellowships, awards, prizes, service on the boards of scientific and scholarly journals are far too numerous to name individually. He has delivered Distinguished Lectureships in the major cities of North and South America, Europe and Australia honoring the greats in psychoanalysis from Franz Alexander through the alphabet to Robert Waelder. In addition he has authored almost three hundred scientific articles, papers and chapters as well as two books, an enviable record. This capsule condensation of his achievements and accolades attests to his dedication and his subsequent copious contributions to psychoanalysis.

The objective in this particular tribute to Leo is to highlight his influence on psychoanalysis in Los Angeles, but it is difficult, if not impossible to delimit his contributions by geographic location. For me, their greatest value resides in their universal applicability, in the panoramic view presented as issues unfold under his penetrating scrutiny, and their originality.

Leo and I first met in 1946, shortly after he arrived here, and we began our didactic analyses with the same training analyst immediately following his arrival. Ever since, we have been associated in psychoanalysis in Los Angeles, even before our present Institute was approved as such. Many of us who became clinical associates then had been engaged in practice in other medical specialities prior to the war, and decided to become psychoanalysts following war experience and/or displacement resulting from the war. Leo, on the

contrary, had elected neurology and psychiatry from the very beginning and had had more experience than not all, but many of us. He already had several publications to his credit. One, entitled "A Psychoanalytic Study of Maladie des Tics," co-authored with Margaret Mahler, who had only recently come to this country and was a teacher of Leo's during his residency, exemplified the level of his endeavors.

His capacity for hard work, voracious pursuit of knowledge and information and creativity, along with an impressive ability to synthesize all aspects of a presentation, thereby bringing together the interrelationships of its various components to result in a simple, clear, concise summary, made him a valued fellow student.

We were permitted to start seminars early in the course of our training. We had some excellent teachers but, as is true in any educational endeavor, particularly where the students are older and have had maturing experiences, there was much to be learned from one another through questions, answers and contributions in the classroom, as well as from the discussions that almost invariably continued after class in the street or at some coffee shop to which we often adjourned. We were favored by visits from prominent lecturers and lively interchanges took place between them and the students as well as among the students theselves.

We read all the literature that interested us. We did not interpret absence from the reading list of certain writers as a ban. We were free agents who listened and absorbed what we heard, but also thought for ourselves. It was in the "outside" discussions that we learned a great deal about psychoanalysis and about one another. We identified the clear and deep thinkers and distinguished them from those of us whose vision was not as acute and far reaching and whose ideas were not as creative. Much self revelation occurred. Even though we were novices, in the intimacy of heated arguments, when our defenses were weakened by our zeal, we became aware of the character traits of our colleagues, and often of ourselves as well. Leo staunchly advocated those principles which he perceived as the bedrock of psychoanalysis, neither mutable, nor expendable, while simultaneously militantly opposing complacency, uniformity and blind conformity which he knew could lead only to mediocrity and strangulation. All of us aimed to learn psychoanalysis as it was taught to us and to apply it in the most effective and rewarding manner. Our primary aim as clinicians was to help the patients and we were always on the lookout for more expeditious ways to achieve the desired results. Many of us discovered that when we were seduced by parameters which promised shortcuts, rather than advancing our cause, we found ourselves set back by inadequately tested deviations.

Leo learned tolerance for the criticism of his steadfastness, seen by some as rigidity while by others as ardent support of the survival of psychoanalysis as the method that has best served our purposes. Leo defends fiercely that which he seeks to preserve. His work has been directed at strengthening and

expanding by accretion because he feels that the basic fundamentals in the uniqueness which distinguishes psychoanalysis from all other psychologies must be retained without sacrificing growth and development.

From the beginning there has been dissent among psychoanalysts as to theory and technique. Such dissent is more prevalent now than at any other time. Just as the individual grows out of conflict and the resulting resolutions, so psychoanalysis grows out of conflict within the field. Many changes have taken place and currently continue. Freud himself predicted that such would be the history and the future of psychoanalysis. Until the end of his life he repeatedly emended his writings; his example in the past was prologue to the future.

Before embarking on training in psychoanalysis, Leo's several significant publications portended his future activities, but few of us realized he would prove to be such a prolific writer and that his writings would cover such a wide scope. Included are topics clinical and theoretical, neurological and psychosomatic, dealing with neuroses, psychoses, adults, adolescents and children, as well as groups and organizational, political and social issues.

Leo's paper, "The Psychology of Poise, with Special Elaboration on the Snout or Perioral Region" published as early as 1954, is a detailed study involving extensive research into the ontogenesis of this area in several species from lower to the highest, man. It explains the dynamics of body language involving the use of hands, mouth and surrounding structures that we daily observe in our patients and has far reaching implications for our work. It offers sound evidence of the defensive elements in drinking and smoking, two pernicious habits which many addicted would like to be able to abandon for which our aid is enlisted. Of interest in many of Leo's writings, aptly demonstrated in this paper on "Poise," is his ability to perceive in the commonplace, the mundane, clues to important qualities and characteristics of the patient's unique personality. The curiosity once aroused is pursued and satisfied, regardless of the time and energy required to work out the most minute details, and all of us benefit from his discoveries.

"On Friendship," a larger version of the Presidential address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association in Toronto in May 1962, is the opening article in volume XI of the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association.* One of the most frequent of all human relationships, taken for granted because it is universal, friendship is identified, traced through its evolution during different phases of development, delineated and elucidated with infinite care and meticulous research into every area of applicable knowledge, creating a mirror that reflects all aspects of mental functioning, dynamics, defenses, object relations and conflicts. Again, it is this kind of attention to the omnipresent that provides us with additional understanding of obscure problems which we not infrequently confront.

Leo's paper entitled "A Psychoanalytic Perspective Leading Currently to the Syndrome of the Compromise of Integrity," presented in 1973, his valedictory address as President of the International Psychoanalytic Association and published in their *Journal* in 1974, proved prophetic. Although the phenomenon has always existed, the American people have been astounded by the rapid succession of scandalous compromises of integrity in areas heretofore felt to be beyond reproach, such as: judges, the military and other departments of government as well, in addition to Wall Street. We need to understand the dynamics of such events which are observable in the microcosm of the individuals we encounter in our daily work, for without enlightenment there can be no hope for change in the individual or the groups he constitutes. The most recent Iran Contra affair exemplifies dramatically and with world wide repercussions, conflict of ego versus superego, which result, Leo shows, in favor of narcissism at the expense of principle.

Leo is the consummate and incessant psychoanalyst. His analytic stance is an integral part of him; he is accompanied by his third ear and eye wherever he is and as a result his comments and contributions are uniquely psychoanalytic. Recently the Walter Briehl Human Rights Foundation honored the memory of Muriel Gardiner with an all day conference entitled "Official Terror: Psychological Causes, Consequences and Remedies." Included was a film made in Greece during the dictatorial rule of Papadopoulos which depicted the conversion of a normal boy of seventeen to a torturer. In his discussion of the film, Leo pointed out that at his age the normalcy and universality of the need to separate and individuate, the wish to be free of parental restraint and criticism, along with the desire to belong, to have friends, to compete and to take risks in the hope of mastering anxiety, all of these enhanced by a look of approval and admiration from a younger brother, conspired to make him available to the training group which indoctrinated him. In the film the group activities expose the boy to terror, actual and potential, physical and mental, in small doses with suggestions of more. Although the anxiety generated is greater than the actual hurt, it is the unpredictability of danger which is the essence of the anxiety. Although there appears to be a choice for the newcomer to the group to remain or not, that there are virtually no dropouts speaks against the existence of such a choice.

Leo traces the progression of events in the making of the torturer-terrorist from exposure to terror, through hatred of the immediate aggressors, constantly aroused but simultaneously controlled and rechanneled into directions provided and desired by the oppressors, to accepting the offered status of power, masculinity and precipitous adulthood, while repressing the simultaneous submission to authority which accompanies this. He describes the crucial intrapsychic increment of the conversion of aggression to sadism, and the alleviation of guilt for pleasure in cruelty by deflecting it to the external perpetrators who ordered it. "I was just following orders," is the unconscious rationalization. The internal composition of the superego is

altered toward values permitting antisocial acts approved by the group. Castration anxiety, ordinarily a deterrent, is converted to pleasure in castrating others. Active and passive instincts are converted into sadomasochistic perversions, in the cruelty inflicted and in the submission to the leaders and their surrogates. By being condoned by the culture, these also become ego-syntonic.

The foregoing comments illustrate Leo's exceptional talents to dissect thoroughly down to the minutest details a single issue which may superficially appear to be only tangential to psychoanalysis, and to exploit it to the utmost so that the work illuminates for each of us some segment of our therapeutic efforts with our patients, as well as our understanding of the political, social, economic environment.

This valued capability is deeply appreciated not only by Angelenos who have free and frequent contact with Leo, who graciously acquiesces to requests to participate in such programs, but as well, by all who look to psychoanalysis for enlightenment through deeper understanding resulting in improved life. His role as a contributor to the enduring archives of our discipline will likewise prove equally enlightening to our successors.

From all of us who have learned, not only from the actual content of Leo's work in its creative originality, but also from the exemplary systematic approach and unfailingly scientific methodology employed in all his explorations, as well as from his dedication and unrelenting pursuit of truth, our thanks and best wishes for continuing productivity.

APRIL 26, 1986: A PSYCHOANALYTIC SATURDAY WITH LEO RANGELL

by F. Robert Rodman, M.D.

The day was devoted to an exposition of Leo Rangell's contributions to psychoanalysis. Out of some 250 published articles and 2 books, Rangell chose a pivotal 20 with which to span basic themes during 35 years of writing. Having to leave out scores of influential papers, he nonetheless gave an audience of 300 at the Harvey Morse Conference Center of Cedars/Sinai Medical Center a sustained impression of his powerful capacity to observe, verbalize, and theorize on psychoanalytic subjects. It is impossible to summarize in this report the density, multiplicity, and originality of the day's ideas. They held the listeners' attention throughout, a dramatic index of the clarity and internal cohesion of a lifetime of thought. The cumulative and inevitable effect was to demonstrate that his strenuous form of reasoning is psychoanalytic to the bone and, at the same time, completely unparochial.

He is one of the group of theoreticians which inherited the mantle of the ego psychologists Anna Freud, Otto Fenichel, Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, Rudolph Loewenstein, David Rapaport, Edith Jacobson, and Robert Waelder. Besides Rangell, this group comprises Margaret Mahler, Leo Stone, Jacob Arlow, and Charles Brenner. What Rangell has come to call "total composite psychoanalytic theory" (the word "composite" has been added since this presentation was given) appears to be an overarching response to the formation of rival groups in our time. Its message is clear: there is room for valid contributions under the great analytic umbrella. It is not necessary that concepts of proven value be jettisoned to achieve a sense of scientific and therapeutic advance. Quite the contrary. As we move forward on various fronts, we need to restrain the urge for a sense of the modern, if it is so compelling that it can only be achieved at the expense of what we already know to be true. Rangell implies neither eclecticism nor forced logic in the effort to bring everything of analytic value together. He facilitates a thought process which safeguards concepts from excesses of emotion, pro or con, so that they can be considered properly in the course of time. It could be argued that his powerful restatement and expansion of analytic principles places him at the very apex of his generation.

The phrase "total composite psychoanalysis" is itself a reflection of his dislike for the usual designations orthodox, traditional, and classical. Rangell will not be reduced by labels which have acquired the connotations of criticism intended by those who wish to draw contrasts between themselves and him. The terms are, in any case, not adequate to denote the breadth and depth of his conception of psychoanalysis. The psychological territory for which he settles is nothing less that the full range of human experience for the understanding of which "unconscious intrapsychic conflict" is indispensable. This will include all parts of psychoanalytic thinking which have been split off and sometimes deified by the founders and followers of dissident schools. The word "composite" suggests the proper valuation and placement of such parts within the whole structure.

Throughout the daylong presentations, which were punctuated by 4 sets of 2 discussants (Drs. Ourieff and Grotstein; Call and Stolorow; Aronson and Saperstein; and Lansky and Lebe), Rangell returned over and over to the theme of the whole. Moving from the metaphor of the wheel, with its hub, spokes, and periphery, to the sphere for its 3-dimensional possibilities, he laid out groups of terms which guide his thinking. The complexity of his conception of the world of psychoanalytic thought was increasingly evident, so that the end result was to remind the audience of the vast range of human psychology and, by implication, to call it back from the siren song of simplistic theoretical and technical conveniences. He spoke of pregenital and genital; gross and microscopic observation; the clinical and the theoretical; oppositional conflicts and choice conflicts; anxiety as a cause and anxiety as a result of conflict; somatic and psychic structure; psychoneurosis and the compromise of integrity; biology and mind. Each separate subject varies characteristically from all others and Rangell is not reduced to dealing with polarities. In a way which is recognizable to anyone who has studied his work, he shows us the similarities, differences, and typical elisions between pairs. He is not enamoured of dualities either, with or without tension between them. He will reply to Brenner's marriage of affect and ideation with his own view that the total human experience must also include the physiological results of affects. Or he will add to Freud's "love and work" as the ingredients of emotional health, "friendship."

He situates himself between the sociocultural world of the externally observable and the dark biology of man's inner existence and in so doing he emerges as one of the very few analysts who deserve to be called by the generic term psychologist, in the way that William James was a psychologist. Always attentive to the substance of a contribution, he never lets an objection to one idea prevent him from finding value in another offered by the same writer. He may find Erikson's term "identity" the equivalent, along with "self", of an inexact interpretation which obscures the theoretical issues it purports to clarify. But he can give credit to Erikson's range of contributions to generational history. He may criticize the Kleinian surprise at discussions of the pregenital among analysts whom they had portrayed as wedded to an

exclusive, antediluvian focus on triadic conflict. Yet he can also find fault with the working alliance or the therapeutic alliance as concepts which justify the gratification of pregenital need in a basically non-analytic fashion, and in so doing line himself up with Kleinian strictness. He may disagree with the reasons which prompted Greenson's comments on the fate of new ideas in psychoanalysis, but find value in his views on this subject anyway. He strives to be fair and objective under the pressures of controversy. To borrow a term from his famous 1953 paper on the snout, he is poised admidst complexity.

At the "core," a word which has become synonymous with Rangell, lies the sequence of intrapsychic events which yield up the microdynamic data on which a theory of unconscious intrapsychic conflict is rooted. Affect, anxiety, instinct, trauma, decision are all illuminated in the clear light of his thought. The link from the intrapsychic sequence to the theory of action opens out into the sociocultural world and puts analysts in a position to contribute their unique viewpoint to the social sciences, to history, for example, sociology, anthropology, political science, group dynamics, social psychology. He would hasten to emphasize that this does not make analysts competent to diagnose individuals from the public record alone. He avoided this justifiedly criticized pitfall in so much psychohistorical writing in his *"The Mind of Watergate."* Instead, for example, he would call our attention to a mechanism he named "identification with the corrupt," to match the well-known "identification with the aggressor," and in so doing direct our meditations to a world of ideas which link man's deepest effort to master his instincts and his methods of survival in the midst of social deterioration.

Rangell's presence and power on the psychoanalytic stage can be glimpsed in his insistence on using the word "compromise" in his own way. He is unconvinced by Brenner's claim that compromise formation characterizes the result of all intrapsychic conflict. He opposes this view with a delineation of the structure of unconscious decision making, wherein one chooses this over that, instead of blending the two (or three or more). Man's responsibility for his actions is thereby immeasurably deepened, and a sense of the tragic dimension of choice (never elaborated upon by Rangell in his characteristically scientific concentration) takes on new meaning. On the other hand, he introduces "compromise" in his concept of "the compromise of integrity," where superego-ego conflicts express themselves in behavior with others. The word is greatly intensified in meaning by being paired with integrity while simultaneously removed from universal application in the realm of neurosis. This is an example of a kind of willful insistence on his own version of explanation, the sort of attitude that may liberate others to a similar independence, or irritate those who would prefer his compliance with one set of influences or another. He is unabashed in putting forth his own views, together with the evidence for them, yet he does not speak in the terms of philosophy or grand drama. He appeals to the powers of reason in his audience, not to their emotions. He is deliberately uncharismatic, the better to focus everyone's attention on the science in his subject matter, not on its art.

He pits himself against the trendy "age of narcissism" to describe our time, and insists that Auden's "the age of anxiety" has not ceased to be. Here he frees us from the tyranny of public speech, promising by his example an entire attitude toward man's persisting nature in spite of social change. We are given comfort to think critically not only about the barrage of contributions to the subject of narcissism, but about all newly developing subjects of interest.

Psychoanalysis positions its practitioners between human feeling and the pursuit of truth. The temptation among healthy human beings is always in the direction of the open offering of care, and, as such, constitutes the basso continuo of an anlytic endeavor. Only by the circuitous path of a search for truth can an analyst transform his basic urge to help into the force of a lasting change based on insight. Rangell's contributions, which bear the unmistakable stamp of a rigorous scientific mind, encompass that search for truth without ever demeaning the most human of our impulses and those of our patients. He has earned the right to coin the phrase "total composite psychoanalysis" and, in effect, he invites us to share in a balanced use of the imagination in conjunction with constant and critical observation of reality. He reminds us that Anna Freud called psychoanalysis a discovery procedure, rather than a creative one, and in so doing puts an appreciation of external reality at the top of our list of priorities. But he does not leave out the imagination, anymore than he leaves out the empathic capacity in the conduct of treatment.

The 20 papers chosen for this unprecedented daylong review, ranged from his classic exposition on a patient with a doll phobia, in which his capacities as an observer are foremost, to his recent *The Executive Functions of the Ego,* in which he enlarges psychoanalytic theory in a way that has vast implications for mankind. No one who attended the Rangell Saturday will have failed to be moved by his passionate dedication to psychoanalysis and the uses to which he has put his wide-ranging brilliance.

LEO RANGELL, THE CRYPTO-CHILD PSYCHOANALYST

by Heiman van Dam, M.D.

It is indeed a pleasure to participate in the writing of this special edition of the LAPSI *Bulletin* in honor of Leo Rangell. Norman Atkins and I have divided the formidable task of synthesizing his scientific works which span almost half a century. His bibliography itself is twenty-two pages long and contains over two hundred fifty references. Far from resting on his laurels or showing signs of slowing down, Rangell's creativity not only continues unabatedly, but actually is on the increase as can be judged by the quality and quantity of his publications. More will be said about the possible significance of this later on In order to divide the work between us in half it is awesome to consider that I will cover the works published during the first twenty-eight years of his career and Norman will cover "only" the last seventeen years. What I will try to do, is to attempt to demonstrate that there exists a certain number of common threads which run through and unify many of his writings. The one common thread I will choose to concentrate upon is his interest in the psychoanalysis of children and direct observations on infants and children. Part of this interest undoubtedly was stimulated while he was a candidate in training in the New York Psychoanalytic Institute before World War II. Two of his teachers in this regard are worth mentioning, namely Margaret Mahler and Rene Spitz. Both had just arrived from Europe.

After his military service during World War II Rangell settled in Los Angeles, and soon became not only a very active supporter and participant in the child analysis program as it was being initiated in its early stages in Los Angeles, but also his own interest in child analysis was reinforced by it. It is not my task to outline here the significant contributions Rangell made to the child analysis program. Suffice it to state here, that not only did Rangell influence the development of child analysis in Los Angeles, also, as mentioned before, it crystallized and stimulated the developmental approach in so many of his papers. I will group certain of his writings in order to demonstrate this thesis. In doing so, it is not intended to diminish the value of his many other writings during this period up to 1970, which do not fit in with this thesis.

Rangell published his first paper in 1942. It was in the field of neurology and was followed by four more papers in that field. While only a psychiatric resident and just a beginning candidate, he published a paper in 1943 entitled "A Psychosomatic Study of 'Maladie Des Tics' (Gilles de la Tourette's Disease)." It was the account of his psychotherapy of an eleven year-old boy, Freddy, The case was supervised by Mahler, who is the co-author of this paper. Actually, this is a transitional paper. Although it contains an excellent neurological description of this child, the paper primarily describes the psychological aspects of this case. Of added historical interest is the fact that

the discoverer of this syndrome, Gilles de la Tourette, was a student of Charcot and the paper quotes Charcot's views on this syndrome. Incidentally a print of one of Charcot's famous "lecons," of such historical importance to Freud, with Gilles de la Tourette present in the audience, hangs in Dr. Rangell's office today.

Rangell and Mahler attribute this syndrome to a neurological predisposition and a psychological and psychosomatic overlay which may give rise to the symptomatology if entry into latency is particularly stressful. The result is an "incontinence of emotions," as manifested in the involuntary motor actions including the echolalia and coprolalia. The paper shows a meticulous attention to the clinical details of this case in order to explain the psychological and psychosomatic aspects of this case. They describe in detail the erotic and aggressive conflicts of this child. There is also already a hint that conversion symptoms can occur without hysteria. This became the subject of a separate paper by Rangell years later, in 1959. The authors end on a cautious note, namely that the child's improvements achieved with psychotherapy will be temporary, and that the prognosis remains poor. However, at a Memorial meeting to Mahler held in Paris in 1985 just after her death, Rangell reported that Mahler had recently met with Freddy in New York, making this almost-50 year follow-up probably the longest follow-up of such a case in the literature. The patient, now a man in his late fifties, has been symptom-free with the exception of a torticollis. The syndrome had started at age seven with a stiff neck. This paper is very much to be recommended to anyone working with a patient with tics. The clarity of the description of the psychodynamics of tics is as valid today as it was then and anticipates what was to follow shortly, namely a series of brilliant contributions.

Rangell's career did not evolve gradually. One can see how he burst forth upon the psychoanalytic scene not unlike the Greek goddess of wisdom Pallas Athena of whom it was alleged that she sprang forth out of the head of her father Zeus, fully armed. After the war, in 1950, his first truly psychoanalytic paper saw the light. It was published in the *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child.* It should be seen in its historical context. Psychoanalysis of children in the United States was still in its infancy, and training in that field had barely begun. At that time there was no training in child analysis yet in Los Angeles. The title of the paper is "A Treatment of Nightmares in a Seven-Year-Old Boy." The paper consists of the description of a treatment by correspondence between Rangell and some well informed friends of his in New York, who wished to treat their child's phobia by communicating with Dr. Rangell along the lines of Freud's work with the father of Little Hans. Reluctantly, Rangell agreed, because referral to a child analyst was impractical. The dynamics of the little child are spelled out again extremely clearly, namely oedipal rivalry with the father and with a sister four-and-a-half years younger than the patient. What is of equal interest in this paper, besides the lucid description of the dynamics of the case, is Rangell's understanding of resistances in children. For instance, he writes to the father, that asking the child about death wishes

will only bring out the child's denial, whereas by telling the child about the ubiquity of death wishes one will obtain new material. The new material indeed came to the surface, in the form of the negative oedipal constellation. Rangell, recognizing the resistance "a deux," both in the father-therapist and in the child, dealt with both of them. His advice on technique is as valid today as it was then, and applies equally to child and adult analysis . . . "interpretations, if given, should be cautious and tentative, and not dropped like dynamite." A little further in the paper, he demonstrates the child's castration anxiety, and rightly advises the father-therapist: "This information is for you, not for him (the patient)." The paper also contains an excellent description of how to evaluate therapeutic progress, a forerunner of a later paper on termination. The paper concludes with a truly brilliant comparison with the little Hans case, with remarkable parallels in the symptoms, the histories, the treatment course, and even the fortuituous outcomes toward the future. Finally there is a discussion of the limitations of this form of treatment.

As mentioned in the beginning, this paper should be seen in its historical context. At that time, psychoanalysts were still very much collecting direct data about children, some of which came from child analyses, others from analytically oriented observations. Notice for instance the broad scope of the title of the publication in which this paper appeared: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child,* i.e.: the means by which this study would take place was not limited to analysis only.

The other historical aspect to consider in re-reading this paper is the history of Leo Rangell himself. This paper appeared just about at the time that Margarete Ruben came to Los Angeles. It heralded Rangell's interest and participation in the child analytic activities that would soon be part of the educational and scientific scene of the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Institute. In the fifties, Leo moderated and led a group of out-of-town meetings on child analysis and child psychiatry which were not only inspirational scientifically but were experiences in conviviality never to be forgotten by the participants. One such especially exciting meeting remembered by all took place in Rancho Santa Fe. In each of these meetings, Leo stimulated the questions and discussions, and at the end of the weekend summarized and integrated the scientific output to the delight and elucidation of all. This group became the nucleus of the future child analytic group, the Los Angeles Society for Child Psychiatry, and of the Reiss-Davis Clinic.

The next paper that I want to draw attention to is the one on The Analysis of a Doll Phobia, published two years later in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*. This paper was awarded the Clinical Essay Prize of the British Institute for Psychoanalysis, the first time this prize was won in the United States. Remarkably, this case was treated when Dr. Rangell was still a candidate. The paper was his graduation thesis. It has been reprinted in a number of books and is used in courses on the treatment of phobias in many

Institutes. The paper has multiple appeals. It is a clear demonstration of the multiple meanings of this particular phobia. Rangell compared it to "spokes of a wheel with the symptom doll as the hub." These symbolic meanings are carefully traced back to their origins in the childhood of the patient: the relationship to castration, to traumatic events during childhood, oedipal and preoedipal, the anal phase, the patient's identification with the fragile doll which can break, and his identification with a deceased sister. The doll represented the mother without genitals, and the patient's homosexual wishes toward his father. It is not just a beautiful clinical case report, it also demonstrates so well the importance of reconstructing the childhood neurosis as well as the adolescence of an adult patient in order to fully understand and work through the psychopathology. Particularly interesting is his analysis of the significance of the death of a sister shortly before the patient's birth. It demonstrates so well the particular difficulties surrounding the birth of a "replacement child," a subject rarely mentioned in the analytic literature. Often it is ignored also in clinical work.

Two years later, in 1953, Leo Rangell was again awarded the Clinical Essay Prize of the British Institute of Psychoanalysis, the first time this award was ever won twice. This was for his paper, the Psychology of Poise. In this paper he elaborates on the psychological significance of the snout or peri-oral region, combining his knowledge of neurology and embryology and his interest in infant and child development, and bringing these to bear on his adult clinical experience. The result is again a meticulous reconstruction of the infantile and adolescent neurosis in order to understand his patient's difficulty with poise, and, in particular, its relationship to orality. As with any other psychic activity, many factors contribute to the state of poise, not only orality and its relationship to the fear of the loss of love, but also problems related to the superego, such as the "reprojection" of its appraising functions "or a lack of internalization of it in the first place." Poise can be a defense against affects like shame — it has exhibitionistic aspects as well, and serves narcissistic needs, is dependent on the state of self-esteem, as well as fitting in with cultural expectations. Poise is then linked to the expectations of the availability of the breast, and its potentiality for the infant. It implies ego capabilities in the growing infant. After this theoretical and developmental excursion, Rangell returns to the patient and measures how well his theoretical understanding fits his patient. It is interesting to see how Rangell struggled with understanding these early nonverbal states of the infant. Terms like symbiosis were not yet part of the analytic language and conceptualization. Rangell uses terms like "being anchored," "being attached," "re-establishing the original biological unity," at one with . . . the source of narcissistic supply" etc. Then follows his elaboration of the oral zone and his innovative insight to include the entire snout area. This is supported by relevant child observational data, as well as references to Hoffer's observations in his paper on mouth, hand and ego integration. What needs to be stressed here is one of Rangell's strengths, namely, that his work remains well-balanced in the sense that these preoedipal nonverbal data are

interrelated with more advanced levels of functioning. Not only the role of the ego function of anticipation is stressed, but also the importance of the snout for sexual activity and for expression of affects. The snout "is the small porthole through which can be observed from the outside the person's affective state."

Rangell demonstrates how one can use the state of a patient's snout as a nonverbal communication, which then can be interpreted. For the child analyst this paper represents an important bridge between child and adult analysis. Namely, the child analyst works almost constantly in this area between non-verbal and verbal interactions of his child patient. Rangell demonstrates that the same pertains to adult patients, be it most often to a lesser degree. In this paper, he describes how one makes use of these observations and integrates them in one's interpretative work with patients.

The next paper to which I wish to refer, indicative of Rangell's interest in child development, appears as the lead article in Vol. IX #4, 1961 of *The Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association,* entitled The Role of Early Psychic Functioning in Psychoanalysis. It was read as the Chairman's address on a panel on early psychic functioning and was also presented to the Los Angeles Society for Child Psychiatry a short time later. This paper is a logical sequence and elaboration of the paper on poise. In this paper we see not only evidence of his contacts with Ekstein, Tidd, Call and Beckwith on the local scene but also his involvement in the work of Spitz, Benjamin, Fries, Escalona, Deutsch, Ernst and Marianne Kris, Anna Freud, Greenacre and others. He makes special reference to his old colleague and co-author Mahler, whose "careful, detailed, and microscopic . . . work on autism and symbiosis . . ." offers much illumination on the course of development of psychic life in the earliest neonatal period, and the pitfalls and deficiencies of which may here ensue. In the paper on poise the integration of data from early psychic functioning with later levels of development was implicit. In this paper it becomes explicit in the form of a warning, that some may not see "this portion (of early psychic functioning) in relationship to the whole." He warns against evolving "systems" and "schools" — this was in 1961! — based on such fallacies of overemphasizing early psychic functioning instead of maintaining a balanced view between the beginnings of psychic development and its gradual unfolding into the later structures, which had been discovered and described before.

At the same panel, Rangell presented another paper, co-authored with Rudolf Ekstein, their well known paper on Reconstruction and Theory Formation. In this paper we find much of what is familiar to us already from Rangell's previous writings. The authors re-examine Rangell's reconstructions in the paper on poise, as well as other clinical data from Rangell's experience. Reinforced with the experiences of Ekstein with psychotic children, they reconfirm Rangell's earlier position of the necessity of validation in order that the theoretical formulations derived from reconstructive work do not become speculations. Particularly they

recommend "convergence of different lines of research." In other words, reconstructions made during adult analysis, during child analysis, and direct observation of infants and children should yield findings that are "mutually explanatory." They are critical of the reconstructive work of the Kleinian School and also offer very cogent reservations about Isakower's and Lewin's reconstructions, partly based on the divergence with the direct observations of infants by such researchers as Spitz. What Ekstein and Rangell were struggling with, and trying to come to grips with in this crucial paper was how to integrate the findings of the burgeoning field of direct observation with the data of psychoanalysis. This process continues to challenge analysts. There is, for instance, the ongoing workshop of Justin Call and Eleanor Galenson on the relevance of infant observation for the psychoanalysis of children and adults. M. Mahler and Lampl-de Groot more recently echoed similar cautions as Rangell and Ekstein.

By 1963 Rangell's fame as a student of infant and child observations was well established. It had earned him the honor of being a contributor to a tribute to Rene Spitz on his 75th birthday. The paper he wrote for the occasion was Beyond and Between the No and Yes.

This paper is a brilliant extension of Spitz's observation that the gestures NO and YES are related to the nursing experience. Rangell shows how the same is true for the words NO and YES. His evidence is partly based on direct observation, partly on his findings described in the paper on poise, and partly on his neurological background, as well as phylogenetic considerations. This paper shows how the musculature used for ingestion of milk is also used for the word "yes," and the musculature used for the rejection of food is also utilized for the word "no." The area between the No and Yes is the area of ambivalence. This part of the paper forms the springboard to demonstrate the development throughout child and adulthood of these early communications, again connecting observational data with findings from his adult analytic practice in a most convincing way.

Always bridging, Rangell kept connecting child data to adult analyses long before this topic became one of general interest. There is also an early much-quoted paper on the role of the parent in the oedipus complex (1955), reprinted in a book on Parenthood, papers on television and young children, nursery school education, and others. Of particular interest is how well Rangell demonstrates the developmental progression from nonverbal to verbal communication. The two areas interdigitate for a long period of time. The two methods of communication continue to co-exist well into adolescence. Gesturing during speech can be looked upon as a remnant in adulthood. Both are subject to analysis as was so clearly demonstrated in the paper on poise. Its implications for the understanding of acting out, a later interest of Rangell's (1968) is also obvious. A continuously and active contributor to the scientific life of the American Psychoanalytic Association in the '50s and '60s, Rangell followed up this subject in 1969 when he chaired a panel at the American on Nonverbal Communication in the Analysis of Adults.

In 1963 the *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* published two papers by Rangell in one volume, in itself a very rare occurrence for this prestigious periodical. Both papers deal with his understanding of the intrapsychic conflict. The first paper, entitled The Scope of Intrapsychic Conflict, examines in minute microscopic detail the dynamics of the formation of intrapsychic conflict. In 13 lucid steps, he outlines what may ensue when psychic equilibrium is impinged upon. He distinguishes between early stages of normal conflict and further development into pathological conflict. He delineates two kinds of intrapsychic conflict, choice conflict versus conflict of oppositional forces, a subject which is elaborated upon in many subsequent papers in later years. Rangell also includes and restates here his unitary theory of anxiety, which is described separately in detail in two other papers. Embedded in this concept is a modification of Freud's idea of the actual neurosis, and a fusion of Freud's two theories of anxiety based upon Rangell's detailed examination of the dynamic sequence in the formation and vicissitudes of intrapsychic conflict.

Throughout this largely theoretical paper he falls back time and again on evidence from infant and child cases and observations, particularly from his data in "Beyond and Between and No and Yes."

The accompanying paper, Structural Problems in Intrapsychic Problems, examines in detail the structural characteristics of intrapsychic conflict. The paper also anticipates the 1969 and 1971 papers on choice conflict and the decision making process, ego functions which had not been clearly spelled out by other authors. In this paper Rangell elucidates in his usual very clear style the interrelationship between inter and intra systemic conflicts. He considers the question of intrasystemic conflict within the superego, as in the case of contradictory superego warnings or guidelines, and also between contradictory drive tendencies in the id. Although leaning toward assigning these functions to the ego he recognizes that developmentally, over time, the superego tends to become more consistent within itself. He offers a possible solution, based on the argument of the common origin of the superego and ego. He concludes that separateness as well as overlapping and interpenetration are characteristics for all three of the structural agencies of the psychic apparatus.

In discussing the observation that autonomy in the superego is less achieveable (in the superego) than in the ego we can see the forerunners of Rangell's later contributions on the compromise of integrity (1974) and on the Watergate problem (1976 and 1980). In agreement with Arlow he cautions against the overuse of the concept of the intrasystemic conflict at the expense of the importance of the role of drives intersystemically for conflict formation. A sequential chain leading to choice and decision-making is first proposed in these two papers. Interestingly, Rangell also discusses the role of the life and death instinct in connection with the formation of conflict. In

general, his views, though differing and expanding, are in agreement with the views set forth by other theoreticians such as Fenichel, Hartman, Kris, Loewenstein, Rapaport, Jacobson, and others. The paper is to be recommended strongly, especially for anyone interested in the study of ego and superego development and their contribution to psychic conflict.

Finally, I wish to draw attention to a panel report in the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association,* 1965, Volume 13, on the relationship between child analysis and the theory and practice of adult psychoanalysis. Rangell, as chairman of this panel gave the opening remarks, in which he outlines differences and similarities between child and adult analysis both from the technical and theoretical standpoints. The other participants of the panel were all child analysts. Rangell clarified and unified the discussion as it reigned over transference and counter transference and over modification of child analytic techniques due to the immaturity of the child's ego vs. the use of parameters that may occur in certain child and adult cases. He stressed the need to address the child in adult patients, and illustrated the importance of understanding infancy and childhood for the understanding of adults. He further stressed the importance of both affective and cognitive relatedness, optimally combined, as necessary for successfully analyzing both children and adults. He also described the similarity in goals and in criteria for termination in child and adult analysis. At the end of the day Rangell gave one of his brilliant summaries of the proceedings of the day. His expertise prompted one of the panelists (Solnit) to express his wish to recruit Rangell to the ranks of child analysis.

Rangell's scientific link to infancy and childhood never wavered. He gave the Plenary Address to the first meeting of the new field of infant psychiatry in Newport Beach, started by Call and Galenson, which later became first a national, and then a World Association for Infant Psychiatry. Leo also presented another important paper on "Structure, Somatic and Psychic: The Biopsychological Base of Infancy," at the second World Congress on Infant Psychiatry held by this Association in Cannes, France in 1982. In 1984, he was the Plenary speaker at the Annual meeting of the Chicago Society for Adolescent Psychiatry in Lake Geneva, Wisconsin. His address at that time was entitled "Seventeen," and is now being published in a book on Frontiers of Adult Development.

Having presented some of Rangell's writings and activities up to 1970, it seems abundantly evident that there was a very close relationship between Leo Rangell and child psychoanalysis. In the seventeen years since that date, Dr. Rangell has published at least as much as in the prior twenty-eight years. Undoubtedly, like everything else, this creative spurt was multiply determined. Leo's creative productivity since 1970, however, was less in evidence and his papers less heard on the Los Angeles scene since that time. I believe one factor which can be singled out for this was the reorganization of the Institute which took place in 1967. As is well known, Rangell did not

agree with the course of events and as a result he withdrew from the scientific and educational activities locally and eventually resigned. This, however, freed some of his energies which obviously in part can account for the tremendous increase in his creative endeavors. However, it also moved him further away from the child analytic program in Los Angeles which had been enriched by his past involvement, and which had given direction to a considerable amount of his thinking and writing. The loss of Rangell to child analysis in Los Angeles is an indication of the high price paid for the reorganization of the Los Angeles Institute, a price that could not be afforded.

It should be made clear in focusing on this one side of Rangell, I ignored all the other sides of him and thereby had to omit a discussion of a large number of highly important papers, such as his papers on anxiety, nosology, the nature of conversion, termination, trauma, acting out, choice conflict, and most of all his paper on similarities and differences between psychoanalysis and dynamic psychotherapy. It contains his famous definition of psychoanalysis, which has stood the test of time ever since it was written in 1954. Also left out of this summary of Rangell's works during this period are his presidential addresses (one on friendship), his presidential newsletters, his remarks as a much sought after discussant of many papers, including Anna Freud's, introductory remarks as Chairman of many panels, national as well as international, his many reports as reporter of panels, regular participation and the leading of discussions at the Annual Scientific Forums of the Hampstead Clinic, a summary of Anna Freud's lifework for the *Social Science Encyclopedia,* and a number of obituaries, including Anna Freud's in the *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child,* another of Heinz Hartmann in the *International Journal,* one of our own David Brunswick in the *Newsletter of the American Psychoanalytic Association.* The scope of Leo Rangell is indeed the entire field of psychoanalysis.

THE WORK OF DR. RANGELL - RECENT YEARS

by Norman B. Atkins, M.D.

Over the past two decades the areas of scientific scrutiny and writing of Dr. Leo Rangell have ranged from microscopic to macroscopic phenomena; from the intrapsychic to the social systems of human functioning. His papers include both the theoretical and the clinical, psychoanalytic technique and the theory of technique; interlocking affects with cognition and conation. His work has encompassed a number of significant core psychoanalytic and human societal issues; building bridges between ideas, concepts and theories and between all of these and clinical observations. In every paper, as well as integrating previous understandings, Rangell always adds something new and different, a new perspective, a new insight, a new integration never before explicitly stated or described.

There are several broad categories of issues around which a number of his major papers can be related. Psychoanalytic theoreticians have especially appreciated his revised and unified theory of anxiety, his deepening of the understanding of the role of psychic trauma, and detailed elaboration with a microscopic focus on intrapsychic mental life. In "The Metapsychology of Psychic Trauma" published in *Psychic Trauma,* (1967), Rangell developed an integrated theory of trauma. He noted that Freud presented seemingly different views on psychic trauma during his life which were supplemented over the years by the writings of other psychoanalytic theorists. Rangell viewed all of these significant contributions as components that needed to be "tied together into a continuous integrated unit in order to understand the whole story of trauma." This approach reflects Dr. Rangell's interest and capacity to bring together, modify, integrate and develop new perspectives for psychoanalytic theory. He has studied in great detail the intrapsychic series of events which lead to defense and subsequent neurosis. He is convinced that anxiety has a special role in this intrapsychic sequence having precedence over the impact of all other affects. The ultimate fear (anxiety) is the traumatic state of psychic helplessness including that of being affectively overwhelmed.

He has written extensively on the problem of anxiety including, "The Psychoanalytic Theory of Anxiety," (1965); "A Further Attempt to Resolve the Problem of Anxiety," (1968); "Understanding and Treating Anxiety and Its Derivatives," (1978). In his 1955 and 1968 papers Rangell worked toward achieving an integrated psychoanalytic theory of anxiety combining elements of Freud's two theories of anxiety. Rangell indicates that a reaction to traumatic states is the common denominator of Freud's two theories and he utilizes elements of both theories to achieve one coherent and comprehensive theory. He describes how the anxiety reaction is initiated either by an existing

traumatic state, passively endured and similar to what Freud described in terms of an actual neurosis in his first theory, or alternately activated by the ego as a sample of trauma with subsequent anxiety. This is utilized as a warning, a signal, of an anticipated danger situation (Freud's later theory). He does not agree with Freud's early formulation regarding the direct one-to-one transformation of the repressed libidinal excitation into anxiety but believes the "aktualneurose" is better viewed as an example of a psychic traumatic state passively suffered by the ego with resulting anxiety.

Rangell finds Freud's second theory, the signal theory, quite compatible with his own thinking regarding an active ego. In the 1968 paper he expresses the hope that with suggested reformulation of Freud's two theories he has resolved the seemingly contradictory aspects of those theories. He concurs with Freud's statement of anxiety's centrality in the neuroses and reiterates his position that the task of analysis is to search for and expose anxiety; to make unconscious anxiety conscious.

In connection with his studies of psychic trauma and anxiety, conflict and defense, Rangell has produced over a period of years a group of papers which deal with the intrapsychic process in metapsychological theory, the psychoanalytic process and its implication for technique. He writes that his concepts of an intrapsychic process is "an expanded formulation of the idea of thought as trial action and of the signal theory of anxiety." He believes "the psychoanalytic method alters the functioning of the ego astride the unconscious intrapsychic process, strengthening its control over anxiety, defense, trauma and symptom formation" and that is what "is mutative in the psychoanalytic method." This follows from his interest in the strengths and capacities of an active ego which initiates and makes choices and decisions when faced with conflict. Mainstream psychoanalytic theories have had little place in dealing with conflict for unconscious will, affirmation and choice. The emphasis in metapsychology has been on a strict psychic determinism, limiting the ego to defense and compromise formations in the face of intrapsychic conflicts. This is an ego reacting to and mediating the demands of the id, superego and reality, channeling drives, utilizing its defensive capacities and achieving compromises.

Recently a number of psychoanalytic theorists have been concerned about the relative neglect in papers on metapsychology of studies providing a place for will, affirmation, choice, decision and judgement (unconscious, pre-conscious and conscious). These capacities have been either minimally or incompletely developed in our conventional psychoanalytic metapsychology such as Hartmann's and Rapaport's. Freud does mention these attributes and potentials but only sporadically in his works. It has been suggested that Freud really had two separate, independent psychological theories. One, the clinical, which provided for these ego attributes but which cannot be found in the metapsychological theory. Rangell felt there was no need to find other theories or part theories to account for the substantial but relatively neglected

and confused areas of will, choice, autonomous direction and responsibility. He developed a unified, comprehensive theory that did not discard the old but is a metapsychology that includes an active ego which wills, decides among choices.

In his 1971 paper in the *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child,* entitled "The Decision Making Process," Rangell brings together the heart of his ego-psychological and metapsychological thinking about the core of human psychological functioning in everyday life and in psychopathology. Here he lays the ground work for his later developments concerning the executive functions of the ego and the nature of the psychoanalytic process. He begins with a case of a man who was almost totally unable to make a decision concerning meaningful choices and options in his everyday life.

From this macroscopic view of the problem, Rangell proceeded to theoretical considerations which contribute to metapsychology. In his microdynamic sequence of intrapsychic events involving potential conflict he hypothesizes the ego first sampling the reaction of the superego to small controlled amounts of instinctual discharge. Signal anxiety may occur depending on the nature of traumatic memories which are tapped.

The next step is Rangell's original contribution to the understanding of the nature of intrapsychic conflict. He hypotheses that if there occurs signal anxiety, the ego is confronted with a dilemma between alternatives, involving a necessity for a decision, a choice between the competitive demands and opportunities of psychic systems. Rangell believes this introduces into metapsychology a newly discovered type of intrapsychic conflict with an autonomous ego function that deals with this choice dilemma conflict. This is different from the oppositional ego-id conflict which is generally understood as *intrapsychic conflict* and which does play a role in other phases of the intrapsychic process. He does not believe that indecision stems from polar and opposite instinctual drives or qualities of drives as drive components. Such instinctual dichotomies result in ambivalence, not indecision. Indecision is an ego disturbance reflecting disturbance in the ego's decision making function. He believes that an understanding of this complex phase of the intrapsychic process with its intrinsic ego sequence of anxiety — choice — decision — action can serve as a psychoanalytic contribution to decision theory.

In the paper, "The Executive Functions of the Ego: An Extension of the Concept of Ego Autonomy," (1986), Rangell offers his most complete and detailed presentation of his extension of the concept of ego autonomy. He extends his concept of the autonomous ego functions to the psychoanalytic treatment situation and to conscious ego functioning. He believes that in psychoanalytic treatment "a psychic determinism which does not include the roles of unconscious decision and choices make such a treatment incomplete and defeats its goals from the start." He finds it necessary in psychoanalytic treatment to make such interpretations as: "You have a choice," or "You had

a choice and chose this or that," or "you set up conditions which made such a decision inevitable."

Rangell states that strict psychic determinism must be expanded to include a recognition of unconscious will, choice and ultimately of responsibility. He writes, "Taken by itself psychic determinism is incomplete unless it is viewed in the context of the role played by the individual himself in controlling and shaping his destiny." Recognition by psychoanalysts of these unconscious capacities of the ego places an increased burden of responsibility on themselves and their patients for pre-conscious and unconscious choices and actions.

Rangell writes in "Unconscious Choice, An Extension of Psychoanalytic Theory," (1987), that the earliest psychoanalytic insights injured man's narcissism and contributed to resistance to psychoanalytic understandings, "in that man was shown to have less control over his action than he knew; with the present addition the opposite is also the case, i.e., that with the introduction of unconscious choice and decision, man chooses and acts with more purpose and intention than he knows." Faced with the possibility of being more responsible for thoughts, affects and actions than we wish to acknowledge contributes to another potent source of resistance to psychoanalytic insights.

In 1987 Rangell applied his theories and understanding about the ongoing intrapsychic process with its specific points of vulnerability to psychopathology, to the psychoanalytic process treatment situation in "A Core Process in Psychoanalytic Treatment." In this paper he describes in detail the nature of the psychoanalytic situation and develops a theory of technique based on his expanded view of metapsychology. He writes that as the analyst functions, "The patient identifies with the analyst's analytic function, the patient's ego with the analytic ego of the analyst. This identification is mutative, causes change, brings about structural and dynamic alterations in the intrapsychic functioning, therefore in the external behavior of the patient." The qualitative inter-relationships and the quantitative proportions between psychic structures are altered in treatment.

An interesting dyad among Dr. Rangell's articles is the pair concerning "The Self in Psychoanalytic Theory," (1982) and "The Object in Psychoanalytic Theory," (1985). He states that the central concepts in analysis need to be periodically redefined. He does this for the concept of *self* which in recent years has been so significant in self-psychology theories and follows with a redefinition of *object* which similarly has been a central feature of object-relations theories. In these two papers Rangell critiques schools of psychoanalytic thought which have focused mainly on either the self or on the object side of the self-object dyad. These are both thorough studies with Rangell's contributions to self linked to object within the framework of current ego psychology and metapsychology.

In the paper on the self, Rangell traces the roots of the concept from Freud's earlier contributions to Hartmann, Jacobson, Kernberg, Winnicott and Kohut's later elaborations. He discusses the complex interaction between individual and group dynamics, stating that when the group dynamics are "intense and dominant, they influence and take over the dynamics of the individual." He writes, ". . . to remain an individual within the group takes a certain permanence and resistance of the differentiated self."

Rangell's works range from his studies of the self and object to group and social phenomena and applied psychoanalysis as in his book, *The Mind of Watergate*. These studies complement each other in a necessary and essential way. In the 'self' paper he notes that Mark Kanzer wrote extensively about Freud's contributions to applied psychoanalysis as vital to an understanding of his thinking and that they were insufficiently appreciated. Rangell considers his own works in this genre as a similarly important aspect of his psychoanalytic contributions.

The more recent 'object' paper deals in depth with the concept of object but always in the context of the relationship of object to self. In addition there is a fuller discussion of the self in psychoanalytic theory. The paper details interrelations between the self, the object and reality. Rangell suggests a more complete understanding of the object requires conceiving of it not simply as a psychic representation involving fantasies on the part of the subject but as an independently functioning system of its own in the real world, just as the self is, with ego, id and superego components.

A deep and abiding interest in human relationships is reflected in all of Dr. Rangell's clinical papers, the papers on technique and theory of technique, and continues into his investigation of the individual in relation to groups and into group psychology itself. Definitive studies of relationships between individuals and between the individual and the group can be found in his papers, "On Friendship," (1963) and "The Cacophony of Human Relationships," (1973). In 1973 in the Presidential Address at the 29th International Psycho-Analytical Congress he introduced the concept he describes as the syndrome of the Compromise of Integrity, C of I. This was an extension and an outgrowth of his interest in the active ego's decision making capacities which added to the already well known descriptions of the reactive ego with abilities for adaptation to reality (Hartmann) and the defensiv e ego (Anna Freud). This ego which initiates processes within itself is an ego that ultimately shoulders responsibility for its motivations and actions.

As the ego struggles with the demands of the superego and with the id, the outcome may be neuroses on the one hand or the syndrome of compromise of integrity if the ego in its conflicts with the superego manages to overthrow or diminish the superego. The syndrome of C of I is ubiquitous and universal. It involves the ego's self serving options winning out over the relentless demands of the superego and its standards. Rangell reminds us that "narcissism is the enemy of integrity." He points out that in addition to this

SCIENTIFIC MEETING REPORT:

Unconscious Choice: An Extension of Psychoanalytic Theory

Presenter: Leo Rangell, M.D.

Reported by: Lee W. Shershow, M.D.

On January 15 Leo Rangell delivered an important new paper to our Society. His presentation, as usual, was stimulating, was well attended by many Society members and other friends of Dr. Rangell, and produced an exciting evening for psychoanalysis in Los Angeles.

Dr. Rangell began his paper by contrasting the advances made by a successive series of new psychoanalytic models, with the approach he prefers of "steady accretions to enduring psychoanalytic theory." (All quotes will be taken directly from the text of the paper.) Placing this contribution in perspective, Rangell described this paper as a "major new branch stemming from the main trunk of psychoanalytic theory," which would focus on a cohesive theme running through a selected group of papers from his previous psychoanalytic work. This theme, which centers on the exercise of unconscious choice by the ego, constitutes a "unifying thread underlying human mentation," and has "far-reaching consequences for the understanding of human behavior." "The operation of an active though unconscious ego decision and 'will' in the final psychic outcome, introduces a significant new dimension into psychoanalytic theory, the psychoanalytic therapeutic procedure, and the elusive questions of responsibility and accountability." Such ambitious goals clearly elevated this presentation from the realm of a routine psychoanalytic paper to an important and seminal contribution extracted from Rangell's entire career as a psychoanalytic theoretician.

Dr. Rangell then gave a lengthy description of an "intrapsychic core process" that included as its key new point the idea of unconscious decision-making by the ego. He arrived at this conclusion through an ingenious synthesis of the structural point of view with signal anxiety. He proposed a twelve-step intrapsychic and unconscious process. It began when the ego "permits a tentative experimental discharge of an instinctual impulse," and if a "safety signal" is received, the ego proceeds with external activity, in the form of thought, affect, or action. If, however, the ego received a signal of anxiety, it is confronted with a choice type of intrapsychic conflict: "The ego must now decide what to do next, in terms of id vs. superego or environmental demands."

Dr. Rangell proceeded to describe in his masterful and unique manner the resultant possible outcomes of the ego's decisions. They ranged from a decision to instigate successful defenses that produce intrapsychic stability, to failed defenses, increasing psychic tension, traumatic helplessness, and eventually the whole spectrum of psychopathology. This part of the paper is difficult to summarize, as he pursued a "microscopic" examination of the ego's decisions. Dr. Rangell would also periodically digress from the text of the paper to emphasize one particular feature, often connecting an idea to previous papers written by himself in the past, or other prominent psychoanalytic theoreticians.

During this description he repeatedly emphasized that the concept of unconscious ego decision-making was a useful and new extension of classical psychoanalytic theory. He said:

> The operation of an active though unconscious ego decision and "will" in the final psychic outcome, introduces a significant new dimension into psychoanalytic theory, the psychoanalytic therapeutic procedure, and the elusive questions of responsibility and accountability.

Dr. Rangell used the balance of the paper to expand on his ideas that unconscious decision-making by the ego was "an organizing principle of all human behavior." He used the twelve-step process to integrate both Freudian views of anxiety, i.e. dammed-up libido or tension states, and signal anxiety. He said that his sequence "encompasses and contains" all other psychoanalytic theories, including:

> . . . the self, the object, the interpersonal, Kleinian, developmental theory, information processing, systems theories, the findings of direct infant observers, even the concepts of computer analysis, or of the brain as the largest and most complex of computers. . . . This base . . . makes many alternative theories unnecessary, such as G. Klein introducing purpose and intention, or Schafer a theory of action, Kohut the self, Stolorow intersubjectivity, or Gedo the centrality of a hierarchy of values.

Finally, he clarified the role of intention, decision, and responsibility within structural psychoanalytic theory, areas some analytic writers would prefer to limit to a "clinical theory" of hermaneutics.

The paper was followed by three discussions by Heiman van Dam, Norman Atkins, and Gerald Aronson. Dr. van Dam found the paper most exciting and useful, and felt it to be especially relevant to child analysts, and to the issues of decision-making in clinical work. He also raised a most interesting question, in applying Rangell's ideas to non-clinical areas, by asking why so many members of the audience leave early during the scientific presentations. Dr. Atkins agreed that it was a powerful paper analytically, and emphasized the importance of Dr. Rangell's recent ideas on the compromise of integrity. He

reminded the audience of Dr. Rangell's previous exploration of integrity in his book *The Mind of Watergate*. Dr. Aronson agreed that the paper's main importance was its contribution to on-going discussion among analysts on philosophical issues of psychic determinism and accountability.

The final part of the evening — and in some ways the best part — was Rangell's response to the discussants. In a relaxed and informal manner, he addressed all the issues raised by the discussants. In addition, to the delight of the remaining audience, he shared some personal information on how he became increasingly concerned throughout his analytic career with questions about human decision-making, will, and integrity. He related how he developed his unique concept of "identification with the corrupt" through careful observation of the political career of Richard Nixon and more specifically of the "men under Nixon." These final remarks provided a most pleasant and enjoyable ending to his stimulating presentation.

LEO RANGELL: A TEMPERED IMPATIENCE

by Gerald Aronson, M.D.

For 30 of the last 40 years I have plundered cheerfully. In the past 10 years, remorse in a reluctant seniority has forced a pleasant necessity upon me: to acknowledge in public as often as I can make it happen, or as the occasion befits, my debt to those several victims from whom I have borrowed so liberally.

Today I can do that for Leo Rangell.

On October 1, Leo will be 75. His tennis hardly shows it; his productivity not at all. To scan the work of four and a half decades, stretching from sea to sea, from anxiety to free will, from symptom to society, is to glimpse a psychoanalytic empire conquered not by brute force, but recruited by method, encompassed by experience, and ruled by order.

If you were to sit down and read these close to 300 papers, plus 2 books, you would be immersed in a river starting in the rivulets of six neurologic papers, then running in great torrents, and now rolling in mighty cadence toward the sea. The later years, by actual count, show greater variety, plumb deeper themes, and course in serried rank more densely than the years before. With many papers and two books in press, a few more in preparation, and a Festschrift in the works, it looks like he will never stop.

Thomas Huxley did not know Leo Rangell when he said: "A man of science past 60 does more harm than good."

This huge output, a treasure house for plunder, was produced amid a busy practice, without academic support (except for a productive year as the only non-academician at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 1962-63), and alone (save for an early one with a young Margaret Mahler, a classic paper on Tics, in 1943, and a lovely paper on Reconstruction and Theory Formation with Rudi Ekstein in 1959).

In medieval times an output so vast would excite the envy and acumen of the scholastic masters, who would attempt to classify and explain such an array of writings. This is not limited to medieval scholars. To those troubled by their own urge to classify, one would have to find that Rangell has *the gift* of libido sciendi (the lust to know), and also to organize and cohere what is known.

Consider: when a topic is assigned him, or a subject moves him, he wraps his mind around it (The Executive Functions of the Ego), encircles its outposts (Responsibility and Free Will), probes toward its heart (The Trauma papers), builds bridges toward related ideas (on Friendship, the Cacophony paper), and throws up buttresses to shore up listing concepts onto a firmer foundation (the Unitary Theory of Anxiety).

This phenomenon, Rangell — of what is his productive fabric made? J. J. Thornson in his assessment of Lord Rayleigh said:

> "There are some men of science whose charm consists in having said the first word on a subject, in having introduced some new idea which has proved fruitful; there are others whose charm consists perhaps in having said the last word on the subject, and who have reduced the subject to logical consistency and clearness."

Rangell has done both and here I point to three paths into the treasure trove, any one of which (Dayenu!) would reward the most dogged plunderer: the findings ("the first word on a subject"), the method of thought ("the clearness"), and the framework of thought ("the logical consistency").

Until recently in the history of medicine, it was difficult for a thief of ideas to make off with stolen goods. Syndromes were guarded by eponyms. The thyroid was von Basedow's territory, hysteria Briquet's. You couldn't cart those off and produce them out of your own pockets.

Imagine then:

Rangell's syndrome / The Compromise of Integrity
Rangell's gain / The tertiary gain of symptoms
Rangell's phase / the post-analytic phase

And what proprietary rights would have to be undone with: the third separation-individuation phase, signal affects, the two types of unconscious conflict (choice and oppositional), the unitary anxiety theory, the micro-dynamic sequence, the decision-making function of the ego, the theory of action within the structural view (long-delayed since Hartmann's plea), and, as the ads say, more, much more.

Those are first words on the subject, and where not first words, deeper explorations into uncharted waters.

Now — what of the method of thought? Leo is vexed when I interest myself in methods of thought and silently stares at the ground when I talk about "What are the rules for judging what's right? By what canons do we award truth"? He is bored by epistemology and seeks validity by ontologic criteria: coherence, correspondence with fact, correlation with metapsychology. Like the hedgehog of Archilochus, about which more later, he bristles at philosophic considerations while trying to maintain a tactful equanimity.

Rangell asserts a stance within psychoanalytic history: the lineage of Freud, Anna Freud, Hartmann, and Rapaport, a collegial patrimony responsible for two major acts: one of restraint and one of construction. Perpetually out of step with those who, if they were to be believed, were on the edge of a breakthrough that would put a permanent end to uncertainty and unhappiness, this two-generation tier of thinkers erected a metapsychological scaffold which Rangell has sturdied into a tower.

But I delight in observing that in Rangell's case, even more than in the psychoanalytic lineage to which he has assigned himself, certain grand philosophic themes course through his work culminating in the 1986 and 1987 papers, and those to come, dealing with the Executive Functions of the Ego, Choice and Responsibility, Free Will et al. The psychoanalytic enterprise, in Rangell's hands, addresses itself to Kant's three questions: What must be the case? What should we do? For what may we hope? Later in life, Kant asked his famous fourth question: What is man? Rangell tackles that as well: the structure of longings, threats, decision-making, affects,will, etc.

I know that Leo disclaims so glorious and intricate a lineage, impatient as he is with philosophic fiddle-faddle. He bases himself instead on the nearer horizon of 1900, but his method of thought, as well as his interests, are firmer than most psychoanalytic theoreticians.

The style of his essays, discursive and non-polemical, testifies to a tough-minded spirit for whom the sustaining dialectic is not a doctrine of inevitable progress but a means of nurturing a rich balance. Almost every paper is an intellectual novella with the aim of the 19th Century philosopher: to explore the new in order to test and unfold an encompassing frame.

The architecture of almost every Rangell paper, laid bare, reveals a trellis of classical psychoanalytic metapsychology, a method Socratic, and a program of investigation startling in its similarity to Kant's.

The central metaphor, Rangell uses it again and again, is that of the wheel, with its hub and interconnecting spokes. The Kantian triad of Unity, Plurality and Totality, which are categories of quantity, can be seen clearly, exhaustively (not exhaustingly!) everywhere. Consider the *1982 Transference to Theory:*

> "... rather than postulate a separate theory for each case or type of patient — a theoretical way of life hardly congenial to the family of science — I prefer to conceptualize a diversity in unity . . . Psychoanalytic metapsychology, the abstract theory of psychoanalysis, consists of not one but a number of points of view. . . the aim is completeness with parsimony."

The three Kantian categories of Quality, Reality, Negation and Limitation, can without difficulty be discerned in Rangell's program: Limitation, for example, is illustrated in the *Cacophony* paper (1973):

> "Psychoanalytic explanations do not explain all divisiveness and lack of cohesion between people. . .Many causative factors (are) outside of psychological sources completely, nor, within them, factors which arise from extra-conflictual, autonomous differences."

This acknowledgement of limitation, a boundary firmly drawn to permit a tactical focus on an area of study by exclusion, but much more importantly asserting a limitation of method and knowledge, is a bracing dash of cold Kantian water flung in the face of a vague psychoanalytic imperialism which claims all, yields nothing, and explains little.

Just as he disclaims any knowledge of Kant as programmatic guide, so does Rangell shrug off any formal learning of Socrates. He has come independently to the method of Socrates in Plato's Phaedrus. Listen to Socrates, then to Rangell:

> Socrates: "It would be very agreeable if we could seize significances in a scientific fashion by a certain pair of procedures. . . First, the taking in of scattered particulars under one idea, so that everyone understands what is being talked about. . . Second, the separation of the Idea into its parts, by carving nature at its joints, not breaking a limb in half, as a bad carver might." (Phaedius 265 D.)

This is the method of collection and division.

> Rangell in *Structural Problems in Intrapsychic Conflict,* "decomposes various functions which on a grosser view we are apt to consider as one. To choose is not the same as to organize and neither is the same as to synthesize."

The first method, that of collecting scattered particulars, receives its finest expression in the *Poise* and *Doll* papers.

I have commented briefly on program and method. Rangell's rhetoric, his way of writing, has several interesting characteristics. It is, most frequently, firm and supple. In *Structural Problems,*

> "I cannot offer unequivocal answers but merely wish to confront the questions and follow them through. . . to describe in succession two alternative ways of looking at the situation. . . We could then see with each possible answer what falls into place. . . What elements if any are solved. . . Whether any inconsistencies come into play. . ."

Here the net result is to substitute articulate hesitation for inarticulate certainty — the hallmark, as Bertrand Russell would have it, of proper inquiry. Here we see dialogue, not dogma, and we are led to progress by clarifying the conditions in dispute.

At other times, Rangell's rhetoric is a solid phalanx of infantry: the elements sometimes drawing in to avoid attack, defending in dense formation some central concept, at other times expanding, while retaining contact with each other, to capture conceptual ground while giving none. So compelling and adamant is this variation in rhetoric that one feels confronted by an obstinacy. Wm. James remarked: ". . . metaphysics means nothing but an unusually

obstinate effort to think clearly." Sometimes Leo is not only obstinate and clear but obstinately clear.

A fourth point — after program, method, and rhetoric — about his voluminous writings: Most psychoanalysts make use of a specimen case. And this same specimen is dragged through all their papers. Fairbairn noted that if Freud's earliest specimen cases had not been hysterics, if he had started with obsessionals, the whole structure of psychoanalytic theory would be different. Rangell has no specimen cases; he furnishes case illustrations, and he lets them go when they have served his demonstrative purpose. They are not shlepped along from paper to paper like some burdensome albatross.

A last point on style: in his *Core* paper (1967), Rangell's eloquent expressions of gratitude toward Eissler, Greenacre, Alexander, Erikson, and Hartmann, and in other papers toward Greenson, brought to mind a school boy's memory:

> Quintillian (AD 35-95):
> "With so many teachers and with so many examples has antiquity furnished us that no age can be thought more fortunate in the choice of its birth than our own, for whose instruction men of earlier generations have earnestly labored."

Rangell is among these teachers.

This generosity in attribution, a quality which bursts through in almost every paper, is the mark of the personality whether or not such generosity is extended to him.

He appears to seek no followers, attempts no charisma other than the charisma of ideas, and holds to a credo which serves as a constant, unwavering framework. The cantus firmus, the plainsong, on which all his observations are based, is to be found in the *Core* paper (1967):

> "It is the unconscious rather than the conscious, the intrapsychic rather than the internal-external, and the conflictual rather than the conflict-free and autonomous, which I submit as the analytic focus."

Rangell is rare: he contributes *and* he systematizes. These activities are not commonly under the same tent. Isaiah Berlin based a taxonomy of thinkers on a line from Archilochus: "the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing." The hedgehog relates everything to a single central vision, coherent and articulate, while the fox follows every lead, relevant or not, pursuing many ends. Rangell has chosen a domain, tracked details, and systematically fleshed out a general scheme (classical psychoanalysis) with texture, form, and coherence. The ardent energy and curiosity of the fox covering a wide territory has combined with the constancy, orderliness, and thoroughness of the hedgehog. Impatience, eagerness and passion united with steadiness and sureness of ground.

Perhaps a more elegant comparison is to the Cesar Franck symphony where themes are stated clearly, melodies gathered to them, and then the themes are developed, not varied as in most works, but developed and extended.

Systematization is a prosaic word, but it tells of a powerful motive and of a militant vision. That vision, to systematize his own thought and observations (*Anxiety,* 1955), to unite these in a refreshened Freudian viewpoint (*The Human Core,* 1967), has not taken its most daring turn. In his most recent papers on choice and responsibility, and unconscious choice, Rangell has become Icarus to the more cautious Daedelus who plays it safe. Icarus, as Eddington has said, will "strain his theories to the breaking point till the weak joints gape."

When Leo loses at tennis it is because he reaches out to the ball before it has come to him and because he restlessly wants to move on to the next point before he has finished the last one. Character shapes style, on the court and off. He wants to get on with it.

The administrative posts which he has occupied (twice President of the International, twice President of the American), the honors and awards which have come to him, the service on scholarly journals, his lectures on all the continents where psychoanalysis is practiced (he is our third and portable Institute) have created so signal an impact that, at the 50th reunion of his medical school class, he was given an award, the first ever to a psychoanalyst, never before out of the hands of the "hard" scientists, and given only to five people out of the 60 years of alumni under consideration.

The Medical Alumni Association
The University of Chicago
Medical Alumni Award for
Distinguished Service
in Recognition of Contributions of
Distinction to Medicine and Society
LEO RANGELL, M.D. '37
is Granted this Award on
The Occasion of the Medical Alumni Reunion
11 June 1987

I have said little of those matters about which I have felt most strongly, and perhaps idiosyncratically. His Presidential address on the occasion of Anna Freud's return to Vienna in 1971 and his meetings with the German psychoanalysts in Wiesbaden in 1983 (reported in the *American Psychoanalytic Association Newsletter* 1984) put forward high and uncontrived sentiments; accidents of style have dropped away; Leo is present in every word with moral weight and pivotal magnanimity. Decision is possible; the past need not be prologue.

A LOOK AROUND

by Leo Rangell, M.D.

I thank all the contributors for the nice things they said about me.

The invitation of the Editor, Sam Wilson, to write a piece to wrap up this issue presents me with a challenge and a problem; as always, everything is dichotomous. What to say? Should I keep it light and happy, or "say it as it is"? This implies that "like it is" is not all that positive and friendly — which is the case. I will do both; that is always a good solution, voice some of the problems and also what might shine through positively around them. A number of friends have offered unsolicited advice: "Say what you think — what do you care anymore." I will — to some extent.

Psychoanalysis is at a crossroads — again. But this is a long and deep one. We seem to have chosen a path on the fork, and already traveled some distance on it, which I consider regrettable, if not self-defeating.

To bridge from some of the things I said in the interview to the larger scene, many of the feelings I expressed about the fate of my own contributions to psychoanalytic theory apply equally to the status of psychoanalysis as a whole. Psychoanalysis itself is on the defensive; and I don't think it is always winning.

As a journalist who seeks a handle for a story, let me start with a "fer instance." A patient recently came for a consultation. She received three names locally; mine was added from New York, not from here. She liked me. But what had been said about me by others was "He's world-renowned, and he's such a nice man, but he's heavily Freudian." This was already a good local recommendation; although the word "heavily" was added in this one, perhaps to balance the others. I would not be telling this if it were unusual, but this has become part of "the average expectable [analytic] environment." The patient, pathognomonic of the times, does not want a "Freudian" analysis. I will not go any further about the course of this patient. Her pre-treatment analytic explorations did not help but impeded her path toward conflict resolution. But this clinical instance has wider implications.

It is ironic: while some think I might be one of the most honored of analysts, as the writings in this issue could lead one to believe, I also feel the most isolated. I am writing this not for myself — this would not be necessary on that account — but on behalf of the ideas for which I purportedly stand. It does not take the New York *Times* to point out to patients that Freudian psychoanalysis is no longer practiced or desirable. Analysts declare it.

This article needs to be too short to be detailed; I must limit myself to the strength of some summary observations and opinions. What is called the "mainstream" of psychoanalysis is no longer "main." The names should be changed. The average analyst in Los Angeles today is some variant of a self-object psychoanalyst. To represent or adhere to the line of development thought of as steady mainstream psychoanalysis is considered a deficiency, a burden, not an asset. The analyst most in demand here, a major officer of one of the Societies informs me, is one who has been through another line, from Klein to Bion to Fairbairn, to Kohut, to intersubjectivity.

In presenting a summary on the final day of the Madrid Congress in 1985 on "How analysts work," I cited a clinical presentation, received with popular applause, in which a patient, during a Monday hour, reported his anguish and remorse at having allowed his dog to be run over and killed by a car. The analyst introduced and dealt with weekend separation anxiety and hostile wishes in the transference. There was no mention of a piece of the patient's history in which he blamed himself for a car accident which had maimed his younger brother for life while the patient was baby-sitting for him. In the midst of my inclusive summary of "How analysts work" I posed the question, or made the point, that analysts will one day have to decide whether analysis is reconstructive or interactional.

Exactly fifty years after Strachey's influential paper on the mutative effects of transference interpretations, it needs to be decided whether the experience and understanding of transference is a goal in itself or a means to an end, a way-station to reconstruction of the patient's past. That task still lies ahead. Current trends make it ever more pressing. While in the 50's, insight versus interpersonal transactions was considered a dividing line between psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, the same line of demarcation is today carried within psychoanalysis itself, making for two different definitions of transference and analytic goals. Transference, in the new version, is considered to comprise all interactions between patient and analyst, and the goal of analysis is to interpret and understand these in the immediate present. Perhaps a biopsy of the line of demarcation between the two parallel if not divergent points of view, often cited as the reason to replace insight with empathy, is the automatic reference to interpretations as confrontations, a misunderstanding which goes routinely uncontested.

As usual both approaches, one unified and continuous goal utilizing the two, are necessary. Analysis is an interaction through which reconstruction takes place. It is never a question of diminishing the role of transference, but always

the problem of preserving its recapitulative goal. Current transference experiences are understood in the sense of the original definition of transference, not as comprising every interaction between patient and therapist but those which are displaced from and therefor indicative of the patient's repressed past. These are then utilized in traversing the path from current distorted behavior in the here-and-now to their origins in the patient's past, in order for the analytic goals of reconstruction, insight and resulting autonomy to occur.

In contrast, the central, almost exclusive theme, of scientific meetings, clinical case presentations, reports of meetings in the Bulletins of both Societies, attest to the widespread affective acceptance of the interactional, interpersonal, corrective, empathic experience as the central fulcrum of psychoanalytic, not psychotherapeutic treatment. With this, there never fails to be evident an irritability, sarcasm, or explicit opposition to explorations seeking links to the patient's past.

Yet an opposite stance is maintained and worried about when the Institute seeks control cases for candidates to fulfill the official criteria for analytic qualification, or in other aspects of the relationship of the training institutions to the American. Surprise and concern are then expressed at the continual diminution of the availability of "good" cases. Or "Freudian" analysis acquires good currency again when a Site Visit Committee is expected or imminent.

My relationship to the two local psychoanalytic Societies over the years — not unrelated to these subjects — has been quite different from the conventional and typical one. A person joins a Society and remains a member. My own links to the local groups have had a more variable life. I was part of the original single group as a candidate from 1946. I became a member of the L.A. at the time of the split in 1950. I joined the Southern Cal when I disagreed to a sufficient degree with the L.A. in the seventies. I resigned from the Southern Cal. (this in and out is hardly known). I resigned from the L.A. (this is more remembered). I am now an Honorary Member of both, for which I thank the members of both groups. All of these phases and moves were based on goals, values, and convictions. It is not remembered that I built the bridge between the two Societies. No one realized before this that such a link could exist; neither Society in their original Constitutions had prevented a member from belonging to both. I will not relate at this point some reactions I encountered from both groups at this initial construction. Many have traveled over this bridge since, for reasons other than my original intentions.

All of these moves were made quietly and without public issue. The fact is that I did not want or encourage a "group" around me — not that such was unavailable or not offered. While I may not have done justice to the responsibilities of leadership, I always felt, during the divisive 70's, that "groupness" was largely responsible for the lack of rationality, the unfairness to others, and the over-enthusiasm and heightened promulgation of new

theories and groups. Conversely, I also regarded individuality as the most necessary asset for a psychoanalyst. From early on, I resisted submission to, and later, partnership with charismatic leaders. I feel, on this as on the wider political scene, that charisma is more to be scrutinized than followed.

None of this is said in a spirit of self justification. I lost personally with each move and resignation. Perhaps this unusual course is related to two choices along my personal analytic journey. One was the depth of my immersion in the development of psychoanalytic theory and science. I don't think analysts who are not themselves involved in the hammering out and shaping of theory care as much or are as discriminating in the evaluation and differentiation of theories and their sequelae. A second stream of my own involvement has been the active administrative roles I came to play — the history of these is a separate story, an interesting example of what I consider causes and determinants in life — in furthering the purposes and goals of the large and "total" psychoanalytic Societies at all levels, from local to national to international. Here again, curiously, in organizational life as with theories, it was the whole I was attending to, and leading and representing, and trying to preserve and keep rational, rather than overseeing or participating in the division into parts.

I have lectured in all areas of the world to audiences with different theoretical imprints from their own historical, geographic and individual developments. The differences between us, where the spirit was positive, melted away during those times together in favor of the confluence and commonality of our goals and methods. Not all ideas or practices are miscible. Certain aims and attitudes are. In others, choices need to be made. The analysts in Buenos Aires related entirely sympathetically and with a positive link. There was a receptivity to listen to me as a speaker from our different psychoanalytic culture. This was entirely different from my relationships to the Los Angeles Kleinian or Bionian groups in the 1970s. The origins, spirit, and history of development of each duality was different.

I mentioned that in this brief essay there would also be a positive lining to this cloud of criticism and concern. There are several. One is that the present dichotomy of the analytic world is the current edition of a repetitive phenomenon. Alternative systems have divided the analytic world since the advent of psychoanalysis, characterized always by a period of excitement followed by the continued survival of the essence of the psychoanalytic method and goal. Another reassuring thought is that analysts, however trained, often find the enduring line and adhere to it intellectually and even practically in the same way as inexact interpretations work with patients. These may lead in both cases to more exact self-provided unconscious interpretations and insights, from which the unconscious ego continues what was set in motion in the right direction, if not on target.

Still another comforting observation is that some analysts use correct and useful formulations which they may have consciously disavowed. Thus, many

who discard the structural view speak of and aim for structural change. Or adjust themselves to an equidistant stance between psychic systems even though they are not at home with the concept of systems. I feel that similarly many who depreciate reconstruction and insight strive for these, some probably consistently and well. A compelling analytic line of thought may be discovered or rediscovered by students and young analysts, led to this by willing and needful patients. Such paths to continuing self education can keep alive the essence of psychoanalysis as inducing an introspective procedure toward altering intrapsychic functioning.

However, I do have the concern that, just as in individual ontogenetic development original imprints carry the most formative weight, students in psychoanalytic training are affectively imprinted with the theories, personalities and gestalts of their training milieus. Such generations of later analysts do not always listen with receptive affectivity to the cumulative experiences and theoretical achievements of the past. Waelder has said that progress has as many victims as beneficiaries. This applies to psychoanalytic progress and development as to all others.

The original affective and cognitive theoretical imprints, or indoctrination, are difficult to dislodge. A number of Jungian analysts attended my mixed analytic seminars in Langley-Porter which I conducted over a period of years. They listened and participated well; they, of course, retained their ingrained Jungian positions, while feeling, to their satisfaction and relief, that they were in basic agreement not only with my methods but my theories behind them. The same now happens often, in certain milieus, with committed self and object-relations analysts. This trend makes friends, and keeps analysts together, and perhaps even helps what some analysts do in practice, but does not necessarily enhance or clarify understanding.

In a Visiting Analyst's Colloquium I conducted recently with the candidates of the San Francisco Institute, responding to a request, I offered them several pieces of overall "advice." One was to remain "an individual within the group." Both modes of functioning, social and individual, are necessary in life and as a functioning psychoanalyst. But to hold on to autonomy and independent thinking, and counter the "adhesiveness of the libido" which makes analysis interminable and group behavior regressive, was advised as a high priority and goal. A second was to listen to patients as much as to peers or to leaders. A third dictum I laid down before them was to retain a link to the past, to what has been amassed and passed on. Seek out oral and other histories, I admonished them, from whichever "oldies" still remain who are knowledgeable of and willing and still able to provide them. Their loss could lead to a discontinuity of history. A valuable link to inspiration may be severed.

I have been moved to write in many places of the relationship between individuality and groupness, particularly in the development and practice of a psychoanalyst. Following my work on the Watergate years, focusing

especially on the conduct of "the men under Nixon," I delivered the Waelder Lecture in Philadelphia on the subject of "Man in a Group." Bion has also written on irrational group processes. Creativity, in psychoanalysis as elsewhere, comes from individuals, not groups. One does not see a Statue to a Committee. The Society can preserve and advance acquired knowledge, or further its demise.

There can be leadership and influence without the negative effects of group psychology. Analysts originally responded to the charisma of ideas rather than of personality. Freud influenced society and the world not by personal charisma but by the power of his ideas. A piece of introspection and self-insight occurs to me, even to my surprise, as I find myself writing this, which I would like to share with you. If I were to choose the leader-model who perhaps most influenced my own psychoanalytic thinking, it would be Otto Fenichel. Not by knowing him, but his ideas, his body of work. I had read, and gotten the spirit, of his book and his thinking. Not unrelatedly, he was known as "the great synthesizer." Treatment for him was also through the rational ego. I actually met Fenichel, once, for a few days, during my Army period (this is again a story, not for now). He was a stimulus for my settling in Los Angeles after the war. We made arrangements about my continuing training with him. Fenichel died, however, before I came here. Possibly his influence for me remained different than if I had been in a group around him. Others I met here later, associatively linked to him, would have made for a different but not necessarily better growth experience.

All I have said applies equally to both local groups. I have as many areas of agreement and difference with one as the other. I would have said something here about what I think of "The Big Split" of almost 40 years ago, more specifically what the subsequent years say about the split of that time. But again not for now — I hope not for never. The two Societies are, in my opinion, not separated today for psychoanalytic reasons. Both share the same common ground, and more or less the same pointers toward the future.

What will be that future? I am now continuing the interview, and asking my own questions. I have some answers in my head, but I must break this off somewhere. Some other time. I am actually writing about this in another paper. I thank and send warm greetings to my analytic colleagues and friends.

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I cannot leave this without taking note of a sad event which took place during the preparation of this issue of the *Bulletin*. A first and personal contribution to it was made by Helen Tausend, my close friend and colleague during my entire 42 years in Los Angeles. Helen asked a number of times when the issue was coming out. She wanted to see it all in print. She never made it. Helen took ill in October of 1987 and died on New Year's Day of this year. Whatever is good about what has been written here I would like to dedicate to Helen's memory.